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This thesis argues that philosophy is a conceptual discipline. Prima facie, this is an intuitive point. 
It may even seem obvious that philosophy is not a science, which we might (crudely) think deals 
with nature more than concepts; or that it is not a form of mathematics, which, say, deals with 
mathematical relationships between numbers. For philosophy has no interest in testing and 
prediction,1 and try as they might, philosophers struggle to eradicate their problems by deductive 
calculation. For an example case, consider contemporary epistemology’s foundational problem. 
How does anyone know that the world external to themselves really exists—at least, exists outside 
of their perceptions? 
One of the reasons Descartes, in his Meditations (1641), made this issue so compelling is that he 
systematically stripped us of the typical ways of answering empirical and even mathematical 
questions. That was the point of methodological scepticism: were we to justify belief in the outside 
world by appeal to seeing trees and birds, feeling the wind, and smelling the ocean, Descartes 
would simply reply, “But can you place absolute faith in these perceptions? Have they not been 
wrong before?” Of course they have, as when we mistake tress for people in the distance, even 
though our senses are generally reliable. Consequently, we can find ourselves wondering (at 
Descartes’s urging) whether we can ever be certain that the world outside of perception exists. 
Given that the route to this predicament was, in a sense, reflective, it should strike us as perfectly 
natural to surmise that overcoming the problem involves some reflective exercise too—a 
meditation, perhaps, in Descartes’s sense. Thus, we come to one way in which to characterise the 
philosophical task before us: we must use our reasoning faculties to solve the problem, somewhat 
perhaps as Euclidean geometers or arithmeticians do, although with much less precise tools and 
under a constant, scrutinising gaze. 
Descartes’s adopted mode of (apparently) universal doubt—a doubt of everything that is not 
absolutely certain—is representative of philosophical problematics more generally. To be sure, 
philosophy does not always subject its readers to that same standard of doubt, but it commonly 
has that flavour: a feeling that tried and tested empirical methods are of no use to solving 
distinctively philosophical conundrums. That is expected, for we did not encounter the sceptical 
problem above as we might discover some curious empirical phenomenon; we did not encounter 
some object, some living being, or some seeming force and wonder what its nature could be, how 
it came into existence, how it manages to survive, or what else it affects. And so perhaps 
                                                 




philosophy’s characteristic puzzles may not be forthcoming of themselves. Even at their first 
showing, some effort is required on the part of the philosophical audience to engage with what is 
supposed to be puzzling. Indeed, the philosophy reader frequently finds herself as though 
watching a fictional film, where suspending disbelief is partly constitutive of the aesthetic 
experience. But unlike film, having ruminated on some strange or disconcerting series of thoughts 
presented to her on philosophy’s screen, the reader is easily led down paths that trouble her as a 
rational creature, for time to come.2  
Central debates in “metaphilosophy”, or the philosophy of philosophy, concern exactly how to 
characterise all this: what philosophical puzzles really are, what philosophers do to solve them, and 
whether the route to solution is relevantly similar to the methods of other disciplines, such as (any 
of) the natural sciences, or mathematics. In this introduction, I will sketch two very different ways 
of conceiving philosophy’s approach (and what it approaches). To survey the field in this respect, 
we could look at those who work explicitly in some circumscribed sub-discipline of philosophy 
that philosophises about itself. But although such an area (metaphilosophy) does now have some 
distinguishable contours, philosophy has always been a self-reflective enterprise.3 At minimum, 
throughout many moments of its history, philosophy’s practitioners have felt it apt not only to 
argue about some specified topics but to argue the method used in the process. Appropriately, 
then, given the sceptical opening, to find out philosophy’s conception of itself we shall look at 
answers to the question of what knowledge is. 
A. J. Ayer’s classic response to the so-called problem of knowledge (1956)—i.e., how 
knowledge is possible—begins its opening chapter with a section titled “The method of 
philosophy” (1956, 7). Ayer asks himself what it is that philosophers are trying to discover when 
they pose questions such as “What is mind?” or “What is the nature of belief?”. In response, he 
suggests part of the answer: “already knowing the use of certain expressions, [philosophers] are 
seeking to give an analysis of their meaning” (1956, 8). That is, anyone approaching the question 
about belief likely has a sufficient grasp of how “to believe” is correctly used in an indefinite 
number of circumstances. And while this may be prerequisite to answering such a question (1956, 
9), a philosopher is responding to an abstract enquiry—What is belief? In this exercise, Ayer thinks, 
                                                 
2 I am not being unkind to film: here, the thought-provoking aspect of films is not the analogous element. 
We suspend disbelief in the reality of films, much as we (if receptive) suspend disbelief in the urgency of a 
philosophical problem. 
3 Cf. Williamson (2007, ix): “The philosophy of philosophy is automatically part of philosophy, just as the 




concrete uses do not of themselves suggest an answer.4 Even so, he argues, philosophers ought to 
survey the different uses of the words (which signify the topics) they are interested in. So, on Ayer’s 
account, we should investigate whether we have one kind of phenomenon in view when a person 
says “I believe...” in different ways, and should fairly conclude that we do not. (Compare “I believe 
in you” with “I believe the Earth is flat”.5) And then when we pose ourselves questions about 
belief—say, whether it is possible to believe something false, or something inconceivable, like two 
and two’s making five—we then must begin by appeal to the ordinary concrete uses of relevant 
terms: 
The argument therefore depends upon certain considerations of language; in the 
present instance, upon the ways in which we use, or propose to use, the verb “to know”. 
But this does not mean that it is an argument about words, in any trivial sense, or that 
it is especially tied to the English language. We are concerned with the work that the 
word “know” does, not with the fact that it is this particular word that does it. (Ayer 
1956, 28) 
Ayer’s example is about knowledge, not belief, but the general point applies: language is to be seen 
as an entry point, and something of a litmus test, for philosophical enquiry. Speakers may use 
different languages but share a tendency to use certain words in similar ways, which makes 
translation possible; in Ayer’s view, then, there is something that extends beyond the surface-level 
use of words: “For our enquiry into the use of words can equally be regarded as an enquiry into 
the nature of the facts which they describe” (1956, 29). 
Now, in the course of this enquiry into the nature of some facts via the use of language, we are 
bound to come upon stubborn collisions in the way of our reasoning. For example, we grant that 
one can believe something false, and that two and two’s making five is false; that implies we can 
believe that two and two add up to five. But it seems as though anyone who believes that two and 
two make five has not understood “two”, “plus”, and “five”. (Further, is understanding a 
proposition not normally a precondition for believing it?) These are not Ayer’s puzzles, but they 
are typical philosophical puzzles. Ayer’s problem is that of how we can ever know, post-Descartes, 
that something is the case. Starting with the uses of words, Ayer narrows his focus by imagining 
                                                 
4 Cf. Wittgenstein (1953, §§89–90) and Ryle (1962, 454) for some connected thoughts, even though, as 
Sandis shows (2010), Ayer’s approach to concepts is ultimately very different. 
5 As will become clear in this thesis, even here the comparison is superficially simple. “I believe in you” 
may be words of encouragement; a signal of trust to deliver on promises (as a loyal voter may say, “I believe 
in Trump!”); or an uncertain mix of both. Similar subtleties are available for “I believe the Earth is flat”, on 




characters in different scenarios with claims to know that something is the case. We are invited to 
judge whether or not they really do know—whether or not the subject’s use of “to know” is 
legitimate. The answer he winds the reader towards is that a subject knows that something is the 
case if, and only if, what she knows is true and she is entitled to be sure that it is (1956, 35). 
What has Ayer achieved here? (Historically, not much, since the subsequently termed 
“tripartite” account of knowledge is infamously open to objection.6) In setting out philosophy’s 
methodology, Ayer advocates a prime place for looking at language. But his stated interest is in 
what the troublesome words and statements mean, which he separates in principle from the 
application of language (1956, 35). Moreover, philosophy’s investigation into uses of “knows that” 
and what we ought to say about them in different scenarios yields, in Ayer’s view, an analysis of 
knowledge itself. Hence why his very first sentence is that philosophy’s methods distinguish it 
from “other arts and sciences”, not its subject-matter (1956, 1). 
Over time, Ayer’s above perspectives have become somewhat dated. In epistemology, the 
tripartite account of knowledge (frequently referred to as a “justified true belief” definition) is 
somewhat still in business, though perpetually vulnerable to counterexample, while many, such as 
Timothy Williamson (2000), regard knowledge as unanalysable, taking it instead as a primitive 
notion. But it is not only Ayer’s epistemology which fell out of fashion: the idea that philosophy 
should investigate language—whether or not as a way of investigating the world—is itself heavily 
criticised in certain mainstream corners. Indeed, the philosopher to whom most of my arguments 
in this thesis are directed, Williamson, recently argued that “few philosophical questions are 
conceptual questions in any distinctive sense” (2007, 3). Williamson’s position, accordingly, 
directly contradicts Ayer’s, since Ayer can say that philosophy has to start with uses of words in a 
range of circumstances, which provides a distinctive sense in which philosophical questions are 
conceptual.7 
Williamson’s methodological perspective is well represented among the naturalists of 
epistemology—for example, take Hilary Kornblith’s Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002): 
The idea that philosophy consists in, or, at a minimum, must begin with an 
understanding and investigation of our concepts is, I believe, both natural and very 
attractive. It is also, I believe, deeply mistaken. On my view, the subject matter of ethics 
                                                 
6 Perhaps Ayer’s account is more nuanced than many typical tripartite accounts, however, for Ayer treats 
the right to be sure of something as relative to context—i.e., that different contexts provide different 
standards for being warranted to hold a belief—and this anticipates a major trend of epistemology, so-
called contextualism. 
7 Ayer is more direct—and less cautious—about the matter in his youthful work (1936, 44). See my Ch. 1, 




is the right and the good, not our concepts of them. The subject matter of philosophy 
of mind is the mind itself, not our concept of it. And the subject matter of epistemology 
is knowledge itself, not our concept of knowledge. In this book, I attempt to explain 
what knowledge is. (Kornblith 2002, 2) 
The evident clash here, between Ayer’s kind of perspective and Williamson’s and Kornblith’s 
(which do not taken together provide an exhaustive range) over how to understand philosophy 
itself is the main topic of this thesis. I am arguing that philosophy is a conceptual discipline: that 
its methods are distinctively conceptual, as Williamson would put it. And even if my view of the 
matter is, as Kornblith concedes, natural and attractive, it is by no means any longer uniformly 
accepted (as it largely would have been in the anglophone philosophy departments of Ayer’s 
heyday).  
Beyond epistemology, Williamson’s vision of philosophy, including his critique of conceptual 
methods, is, I suggest, relatively influential. Consider Gillian Russell’s esteem in a review of The 
Philosophy of Philosophy: 
one thing that I ought to say about this book at the outset is that it is written by someone 
well-informed and well-qualified for the task, someone with an awareness of the history 
of his subject, for the different options that are already out there, and for recent 
developments that have made some of those old options seem untenable. This is a book 
on the philosophy of philosophy written by someone who is good at philosophy. (G. 
Russell 2010, 40)8 
However, opposing this, there is a trend of work which argues broadly in favour of understanding 
philosophy as a conceptual discipline. Notably, Frank Jackson (1998) defends a reductive kind of 
conceptual analysis (in Ayer’s fashion), and Paul Boghossian (1997) defends an analyticity account 
of conceptual grasp. More recently, others have defended armchair philosophy (Levin 2009; 
Cappelen 2012) and an ordinary language approach (Sandis 2010; Baz 2012b) from criticisms 
found in the work of experimental philosophers such as Weinberg et al. (2001) and Knobe and 
Nichols (2007). More current still is Boghossian’s (2011) response to Williamson (2007). 
Boghossian is responsible, in earlier work, for setting up the narrative of metaphilosophy as a 
debate over analytic truth (about which more below). It is within this latter dialectic that the present 
                                                 
8 Others, such as Hacker (2009) and A. W. Moore (2009), have been less complimentary about Williamson’s 




thesis participates, while offering a defence and articulation of a methodology similar in large part 
to that of Gilbert Ryle and later Ludwig Wittgenstein.9 
In my view, Ryle and Wittgenstein have been poorly understood over time and are frequently 
mischaracterised in straw man attacks, as is acknowledged also by, e.g., P. M. S. Hacker (2009) and 
Constantine Sandis (2010, 2011). The metaphilosophy literature does contain defences of their 
methodology, or a related one, which sometimes gets called “Ordinary Language Philosophy” or 
“Oxford Linguistic Philosophy” (sometimes Wittgenstein is felt to operate by different methods 
to the Oxford philosophers). In this vein are books by Oswald Hanfling (2000) or more recently 
Avner Baz (2012a), who focuses on Wittgenstein and Austin, and also criticises Williamson, inter 
alia. There is some crossover with my arguments here, but it is questionable to what extent the 
work of either, which is invaluable and insightful, is taken on board by figures such as Williamson.  
One reason, I believe, is the dominance of the following argument, a version of which also 
features in Williamson (2007, 48–54):  
1. To say philosophy is a conceptual discipline means that philosophy is centrally 
concerned with conceptual truth. 
2. Conceptual truth just means analytic truth. 
3. The idea of analytic truth is either incoherent, useless, or somehow defective. 
And so, 
4. Philosophy is not a conceptual discipline. 
There is good evidence to suggest that many contemporary analytic philosophers believe (2).10 
Notably, Boghossian (1997) accepts (2), which is no surprise, since to some extent he initiated this 
recent trend to use analyticity as an explanation of a priori philosophical investigation. As will 
become clear, with qualifications concerning what conception of analyticity we have in mind, I too 
accept a version of (2). Further, in my view, (1) is a roughly correct articulation of the matter. 
However, I also think that (3) is false; that is, we can explain the idea of analytic truth in a way that 
is useful and coherent. And when that point is conceded, the argument above is halted in its tracks. 
Indeed, I hope to show the opposite conclusion; i.e., philosophy is a conceptual discipline. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that the only way of explaining what putatively analytic sentences 
are is to understand them as conceptual truths; specifically, they are norms enjoining the proper 
application of concepts in a range of circumstances. But clearly, before that argument can be made, 
we must have some grasp of analyticity, or the analytic-synthetic distinction. That is the point of 
                                                 
9 For a worked-out attempt to group Ryle and Wittgenstein together, in their approach and their arguments, 
see Tanney (2013). Also see Hacker (1996, 168–72). 
10 See the comments section of Brian Leiter’s blog entry, (‘Peter Hacker Did Not like Timothy Williamson’s 




my opening chapter, which discusses the history of the concept and how it has been variously 
employed. I will say a brief word about the distinction here first, however, to orient the reader, 
before overviewing the subsequent chapters. 
A textbook statement of the analytic-synthetic distinction, while ultimately misleading, is as 
follows: analytic sentences are those which are true solely by virtue of what their component words 
mean; synthetic sentences are true not only on account of their components’ meaning but also on 
account of facts about how things are. Take the (putatively analytic) sentence, “Adults are grown-
ups”.11 Plausibly, it is true because what it is to be an adult is to be a grown-up. And so it would 
seem strange to say that one ever encounters this claim as a “fact”: one does not survey adults to 
find out whether or not they are also grown-up, and then infer the truth or likelihood of the claim. 
There is thus a prima facie difference between such a sentence and the (putatively synthetic) 
“Adults are disillusioned”, the truth of which one could not hope to ascertain purely by knowing 
the meaning of its constituent words (and where a survey, if necessary, might help—or might not, 
but for a much different reason than in the “grown-ups” case). 
Now, given such trivial examples, we really ought to wonder whether the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, seemingly so pedestrian, could underpin something as grand as the conceptual nature 
of philosophical enquiry. Chapter 1 shows in fact that the notion of analyticity has been used in 
attempts to provide just such a foundation, by thinkers as diverse as Leibniz, Kant, Frege, and 
Carnap. But, following W. V. O. Quine’s infamous attacks on analyticity (1951, 1962), in which he 
characterises the notion as an empty article of faith, many today simply view the analytic-synthetic 
distinction as untenable (i.e., premise (3) above). Now, it is not news to anyone that Quine had 
Rudolf Carnap’s conception(s) in his sights during his critique. But a key point of Chapter 1 is to 
show that the different conceptions of analyticity employed throughout history are not all 
equivalent. Indeed, as I show, philosophers set out varying and overlapping criteria for analyticity, 
putting the notion to work in sometimes rather different projects. Accordingly, the history helps 
us realise that there is not “a” conception of analyticity—uniform, ahistorical, and easily 
understood. This is crucial, for it means that criticism of one conception need not carry over to 
another; not without some work, at any rate. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that we can and should make sense of the idea that conceptual 
truths are analytic by considering a workable conception. Specifically, in my view, an analytic 
sentence is one which expresses a norm. Take, e.g., “Adults are grown-ups”. In the context of its 
                                                 
11 I use this example instead of the dry, industry-standard “Bachelors are unmarried men”, as an homage 





normative use, this should be understood as permitting us to re-describe adults as “grown-ups” 
(and not, say, as “toddlers”). On this understanding of “analytic”, analytic sentences are not “made 
true” by the world (or reality, or “how things are”, etc.), because they are not made true at all. (Though 
they are, as I argue in Ch. 3, §3.1, “true” on a qualified understanding of what truth in such cases 
amounts to.)  
Chapter 2’s focal point is Boghossian’s work on analyticity, in which, effectively, he claims that 
all sentences are made true by the world, or by the facts. Despite this concession to analyticity’s 
typical critics, Boghossian tries to defend the distinction anew by coining a so-called 
epistemological conception of analyticity. The epistemological conception holds that knowledge 
of an analytic sentence’s truth requires only knowledge of its meaning, and not knowledge of how 
things are. His purpose is to show that if some sentences are epistemically analytic in such a 
fashion, then we can explain some a priori truths, such as those of logic; i.e., we could show that 
they are knowable purely by virtue of meaning. Against Boghossian, I highlight his fatal 
presupposition that every declarative sentence is descriptive, whether or not normative. To show 
why it is fatal, I explore a famed Wittgensteinian example (1953, §50). The upshot of this is that 
without the presupposition, there is no support for Boghossian’s pivotal claim that analytic 
sentences are true by virtue of describing facts.  
In the course of Chapter 2’s arguments, a larger purpose emerges. It becomes clear that one 
reason we may be tempted to think sentences expressing norms are actually descriptive is because 
in practice normativity is a diffuse phenomenon: norms stretch out, their authority fades, and they 
rule over distinct jurisdictions. Accordingly, we can readily conceive in many cases how what is 
now normative may soon not be, tempting us to think that any given norm is really a description, 
since what sentences describe need not be the case. Appreciating the diffuseness and context-
sensitivity of norms in turn offers up a sturdy platform to criticise Williamson in the following 
chapter. 
Chapter 3’s central argument is motivated by Williamson’s agreement with Boghossian that no 
sentence could be made true by its meaning alone. For, like Boghossian, Williamson also 
presupposes that sentences which function in practice as rules simultaneously function as 
descriptions of what is the case. I trace the influence of this false presupposition to problems with 
Williamson’s own criticisms of analyticity, including how he mischaracterises conceptual truth as 
providing, putatively, a different “sense” of truth. Moreover, I argue that Williamson’s attack on 
the epistemic aspect of analytic sentences—i.e., that in knowing them, we are justified solely by 




treat some sentences as uniquely normative, Williamson simply cannot explain how linguistic 
misunderstanding—or understanding—between speakers is possible.  
Up to the present point of the thesis, my argument has a dual positive and negative character. 
Predominantly, Chapters 2 and 3 argue against contemporary positions, by simultaneously 
invoking and arguing for the normativity of analytic truth. But the following chapter takes a more 
positive approach still. 
In Chapter 4, I present an equally pressing reason to conclude that some sentences express 
norms and not descriptions: analytic truth, I show, is a precondition for the possibility of synthetic, 
or empirical, truth. That is, it is impossible to describe the world without a background network 
of norms enjoining what count as legitimate descriptions. This point is not obvious to some, partly 
because critiques of the analytic-synthetic distinction often misconstrue syntheticity (empirical 
description) as much as analyticity. Indeed, I argue, with Donald Davidson and John McDowell, 
that Quine’s way of looking at empirical description, evident in his arguments against analyticity, 
obscures the possibility for our claims about the world to be justified by it (or, if not our claims, 
given Quine’s holism, then the whole of language or theory). Worse, since Quine’s picture of the 
relationship between language and the world is shared by many others, without a coherent 
alternative to this picture, all truth (not just analytic truth) teeters precariously on the cliff-edge.  
To resolve this anxiety, I recite McDowell’s (1994) argument that our experience justifies 
descriptions of the world only because our experience itself is, in an important sense, mediated by 
concepts. Put another way, McDowell shows us that we must possess concepts in order to 
experience the world in its conceptually fine-grained nature. And this concept-possession 
ultimately makes the world accessible to us in experience as the sort of thing we can believe and 
be justified about. Finally, then, the takeaway message from Chapter 4 is that normative practices, 
in which we learn analytic truths, are what endow us with this ability to experience and thus 
describe the world truly or falsely. That is why analytic sentences condition the possibility of 
synthetic ones.  
Chapter 5—the final chapter—presents a prima facie worrying argument, which, if sound, 
would show the direction of this thesis to be misguided. Let me summarise my line of thought to 
this point, then, so as to make the threat more vivid. In the foregoing chapters, I have defended 
the idea that some truths (the analytic ones) are conceptual in nature; they are norms, I have said, 
grounded in practice. Moreover, these norms that partly constitute meaning, or conceptual 
content, are often implicit practical principles that language users develop and adhere to over time, 




one is warranted to use a word in a particular way, and a shifting but sturdy backdrop of norms 
(somewhat like chainmail) makes it possible to describe the world truly at all.  
The challenge to this whole dialectic is encapsulated by arguments Mark Wilson makes in his 
book Wandering Significance (2006). After investigating concept-use and conceptual change across a 
broad range of disciplines, Wilson suggests our grasp of concepts is much worse than we think it 
is—that in important cases, what our concepts in fact signify strays far from what norms enjoining 
their correct application will ever tell us. Accordingly, Wilson makes it seem as though the 
normative backdrop I keep appealing to plays no determinative role for conceptual content; rather, 
“Nature” forces change and our norms are always a step behind.  
In Chapter 5, I respond to Wilson by drawing on my former characterisations of normativity: 
conceptual norms, I remind again, subtly vary with circumstance, and enjoy a diffuse, changing 
authority. The problems which Wilson sets out should only worry someone with a simplistic or 
idealised picture of normativity, according to which norms stubbornly refuse to change. 
Furthermore, I show that the other drivers of conceptual change on which Wilson focuses, such 
as the obstacles metallurgists face in applying the predicate “is hard” to a range of materials, not 
only fail to undermine the constitutive role of norms, they exemplify that role. Consequently, the 
wandering concept-uses which Wilson charts for concepts such as “red”, “hard”, and “weighs”—
which previously seemed to threaten my view—provide a fantastic case in point of how normative 
conceptual know-how responds to shifting circumstances. Building on Chapter 4, what this 
demonstrates is that norms—analytic truths—adapt and begin to condition ever new ways of 
describing the world, in tandem even with empirical investigation. 
So much concludes my overview of this thesis, having highlighted the key narrative points in a 
story about analyticity. But none of it will seem especially relevant or pressing if we do not first 
have some appreciation of why the analytic-synthetic distinction was coined to begin with, and 










Conceptions of analyticity  
One purpose of this chapter is to show how the notion of analyticity, or the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, has transmuted throughout history. However, I want to show not just its prevalence 
throughout the past, but its significance. It is no coincidence that philosophers as diverse as Kant, 
Frege, and Carnap structured their philosophical projects around a distinction between, on the one 
hand, sentences, propositions, or judgements which are termed “analytic” and those, on the other, 
which are termed “synthetic”. This division of truths is fundamental to each of their philosophical 
aims. Further, a prima facie similar distinction can be found in Hume’s later work, while Leibniz, 
before him, may well have fathered the idea of analyticity in certain of its most well-known 
respects.  
It will be helpful here to give a broad strokes definition of the distinction to find our footing. 
Recall the examples from the introduction: a sentence such as “(All) adults are grown-ups” is 
considered true by virtue of its meaning alone, while “(All) adults are disillusioned” is considered 
true, if true, by virtue not only of meaning, but also the facts. We must not, however, think this a 
fair or settled way of drawing the distinction, because over and above the significance of the 
distinction, I also want to stress its diversity. Rarely will any definitions that we consider in this 
chapter be the same. Frege, for instance, most clearly characterises his distinction via an 
epistemological criterion. By contrast, the notion which Quine attacks specifies a semantical 
condition for analytic statements. Again, Kant’s distinction is conceptual, or perhaps logical. With 
respect to the difference between conceptions of analyticity, however, we will also come to see 
that the different points of emphasis come about precisely because of the work the conceptions 
are employed to do within specific philosophical projects—however we come to think of those 
projects decades or centuries on. 
I take myself to be offering at first a modest claim in this chapter by arguing that conceptions 
of analyticity take on particular imprints because of how they are employed. Shortly, we will survey 
a whole variety of conceptions, most of which are peculiar to particular philosophers, and which 
exhibit the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, and logical characteristics they do because 
they are embedded in particular philosophical projects. It is a stronger claim, which I also endorse, 
that it is folly to assess the merits of a given notion of analyticity apart from the system or project 
in which it figures. Indeed, we should be wary of abstracting an analytic-synthetic distinction from 
a thinker’s project, at least insofar as that leads us to think that there exists a uniform or simple 




distinction played out in other projects, and second to leave ourselves open to criticism when 
employing it (or criticising it) in our own. For such a distinction does not exist in a vacuum. Kant’s 
notion of the synthetic a priori may well be rejected by most of modern-day analytic philosophy, 
but one wonders how fair the dismissal is if it fails first to get to grips with his notions of intuition, 
concept, synthesis, and so forth, which provide it with its special utility. (It may or may not be fair 
to avoid consideration of the synthetic a priori because of the extra cognitive effort required to 
understand Kant’s critical project, but that is another matter altogether.) 
It is a stronger claim still, which I am not endorsing, that the only way to understand the 
analytic-synthetic distinction is by a near-full awareness of the projects in which it is embedded. 
That is, one can stress the diversity too much. We should recognise that the different 
characterisations of analyticity are a matter of emphasis, for there is something intuitive in the 
distinction to begin with, which normally remains in different articulations. Supposing that 
English-speakers at random were asked whether they could be sure that adults were grown 
children, whether they ought to check, I should think they would either suspect a joke was at hand 
or would get rather frustrated with their questioner. The underlying feeling might be that this 
question is pointless, that it is fundamentally unlike the question, say, whether adults are 
disillusioned. I do not think that the technical formulations of different philosophers ever stray 
that far from something with this much common currency, and so a partial grasp of their 
formulations is achieved with a partial or minimal grasp of their projects.  
In light of the resemblance across the different notions to something possibly already latent 
within our linguistic practices, a pertinent question arises: do technical formulations of the 
distinction offer anything over and above the commonplace? Can any important philosophical 
work be done by means of them? Well, what is clear, at least, is that great philosophers have made 
use of the distinction in order to articulate their vision of philosophy—what it does and what its 
limits are. Indeed, some critics, such as Quine and Williamson, think that by discarding the 
distinction we can show that philosophy is not a clearly delimited separate field of enquiry to the 
natural sciences, but is part and parcel of a broadly empirical system of knowledge (albeit, as a 
more abstract, theoretical component than, say, biology). In my own way, I agree that philosophy’s 
status as a distinctively conceptual mode of enquiry turns on whether we can make sense of the 
idea that some propositions are true not because they describe some part of empirical reality but 
because they reflect something affirmative about our conceptual schemes. What I think is the right 
gloss on this basic idea, however, is something I offer in the next two chapters. 
In sum, then, this chapter serves a number of purposes: it stresses the historical prevalence, 




morphs to meet the demands of unique philosophical projects; and it offers a glimpse of how 
philosophy’s status, in a broader system of enquiry, is related to whether or not the distinction is 
intelligible and useful. A further, and final, reason for this historical overview is to anticipate, 
critically, a contemporary discussion in the next chapter. We will there see that Paul Boghossian 
(1996/1997) claims to have carved analyticity into distinct general conceptions: metaphysical and 
epistemological. He wants to be rid of the former, subject as it is (he thinks) to Quinean-style 
criticisms, and embrace the latter, in order to explain the epistemology of logic. It will become 
increasingly apparent, however, that his attempt fails at the outset: the analytic-synthetic distinction 
has been cast in a number of ways, which underline varying aspects—here epistemological, there 
logical, and so on. But it is highly questionable whether any distinction discussed in this chapter 
can be framed in the “epistemological only” way to which Boghossian aspires. Indeed, next 
chapter, we see how this attempt is importantly misguided. 
At present, however, we must get back to the roots. 
 
§1 History: Leibniz, Hume, and Kant 
We begin the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction with Gottfried Leibniz, but the contrast 
between the analytic and the synthetic certainly predates him. The ancient Greeks, in the manner 
of Euclid, employed methods of analysis and synthesis within geometry. Working back from some 
given, presumed end-point, analysis would proceed to uncover prior principles; synthesis, in 
reverse, could demonstrate that sought-after conclusion from such first principles. This 
conception of analysis was thus regressive, contrasting with other conceptions also home to that 
era—e.g., the decompositional or definitional method of breaking down a complex into simpler 
constituents; or the transformative method, which turned the analysandum into a new form, such 
as algebraic expression (see Beaney (2016, §2), for a greater summary of these points). Even in its 
beginnings, then, there was not an especially settled view as to what analysis and synthesis really 
amount to, and that ambiguity will persist.  
Let us consider an example from the Early Modern era. Marin Mersenne had suggested to 
Descartes12 that the argument of his Meditations would benefit from a geometrical layout, according 
to which terms are first defined, then axioms provided, and theorems derived. Descartes, in 
response, distinguished between two modes of demonstration, analytic and synthetic. Descartes 
gave the name “synthesis” to Mersenne’s suggested presentation, which he tentatively labelled a 
                                                 
12 Mersenne organised the second set of objections from which this point is taken, and is normally taken 




posteriori; and he described “analysis” as “the true way by which a thing has been discovered 
methodically, and, as it were, ‘a priori’ ” (1641, 92). Yet, Beaney has argued (2016, §4), Descartes’s 
descriptions of his philosophical methodology show he was actually committed more to a 
decompositional-compositional model of analysis and synthesis than the regressive-progressive 
kind suggested by his appeal to Euclidean geometry. 
Either way, Descartes’s distinction is perhaps unclear to the modern ear. And that is 
complicated by the fact that at the turn of the nineteenth century, as we will see in §2, the deductive 
nature of Descartes’s synthetic method will conversely become characteristic of a priori, analytic 
definition (which is also transformational, for its employment of a logical language). We can already 
see the fluidity of these distinctions, then, and how they can be dependent for their meaning upon 
philosophical traditions. Given this, what justifies starting at any given historical point, and not 
further back; why Leibniz and not, say, Descartes? Indeed, Leibniz did not discuss truth within 
the framework of an explicit analytic-synthetic distinction, so it is not obvious that we should begin 
a history of that distinction with his work. Nonetheless, there are reasons to start the ball rolling 
from Leibniz’s vantage point, which I will attend to presently. 
First, what Leibniz does say about different kinds of truth is without doubt suggestive of later 
formulations of the distinction, and much more so than Descartes’s. Second, commentators are 
not shy of attributing some such distinction to him anyway (e.g., see Fitch 2008; Hanfling 1981, 
76; Rescher 2011), especially since Leibniz did recommend a process of analysis to uncover truth, 
and not just to demonstrate what has previously been discovered, in Descartes’s manner. And 
third, although perhaps it can fairly be said the distinction as applied to judgements was first Kant’s 
(cf. Anderson 2015, n.8), Leibniz’s separate distinction between “truths of reason” and “truths of 
fact” looks prima facie like an incipient version of it. 
In the following subsection, however, I remain ambivalent on attributing to Leibniz a proper 
analytic-synthetic distinction. For it would be a misleading anachronism to find, in the service of 
understanding Leibniz’s philosophical system, an analytic-synthetic distinction in Leibniz; aspects of 
Leibniz’s philosophy proscribe anything like syntheticity or empirical truth as such, 
notwithstanding his later notion of “truths of fact”, which is still in a sense on the “analytic” side. 
Moreover, as we will see, if we must decide on the matter, the formulation of analyticity most 
naturally attributable to Leibniz has different consequences when applied to, say, Kant. We will 
see that Kant’s conception of analyticity is certainly inspired by Leibniz’s work, but it is in a sense 
a rejection of the remit of Leibniz’s analyticity. If nothing else, then, Leibniz provides a useful 
contrast case—more useful than Descartes, say—for the conceptions of analyticity covered in the 






Leibniz constructed an impressive philosophical system, in spite of never expressing it in one 
major corpus of work. As such, readers are confronted by a vast number of writings, including his 
essays and letters; this presents some interpretive difficulties in general, as it does for me insofar 
as my own aim here is to embed his views on truth within a wider project. Nonetheless, such was 
the systematic nature of Leibniz’s thought, it is possible to glean his more-or-less definitive views 
on a range of topics, and to do so by taking any number of entry points into his system. Plausibly, 
then, even if one seeks to understand his metaphysics or theology, a good place to start is with 
Leibniz’s view of truth. (See Burnham (2017) for a similar exposition rationale.)  
Indeed, in his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz characterises the notion of being or substance in 
terms first of truth (1686, §8). The nature of what Leibniz termed “individual substances”—the 
basic ontological building blocks of the universe—held an enduring and foundational interest for 
him. There is some interpretational controversy as to whether for Leibniz only “substantial forms”, 
such as human minds or souls (which he later referred to as “monads” (1714)), comprise these 
substances, or whether he also admits material, corporeal substances into his ontology (see 
Woolhouse (1998, 10–16) for discussion). We can think of “substantial form”, originally an 
Aristotelian and a scholastic notion, as the manner or shape of something which “gives” that 
something part of its essence. For example, a trophy is more than the metal of which it is made—
it would not be a trophy without, in addition (and at least), the way in which the material is moulded 
into a distinct form. With respect to living human beings, Leibniz’s thought—at least his early 
thought; see Woolhouse (1998, 10–11)—is that the mind or soul endows corporeal matter with its 
distinct form, thereby qualifying humans as individual substances, composed of both matter and 
form (and, as such, as form-matter composites). However, Leibniz’s notion of form, here, extends 
beyond the way in which the form of the trophy makes it what it is; rather, the form of living 
things determines their “organisation” and “functioning” (Woolhouse 1998, 13). 
Now, according to Leibniz, individual substances (be they immaterial or form-matter 
composites) are what we express by grammatical subjects—i.e., those things to which we can 
ascribe properties, but which themselves may not be properties: “It is certainly true that when 
several predicates are attributed to the same subject, and this subject is not attributed to any other, 
it is called an individual substance” (Leibniz 1686, §8). For example, Bobby is tall, round, and 
balding; since we can describe him by means of these predicates, and since “Bobby” does not in 
turn describe some other subject, he is a substance, unlike the properties “tall” or “balding”, which 




To get a firmer grasp of individual substance, Leibniz thinks we must become clear about what 
a true attribution really consists in. His answer articulates a key principle, sometimes referred to as 
the “predicate-in-subject principle” (Mates 1986, 84), on which other parts of his system rely:  
all true predication has some foundation in the nature of things, and when a proposition 
is not identical, that is to say when the predicate is not expressly included in the subject, 
it must be virtually included in it. This is what philosophers call in-esse, and they say that 
the predicate is in the subject. So the subject term must always involve that of the 
predicate, in such a way that anyone who understood the subject notion perfectly would 
also see that the predicate belongs to it. (Leibniz 1686, §8) 
It is worth clarifying the intricacies of these few sentences, not least because the subject-in-
predicate principle was foundational to the rationalism which Kant targeted—e.g., Anderson notes 
that Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier were all committed to versions of the principle (2015, 10). Let 
us unpack some of this detail then. 
First, the idea of a proposition’s being “identical” may seem odd to the modern reader, except 
insofar as one has in mind trivial identity statements. But it is explicable within the framework of 
predicate and subject terms being, so to speak, contained in each other. There is some ambiguity 
in Leibniz’s writings as to whether this identity is meant to hold between the objects of predicates 
and subjects or the conceptual terms themselves; Kant, in fact, argues that this is Leibniz’s 
“fundamental mistake” (Kant 1787, §A270/B326; Beck 1978, n.11). To my mind, this ambiguity 
is at least consistent with the isomorphic nature of Leibniz’s metaphysical system: concepts and 
objects are mirrored at every step.13 In spite of Kant’s criticism, he did take over the containment 
metaphor (see my §1.2). At the conceptual level, the idea is that concepts or notions may, so to 
speak, absorb each other, perhaps in the way we may express meaning-relations today by saying 
“Well, ‘warm-blooded’ is part of what is meant by ‘mammal’, since nothing can be a mammal which 
is not also warm-blooded”. Let us take “A mammal is warm-blooded” as our example proposition. 
In the system of Leibniz, propositions are “identical” when the predicate-term is included within 
the subject-term; accordingly, this identity holds just as much for our example proposition as for 
“A mammal is an animal” or “A mammal is a mammal”—all are identical.14 
                                                 
13 Henceforth, for simplicity, I will treat Leibniz’s subject-in-predicate principle as applying to the 
conceptual terms and not the objects or substances/properties themselves.  
14 There is a stronger sense in which these propositions are identical for Leibniz, which invokes his so-
called universal calculus. In nuce, containment-relations can be defined such that “A contains B” = “A = 




Second, and most surprisingly, it is not just concepts such as “mammal” and “warm-blooded” 
which stand in these containment-relations. It is any predicate-term which truly describes a subject-
term. That is what Leibniz means when he says that a predicate may be “virtually” included in a 
subject if not expressly so. According to Leibniz, the analysis of contingent propositions is 
asymptotic; it must be infinite, approaching ever-closer to identity, and only demonstrable by God. 
Thus, for Leibniz, “Bobby is balding” is a near-identical proposition: because Bobby is actually 
losing his hair, the notion of the predicate, “balding”, is, on an infinite analysis, contained within 
the notion of the subject, “Bobby”. At this point, the isomorphic mirroring between notions and 
metaphysical substances comes to the fore, since “anyone who understood the subject notion”—
i.e., anyone who had a complete grasp of the concept, “Bobby”, and so knew all there was to know 
about him as an individual substance—“would also see that the predicate belongs to it” (1686, §8).  
Now, as anticipated, it is clearly not plausible for any mere mortal to know enough about Bobby 
or any other substance to be able to discern all of his properties; for Leibniz, however, this 
demonstrates our incomplete grasp of concepts, in contrast to an omniscient God. Thus, God has 
a complete grasp of all concepts, and complete concepts present a fully indexed ledger, as it were, of 
all included properties (including those in the past and present):15  
This being so, we can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete 
being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to include, and to allow the 
deduction of, all the predicates of the subject to which that notion is attributed. (Leibniz 
1686, §8) 
Here is where more modern ideas of analyticity may seem applicable. In the work of subsequent 
thinkers, there is a felt urge to carve off some set of statements, judgements, or propositions which 
by means of some cognitive act alone one can determine to be true; one can, in a word, “deduce”. 
The proposition “Animals are warm-blooded” is an ideal such candidate. In effect and by contrast, 
however, Leibniz is arguing that all propositions may be deduced in like manner, at least in 
principle, by God. And that is due to the very nature of individual substances, which is “to have a 
notion so complete” as to allow this deductive process. 
                                                 
15 Actually, there is some difficulty in working out just where the time-indexes fit in, for Leibniz. It is most 
intuitive, I think, for Leibnizian complete conceptual content to consist in conjoined and indexed 
descriptions (“Bobby is balding in 2011”, etc.). However, Mates argues this is inconsistent with other key 




This deductive (or, if it is not tendentious, analytic) parity among propositions is fleshed out 
further by Leibniz’s so-called principle of sufficient reason: the demand that everything be 
intelligible; that all must have some reason or ground for their being so:16 
sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that no fact could ever be true or existent, no 
statement correct, unless there were sufficient reason why it was thus and not 
otherwise—even though those reasons will usually not be knowable by us. (Leibniz 
1714, §32) 
Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason (articulated here in the later Monadology) serves to make 
networks of true claims together intelligible and rational; it is thus that he speaks in terms of 
“demonstrating” the truth of propositions, even those we are normally inclined to view as 
empirical, such as “Bobby is balding” or “the ball is red”. For if we are, per impossibile, like God, in 
possession of a complete concept of, say, that ball in particular, we can show how its being red 
follows from its concept. Leibniz thus sees justification as a matter of deduction, and so to the 
extent that he is committed to analyticity, he presents a logical, perhaps epistemological criterion, 
which bears that similarity at least with Frege’s, as we come to see in §2.1. 
Leibniz does attempt to dissuade readers from concluding that, since a complete concept 
contains logically explanatory networks, all true predicates are thereby logically necessary. That is 
to say, Leibniz, at least on the face of it, warns against thinking that the logical structure of concepts 
implies it is inevitable that agents will do what they do (because of what is true, diachronically, 
about them), thereby providing a definitive case against free will. His warning mentions a logical 
criterion that we will find soon in Hume and Kant (§§1.2-1.3): a person who demonstrated the 
truth of “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” would have shown “that it was rational and therefore 
definite that this would happen, but not that it is necessary in itself, or that the contrary implies a contradiction” 
(Leibniz 1686, §13—my emphases).17 
To deal more fully with the accusation of determinism, Leibniz attempts to show how there 
can be many kinds of truth. This topology presents another area where similar distinctions to the 
analytic-synthetic are made; indeed, perhaps this is the most plausible part of Leibniz’s system in 
which we can find something close to the idea of syntheticity (cf. Beck 1978, 86–88). 
There are also two kinds of truth: those of reasoning, and those of fact. Truths of reasoning 
are necessary, and their opposite is impossible; those of fact are contingent, and their 
                                                 
16 This formulation is similar to Spinoza’s own before Leibniz, in his exposition of Descartes’s Principles; 
see Spinoza (1663, 246, eleventh axiom). 




opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason for it can be found by 
analysis, by resolving it into simpler ideas and truths until we arrive at the basic ones. 
(Leibniz 1714, §33) 
Truths of reason comprise metaphysical, logical, and “eternal” truths (Mates 1986, 105). The 
logical truths are basic laws, e.g., the law of (non-)contradiction (Leibniz 1714, §35), and 
metaphysical truths, such as the truths of arithmetic or geometry; these latter, he maintains, are 
true in all possible worlds, and reduce to the first kind of essential truth (Mates 1986, 72–73). 
The other main class of truths, those of existence or fact, resolve into further kinds (Burnham 
2017, §6a.): first, absolutely universal truths, the kind which must be true of this universe given 
that it is the most perfect universe (as Leibniz elsewhere argues)—even a miracle could not violate 
such truths, and their contraries again imply contradictions (Leibniz 1686, §§6, 13); second, 
universal-physical truths, such as the laws of physics, which could principally be violated by 
miraculous events, since our universe could be other than God allows it to be (1686, §7); and, lastly, 
individual metaphysical truths—i.e., truths about Caesar and other individual substances—which 
are deducible (to God only) from complete concepts of individual substances but are quite 
contingent to those substances as they are. 
Whether or not this division of truths is effective at defending against the threat of determinism 
in Leibniz’s system is not our concern, but we can presently note some of its interesting features. 
One is that the logical criterion noted above, concerning whether the contrary of a proposition 
implies a contradiction, is employed by Leibniz to work out whether some proposition is necessary 
or contingent. For the principle of non-contradiction—“in virtue of which we judge to be false 
anything that involves contradiction, and as true whatever is opposed or contradictory to what is 
false” (1714, §31)—is essentially true; indeed, even God is constrained by logical truths, according 
to Leibniz (1686, §6). Accordingly, although similar non-contradiction criteria subsequently appear 
in both Hume and Kant, the general principle is not linked specifically to determining whether 
some proposition or judgement is analytic (indeed, in §1.2.1, I argue that Hume lacks a notion of 
analyticity, and so really his criterion applies to the a priori).  
Another point to note concerns again the class of essential truths: the further division of truths 
into a mathematical sub-class which reduce to a logical sub-class brings to mind the logicist project 
as pursued by Frege, Russell, and Carnap. Analyticity was the tool with which Frege sought to dig 
down to logical foundations, as we will see (§2.1), but it would not be without caveat to say that 
for Leibniz arithmetic was analytic (likewise for geometry, which was famously synthetic for both 
Kant and Frege though not for the logical empiricists, given the work of Hilbert). At the least, we 




his system is so unlike the logicist systems to follow, since he seems to lack a notion of genuinely 
empirical truths (given that God possesses complete concepts of substances), that if it is correct 
to say that Leibniz is committed to analyticity, then we must say he believes in both the analytic 
contingent and analytic necessary.18 Thus, again if we are in this game, Leibniz regards, for God, 
mathematics wholly as analytic and necessary, and the laws of physics, again for God, as analytic 
and contingent (i.e., God could have designed the world’s physics otherwise, though he chose an 
optimal course). 
Taking stock, it remains questionable, to my ear, whether it makes sense to describe Leibniz’s 
discussions of truth as compatible with an analytic-synthetic distinction applied to judgements or 
truths. It seems he entirely lacks a contrast here, some notion of syntheticity or empirical truth. 
One could argue, indeed, that Kant’s novel conception of the task and structure of metaphysics, 
which we discuss in §1.3, is founded precisely on the idea that synthetic truths are possible—that 
metaphysics can reach outside the realm of conceptual truth in which rationalists had thought it 
wholly consisted.19 Perhaps at most one might say that Leibniz could conceive another view of 
how truths are sometimes made, such as is encapsulated by syntheticity, but rules it out within his 
system. On the other hand, one can see Leibniz definitely is committed to a certain picture of 
analysis. In this connection, one could argue that Leibniz’s project of analysis commits him to a 
conception of analyticity, as evinced, e.g., in his remarks on the role of analysis in determining 
truth: 
But in the case of contingent truths, even though the predicate is in the subject, this can 
never be demonstrated of it, nor can the proposition ever be reduced to an equation or 
identity. Instead, the analysis proceeds to infinity, God alone seeing—not, indeed, the 
end of the analysis, since it has no end—but the connexion of terms or the inclusion of 
the predicate in the subject, for he sees whatever is in the series. (Leibniz 1973, 109)20 
Thus, even though Leibniz is at pains to emphasise that no human could conduct the analysis of 
contingent truths, these truths are nevertheless subject to analysis—albeit a different, asymptotic 
kind of analysis. And if it is a sufficient condition of being analytically true that a proposition be 
analysable (i.e., reducible to identity, in Leibniz’s sense, or asymptotically ever-closer to identity), 
                                                 
18 In his discussion of Leibniz on this topic, and with respect to descriptions of individual substances such 
as persons, Fitch argues that descriptions may be both contingent and analytic for Leibniz (see Fitch 2008, 
38). 
19 See Anderson (2015, §1.1f) for discussion. 





then there are no non-analytic truths for Leibniz (cf. Hanfling 1981, 76). Moreover, this process 
of Leibnizian analysis, as Mates (1986, 122–23) discusses, does proceed by successive substitution 
of definiens for definiendum until we resolve a proposition into its identity. This is a conception of 
analysis that has come to be associated—somewhat wrongly, in my view—with Frege (see my 
§2.1) and which is prominent in Quine’s critique of analyticity as it appears in Carnap (see my §3). 
Whichever way we decide on this topic, one thing has become abundantly clear in this survey 
of Leibniz: the analytic-synthetic distinction, or the notion of analyticity, is far from uniform across 
philosophical usage. The distinction is intricately connected to the specific projects within which 
it is employed, and it will scarcely be fruitful to appraise a conception of analyticity when abstracted 
far from its area of employment.  
 
§1.2 Hume 
Along with Leibniz, David Hume is often cited as having prefigured the analytic-synthetic 
distinction. But perhaps even more so than Leibniz, Hume is thought to have characterised the 
distinction in ways very similar to contemporary attempts, with respect to its epistemological and 
modal aspects—respectively, as linked to apriority and necessity. As it happens, I express doubts 
in §1.2.1 that Hume really is committed to an analytic-synthetic distinction. But nevertheless, 
without question, Hume occupies an influential spot in its history: contemporary articulations of 
the analytic-synthetic distinction are bound to bear some or even many of the hallmarks of Hume’s 
thought on his own related distinction. Moreover, Hume is partly whom Kant responds to in his 
critical philosophy, and it is Kant who formulates the analytic-synthetic distinction in a relatively 
modern guise. (Rightly or not, in fact, Kant is the first to attribute the analytic-synthetic distinction 
to Hume.) 
 
§1.2.1 Relations of ideas and matters of fact 
The discussion of Hume in this section demonstrates a point which recurs throughout the chapter. 
Hume’s philosophical project—his empiricism—shapes the distinction he makes, in the Enquiry, 
between “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”. This distinction divides two types of “objects 
of human reason”: 
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to 
wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, 
Algebra, and Arithmetic, and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or 




operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. 
(Hume 1777, 20) 
Relations of ideas, then, are truths obtainable by reflecting on thinking, and of which mathematical 
truths of different sorts are paradigm. “Matters of fact”, on the other hand, are in effect true claims 
about the empirical world: 
Matters of fact . . . are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their 
truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter 
of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by 
the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. 
(Hume 1777, 21) 
To get to grips with Hume’s distinction, it will help to fill in the blanks with some examples. A 
typical relation of ideas, for Hume, is expressed by a proposition such as “Three times five is equal 
to half of thirty”. How do we recognise it to be a relation of ideas, and not a matter of fact? Well, 
merely by thinking it through. I may just recall the proposition, but my recollection of it is quite 
unlike, Hume thinks, my recollection of “The sun rose today”. I am not, it seems, just remembering 
two states of affairs. And my recourse to finding out the truth of each proposition will be different: 
I will not take it on testimony that three times five is equal to half of thirty; neither will I entertain 
the thought that three times five could not equal half of thirty. Likewise, according to Hume, that 
the sun rose today is not a matter that can be demonstrated in the sense of it being incontrovertibly 
proven; unlike, as we saw, for Leibniz, where God could actually so demonstrate the proposition, 
even if we cannot. It is something, instead, that can be estimated to have occurred with a high 
degree of probability. (Indeed, it is just this degree of probability and its falling short of full-blown 
demonstration over which Hume agonised.) Further, although “The sun rose today” and “It is not 
the case that the sun rose today” do contradict each other, there is no contradiction in supposing 
that either one of these could be true while the other is false.  
Let us be more precise by asking how Hume thinks we can tell apart propositions exemplifying 
relations of ideas on the one hand and matters of fact on the other. At first, Hume gives an 
epistemological criterion to tell between these different objects of thought, for relations of ideas 
are held to be “either intuitively or demonstratively certain” (Hume 1777, 20). Dicker explains that 
for Hume a proposition is intuitively certain when it is self-evident, in the sense that it provides its 
own evidence: to know its truth we simply have to understand what it says (1998, 36f).21 A 
demonstratively certain proposition, by contrast, is one that follows from self-evident propositions 
                                                 




(1998, 37)—here we might think of more complicated arithmetical sums which can be 
demonstrated to follow from those basic ones which are intuitively certain. Thus, relations of ideas 
are unique for the way that they can be discovered to be true, and the evidence we have for matters 
of fact must go beyond simply the propositions themselves. (In §1.2.1, however, we will see that 
an alternative way of characterising intuitive and demonstrative certainty—i.e., as subject to a 
perceptual model of cognition—radically alters the way we look at Hume’s epistemological fork.) 
Put another way, as Hume does, the discovery of relations of ideas is not dependent on 
examining what exists. The ontological claim here is not a criterion for distinguishing relations of 
ideas from matters of fact, but simply serves to explain why there would be epistemological 
differences between the two objects of reason. Beyond these aspects, it is of further interest that 
the criterion Hume offers for how to recognise matters of fact is logically modal (or, as I argue in 
§1.2.1, actually psychological): the contradictory of a matter of fact is equally as intelligible as its 
assertion. One can thus tell relations of ideas apart from matters of fact by negating them; if the 
negation is still intelligible, then one is dealing with a matter of fact: “That the sun will not rise to-
morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, 
that it will rise” (Hume 1777, 21). Note, then, that Hume borrows from Leibniz the law of non-
contradiction as a criterion to show what relations of ideas consist in, which Leibniz used as a 
criterion for determining (analytic) necessary truths. 
Accordingly, in contemporary terms, we would describe Hume’s distinction between relations 
of ideas and matters of fact as bearing at least logical, epistemological, and perhaps ontological 
points of emphasis. Perhaps it is indicative of the importance of the distinction, to Hume, that he 
articulates it by appeal to all these different aspects. Indeed, the distinction does play a key role for 
Hume, in the context of his philosophical project, by delimiting his field of enquiry. For, as we 
shall see, it is matters of fact, and their purported justification, on which Hume centres his 
attention. 
In spite of the fact that Hume cashes out the distinction in these different ways, reading Hume, 
one gets the impression it is its epistemological character which takes centre stage. But does 
Hume’s epistemological characterisation indicate that he thought relations of ideas were a priori? 
Juhl and Loomis point out (2009, 3) that this would not seem to be consistent with Hume’s 








§1.2.2 The empiricist principle 
At the beginning of both the Treatise (1740) and the Enquiry (1777), Hume introduces another 
distinction, between “impressions” and “ideas”, which allows him to state the guiding empiricist 
principle for all his philosophical reflection. Impressions (of sensation) are those which “arise in 
the soul originally, from unknown causes” (1740, §1.1.2).22 Here Hume has in mind those 
perceptions (in a very broad sense of the word) which strike upon us, with respect to which we 
are passive: sensations of heat, cold; pain, pleasure; sight, sound, touch; and so on. Except in a few 
limiting cases (such as in fever, madness, or dreams; see 1740, §1.1.1), Hume maintains that we 
can always easily tell apart such impressions from ideas, a different kind of perception which recall 
or echo impressions. For example, a paradigm instance of an idea would be a memory of a 
sensation such as a pain, some heat, a sight, and so on—“the faint images of these in thinking and 
reasoning” (1740, §1.1.1). As ideas arise in the mind, reminding one of impressions of sensation, 
further impressions of reflection emerge (reflective in the sense that they are introspectible). So 
after, say, a perception of pain, a later idea of that pain may creep upon us, and internally, as it 
were, we shudder in aversion to it; this last perception—the aversion itself—is an impression of 
sensation.  
With this framework of perceptions in place, Hume is able to state his empiricist principle: 
“ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which they are derived, and which they 
represent” (1740, §1.1.1). Hume regards this principle as entirely general. Thus, contra various 
rationalists (including Leibniz), for Hume, there are no innate ideas. Any idea we can conjure 
ultimately finds its roots in impressions of sensation—in the soil of our experience in the world.  
But to come back to the epistemological worry: Hume’s avowed commitment to this empiricist 
principle should lead us to wonder how he squares it with relations of ideas, given that propositions 
exemplifying relations of ideas are, in Hume’s own words, “discoverable by the mere operation of 
thought” (1777, 25). That is a classic description of the a priori, after all; and as Reinach (1908, 
163–66) persuasively argued, Hume evidently believes in something which shares criteria with 
Kant’s a priori (though see Gotterbarn (1974, 278–79) for an argument that Hume’s a priori is 
psychological). Indeed, in the following sub-section, I argue, inter alia, that it does make sense to 
regard Hume’s relations of ideas as a priori, since the propositions instantiating such relations are 
                                                 




held to be intuitively or demonstratively certain.23 There we will hear, crucially, how for Hume 
knowledge is delivered via perception: we “see”, at once, that three times five is equal to half of 
thirty. And so the Humean a priori takes on a perceptual gloss. 
Given the empiricist principle, a larger problem lurks for Hume: the principle itself, that all 
ideas are derived from impressions, is treated by Hume as though an a priori truth. For example, 
when, on analysis, difficult ideas like the self or substance are found wanting of an originating 
impression, Hume declares that minds did not really hold those ideas as such; in that way, 
metaphysical ideas are debunked. Yet were Hume’s principle an empirical generalisation, it would 
be a more adequate procedure to treat these and other cases as at least contenders for falsifying 
the principle (see Dicker (1998, 11f) for discussion).  
The problem with treating the principle as a priori is most vivid when considering Hume’s 
defence of the principle: 
If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not susceptible of any species of 
sensation, we always find, that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A 
blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. (Hume 1777, 20) 
Presumably, then, this support for the empiricist principle is empirical. But that would provide no 
support for an a priori claim—one “discoverable from the mere operation of thought”. Likewise, 
as Dicker argues (1998, 10f), assuming the principle is a priori, then a thought-experiment 
concerning (say) a congenitally deaf Beethoven who nevertheless claims to know what sound is, 
writes down his symphonies, and so on, could not be ruled out as a counterexample by claiming 
that no such man is known to exist. This is a thorny and interesting issue, but we must leave it at 
present.  
Hume himself turned his attention away from relations of ideas. Instead, he focuses on what 
he takes to be propositions concerning matters of fact; namely, those about causation, free will, 
self, and substance. Take “The sun will rise tomorrow”. It can be seen not to be a relation of ideas 
because its contradictory is possible: “The sun will not rise tomorrow”, unlike “It is not the case 
that three times five is equal to half of thirty”, is intelligible (1777, 21). This is so because matters 
of fact state how things are in the world. But how things are in the world is not self-evident; at 
least, not self-evident in the sense that we cannot work out how things are in the world purely by 
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thinking. So, granting that “The sun will rise tomorrow” is classed as a matter of fact, and not a 
relation of ideas, Hume then examines its justification.  
Now, unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact are not demonstrable (note the contrast with 
Leibniz’s truths of fact, which are demonstrable by God). So how can we know them with 
certainty, if at all? There is an interpretative issue here. Does Hume require for all knowledge that 
it is certain? Kevin Meeker (2007, 228f; 240f, n. 6) argues that Hume, when being strict, reserves 
the term “knowledge” for truths knowable with certainty, thus for relations of ideas only. (Allison’s 
point in my above footnote coheres with Meeker’s here.) Dicker (1998, 196f, n. 1), however, 
presents textual evidence to suggest Hume was much more open about this, such that knowledge 
concerning matters of fact, which involves probabilities and not certainties, was definitely possible. 
This is not an issue on which we must gain a perspective. All that is required here is to note that 
Hume at least recognised an epistemological difference between two kinds of proposition, which 
is either narrow in that both can still be known, albeit differently, or wide, in that only one sort 
can be known.  
I take my above discussion to show that Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and 
matters of fact helps him to articulate his empiricist project, and so first and foremost this 
demonstrates the significance of the distinction. Notice how Hume takes as a standard the 
certainty with which we hold true those propositions concerning relations of ideas. He then 
measures against this standard our epistemological grasp of propositions concerning matters of 
fact. Accordingly, in combination with his principle about the derivation of all ideas, Hume then 
investigates our knowledge of matters of fact concerning causality, the self, and so on. 
But notice also how, in turn, the demands of Hume’s project characterise his relations of ideas-
matters of fact distinction. I take this to show that any proper assessment of Hume’s distinction 
ought to acknowledge the place it has in his project. Indeed, we saw that a profitable line of critique 
against the distinction involves seeing how it squares up with other aspects of Hume’s empiricist 
system. One might wonder further whether Hume’s concern is also semantic. For one way of 
responding to the abovementioned counterexample to the empiricist principle as a priori is to 
reconstruct Hume’s principle as a test for meaning. This is what Dicker proposes to do (1998, 14–
17), taking his cue from Hume’s own suggestions in the text. According to the principle thus 
conceived, if no corresponding impression can be found for an idea (say, “self”), from which it is 
derived, then that idea is meaningless. I leave it to Hume scholarship to decide whether Hume 
offered a semantic criterion for relations of ideas-matters of fact—but here we should note that 
this interpretation is of interest given how the logical empiricists are thought to have extended 




§1.2.3 Is Hume’s a priori analytic? 
In the spirit of the historicist theme in this chapter—that no philosophical distinction (such as that 
between analytic and synthetic truth) can be fully appraised without taking into account its 
employment within a philosophical project—I must flag at this stage a problem with the reading 
so far presented: some Hume scholars argue it is mistaken to say that Hume ever had an analytic-
synthetic distinction (Reinach 1908; Suchting 1966; Gotterbarn 1974; Beck 1978; Owen 1999; 
Allison 2008). How can this be, for have we not already seen the similarity between that distinction 
and Hume’s own between the propositions concerning relations of ideas and matters of fact? 
Indeed, prima facie, these two distinctions parallel each other. Yet, as these scholars argue, Hume’s 
fork is most plausibly regarded as only an epistemological distinction, and it is failure to consider 
Hume’s work in the Treatise which leads readers to project the analytic-synthetic distinction onto 
the fork of the Enquiry (cf. Beck 1978, 84). 
To consider this alternative reading, we must have in view a difference between two models of 
cognition. On the one hand is a discursive model, a chief proponent of which is Kant. As we will 
see in greater detail in the next section, Kant argues that there are two fundamental kinds of 
cognition: intuitions, somewhat like sense-data or impressions, and concepts, which the faculty of 
understanding applies to those intuitions in order for cognition proper to occur. Thereby, a so-
called synthesis between the two kinds of cognition occurs in a judgement, which brings the object 
of perception under a concept, such as “the ball is red”. This exposition lacks detail presently, but 
it serves here as a useful contrast—the take-home message about Kant’s model of cognition is that 
the objects of knowledge and thought are not bare presences before the eye, or before the mind’s 
eye: they are perceptions as synthesised with concepts in judgements. 
By contrast, Hume’s model of cognition, much like Locke’s before it,24 appears to be perceptual 
in nature. That is, for Hume, the fundamental object of thought and knowledge is the item present 
to one in experience—a sense-datum or impression (and, relatedly, an idea; for the thesis that, for 
Hume, thinking is as such a kind of feeling, see Allison (2008, 17)). For empiricists, perception is 
the bedrock of knowledge, and only downstream of that does judgement and inference enter the 
picture; as such, Hume’s model is explicitly not discursive, but perceptual (2008, 6). Moreover, as 
Allison points out, Hume’s two basic items of experience on which judgement builds—
impressions and ideas—are conceived in imagistic terms: ideas are but pale copies of the more 
vivid and lively impressions. Thus, thinking itself is, according to Hume, a stringing together of 
picture-like items, perhaps later expressed into something discursive. Certainly, then, there seems 
                                                 




to be no room for Hume to accommodate the kind of analytic-synthetic distinction which Kant 
himself has in mind (and which we explore in the next section) because, by Hume’s epistemology, 
perceptual experience already provides intelligible content (impressions) without the need for any 
kind of synthesis (see also Allison (2008, 10, 332) on Hume’s imagistic interpretation of 
“concept”). 
Accordingly, with this contrast between perceptual and discursive models of cognition in view, 
we can see why there is something fishy about ascribing to Hume a belief in the analytic-synthetic 
distinction—at the very least in the Kantian sense. Hume’s epistemology dictates that all 
knowledge is delivered in experience, or can be traced, reductively, back to experience. Therefore, 
even putatively analytic judgements (discovered by the mere operation of thought) could only be 
known for Hume if they were immediately or derivatively apprehended by perception. Now, at 
first glance, the notion that one could grasp a relation to hold between some ideas, purely by 
perceiving those ideas, sounds implausible. Yet if it is true that Hume regards the propositions 
concerning relations of ideas as a priori graspable, and further that such grasp is to be conceived 
in imagistic terms, it will follow that the discursive distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgements finds no foothold in Hume’s own. 
Admittedly, it is hard to digest this train of thought without some examples. Let us look, then, 
at Hume’s own from the Treatise.25 Allison argues that Hume continues Locke’s tendency to 
“sensualize” the perceptual model of cognition which they both share with, and inherit from, 
Descartes (Allison 2008, 7). Locke’s discussion of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge strongly 
suggests a perceptual reading. Take intuitive knowledge—the kind manifested by grasping a 
judgement that one colour excludes another: 
For in this, the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, 
as the Eye doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind perceives that 
White is not Black, That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal 
to One and Two. Such kind of Truths, the Mind perceives at the first sight of the Ideas 
together, by bare Intuition, without the intervention of any other Idea. (Locke 1689, 
§4.2.1)26 
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As can be gleaned from this citation, Locke’s picture of intuitive knowledge and truth maintains 
that we actually perceive (in the mind’s eye—whatever that quite comes to) such judgements as true; 
we grasp them at once. From here, it might be thought that Locke must at least appeal to a 
discursive model to account for demonstrative knowledge—for it seems we must link together 
intuitively known judgements to demonstrate further ones, thereby initiating a discursive process. 
Yet this is not so, and Locke’s treatment of demonstrative knowledge instructs Hume in the same 
manner, as we see shortly.  
Locke’s a priori is defined by certainty, where intuitive knowledge is here the gold standard. In 
order for demonstrative knowledge to sit on the same level, every rung in a demonstration must 
itself be intuitively certain—i.e., be perceptible (Allison 2008, 66). For example, once we have seen 
that “white” is not “black”, since the ideas are manifestly different, and seen that “black” is not 
“yellow” (say), we may “prove” (in Locke’s terminology) that “white” is not “yellow”. And such a 
proof or demonstration counts as genuine for Locke only insofar as each judgement may be 
apprehended fully by intuition, by a perception of the ideas. 
Finally, a further aspect of Locke’s model which undergirds this intuitive certainty is the nature 
of apprehension itself: what we perceive distinctly (ideas) are immediately intelligible in their own 
right: 
In so far as the mind has such ideas, it is aware of their nature or intrinsic content and 
of their difference from other ideas. For example, to have the idea of white is to know 
that it is the idea of white and, a fortiori, not of blue. (Allison 2008, 67)27 
Thus, we can glean from Locke’s take on colour-exclusion that the phenomenon is first and 
foremost seen (in some sense of “to see”) and thereby grasped; it is not, that is, understood via 
some discursive act. This immediately makes it suspect that for Locke colour-exclusion (and 
similar) judgements are “analytic” in any recognisable sense. Indeed, it seems to me that Locke’s 
perceptual model disallows colour-exclusion judgements from falling under any familiar 
conceptions of analyticity. For example (and to foreground some of the conceptions we discuss in 
this chapter), these judgements are not held to be “true in virtue of meaning”, since the ideas are 
already intelligible as-is, and thus exclude each other; they are not analytic by being reducible to 
logical truths via a chain of logical deductions—rather, truistic judgements themselves would seem 
to be true because they report on a perceived, unanalysable truth at bottom; and, finally, they are 
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not normative expressions, since (problematically) the ideas themselves already seem to have 
normative components built into them (as the idea of white is said to exclude the idea of black).28 
Now, it is one thing to decide thus that Locke works with no notion of analyticity; however, 
the similarity of models of cognition between Hume and Locke, ensures that this is true of Hume 
too. For Hume characterises his own a priori categories, mutatis mutandis, in much the same way: 
the species of philosophical relation (as termed in the Treatise) comprising “resemblance”, 
“contrariety”, “degree in quality”, and “proportion in quantity and number”. It is later, in the 
Enquiry, that these relations are effectively rebranded as relations of ideas (see Suchting (1966, 50) 
and Gotterbarn (1974, 281)). 
Take resemblance, for Hume the most general of these relations. Whether two ideas, A and B, 
resemble each other is something supposedly perceptible by the mind’s eye (Allison 2008, 77–78; 
Hume 1740, §1.3.1). Hume’s own example of resembling ideas is again between colours; he notes 
that ideas of blue and green resemble each other more than those of blue and scarlet. Now, it is 
true that this example of resemblance imports notions of comparison and degree alien to Locke’s 
own example (as Allison points out), but nonetheless, like Locke, Hume contends that by 
expressing the resemblance between ideas in a proposition we express a specifically perceptible 
truth—even though, in fact, many such truths are far from easily perceived. (Think of the 
resemblance between the same shade of colour, in the first instance isolated in a tube, and in the 
second, surrounded by patches of other colours.29) Moreover, in comparing perceived simple ideas, 
we are comparing something ex hypothesi unanalysable: as Suchting points out, this also disqualifies 
such a proposition from being analytic, at least insofar as a notion of analyticity relies on an 
attendant process of analysis (1966, 53). 
The best chance of applying some notion of analyticity to Hume’s philosophical relations 
comes when considering the relation of contrariety. Restricted to contrast between that which 
exists and that which does not, on reflection, instances of this a priori relation hardly seem like the 
sort we could perceive in reality. For, according to Hume, “existence and non-existence destroy 
each other, and are perfectly incompatible and contrary” (Hume 1740, §1.3.1); as Allison concedes, 
this does appear to make a logical point and perhaps anticipates Kant’s own criterion for analyticity 
(2008, 80). Nevertheless, it is because the relation of contrariety does not play well with the 
perceptual model that it ends up seeming out-of-place in Hume’s epistemology, rather than 
becoming an expansion to it.  
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For the remaining philosophical relations to be discussed are by contrast accounted for by the 
perceptual model of cognition, even though it may be problematic that Hume conceives them 
within this model. For example, the degrees of quality between a bright light and a dim one are 
seemingly discerned via perceptual experience, and thus as expressed in a proposition would more 
neatly fit into the matters of fact or a posteriori class. Yet, considered as a relation that holds 
between the ideas themselves—between “bright” and “dim”, say—the relation of contrariety is 
more obviously a priori, even though, again, the way in which we discern the relation is by 
comparing the perceptual ideas and not some essentially discursive concepts. 
Finally, consider Hume’s relation of proportion in quantity or number. This is the only of 
Hume’s a priori relations by means of which we demonstrate, as opposed to intuit, some 
knowledge. Accordingly, it concerns arithmetical and geometrical propositions, which are, as with 
both geometrical and arithmetical, either outright perceived (“[we] might at one view observe a 
superiority or inferiority betwixt any numbers or figures”) or derived, as with arithmetical ones, in 
an “artificial” (i.e., demonstrative) fashion (Hume 1740, §1.3.1). Such demonstration proceeds via 
chains of intuitively known (that is, perceived) truths, just as in Locke’s case. 
Beyond these philosophical relations themselves, it is worth noting that, as Donald Gotterbarn 
argues, even the law of non-contradiction is based, for Hume, “on our ability to conceive or 
imagine the relata having or not having various relational properties” (1974, 276). That is, even an 
aspect of relations of ideas most similar to analyticity—the criterial role played by generating a 
contradiction—is as much psychological as it is logical. Thus, the point is not that a denial of a 
relation of ideas expresses something of the logical form “P is not-P”, but rather that the denial 
would not be imaginable or conceivable in the mind (see also Beck (1978, 83)). Indeed, Gotterbarn 
points out that Hume’s notion of contradiction is itself part of a tradition which spells it out in 
terms of inconceivability (1974, 277–78).  
We can conclude some important things from this brief excursion into Hume’s, as well as 
Locke’s, epistemology. In both the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume sets aside conceptual room for 
a class of a priori propositions. In the earlier work, he terms them the philosophical relations 
among which the relations remain the same so long as the ideas remain the same; in the later work, 
they are “relations of ideas” as opposed to “matters of fact”. Further, it is clear that Hume’s model 
of cognition is by and large perceptual: the rudiments of our thinking and the objects of our 
knowing are perceived, first and foremost—they are impressions delivered to us in experience or 
ideas later remembered or imagined, derived from impressions (while the term “idea” covers both 
these kinds for Locke). Accordingly, Hume treats the propositions which concern relations of 




what can be intuitively or demonstratively known, and these forms of access to the world are 
themselves imagistically conceived. As such, there is a compelling argument that both analyticity 
and syntheticity, as applied to Locke and Hume, are misplaced anachronisms. 
Taking stock, I have given an overview of a distinction found in Hume that somewhat 
resembles the analytic-synthetic distinction as later articulated, differently, by various thinkers. And 
I have given some of the theoretical background necessary for understanding what role that 
distinction plays in Hume’s philosophical project. However, in the course of placing the distinction 
within the context of Hume’s empiricism, serious doubt is cast on the idea that it matches up to 
any familiar analytic-synthetic distinction. Nonetheless, I hope to have shown at least that the 
character of Hume’s fork is directly affected by the role that it plays within the project.30 Later, 
Kant introduces the terminology which has stuck with us to the present day. In fact, Kant claims 
to find the seeds of the distinction in Hume’s fork. Even though I think that is a misattribution, 
the newly termed analytic-synthetic distinction plays a crucial role in Kant’s philosophical project. 
Indeed, the lines drawn first by the analytic and synthetic, and second by the a priori and the a 
posteriori, mark out the foundations on which Kant builds his entire conception of philosophy. 
 
§1.3 Kant 
How are a priori synthetic judgements possible? That metaphysics has hitherto remained 
in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is entirely due to the fact that 
this problem, and perhaps even the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgments, has never previously been considered. (Kant 1787, §B19) 
In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Kant coins the analytic-synthetic distinction as applied 
to judgements, and proceeds to give it centre stage. As seen in the quote above, Kant signals the 
importance of the distinction in the Introduction to the Critique. Prior to that, in the two prefaces 
to the work, he explains some important details about his critical project. I cannot possibly hope 
to give the reader anything like a satisfactory description of Kant’s project. But it is fortunate that 
much of Kant’s task is phrased in terms of the analytic-synthetic distinction, so that my limitations 
here will not be as damaging as they could otherwise be. Accordingly, I will do two things: first, 
broadly explain the context of Kant’s critical project; and second, demonstrate the important role 
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that the analytic-synthetic distinction plays within this project, and thereby also the character it 
takes on because of the work it is employed to do. 
 
§1.3.1 Kant’s critical project 
By the time of the Critique, metaphysics was in bad shape, at least according to Kant. Partly due to 
the rise of Newtonian physics and its battles with a struggling Leibnizian rationalism, and partly 
due to the anti-metaphysical empiricism of Hume, the intellectual atmosphere did not regard 
metaphysics with the respect it once commanded. Kant himself compares the differing paths of 
mathematics, physics, logic, and metaphysics, and paints a sorry picture for his contemporary 
metaphysicians (1787, B vii-xvi).31 Indeed, in the second preface to the Critique, Kant suggests that 
metaphysics needs to undergo a change similar to that which Copernicus brought about for 
physics. Just as Copernicus argued we need to see ourselves—the earth—as what revolves, and 
the sun as what remains static, so Kant recommends we see not that reason conforms to objects, 
but that objects conform to reason.  
What does it mean to say that objects conform to reason? Roughly, that we perceive and 
understand what we do, not because, via perceptual or intellectual media, objects project 
themselves straight into our minds, but because a priori we bring to bear concepts32 on objects—
objects conceived as sensory impressions, that is. This runs counter to the empiricist (and intuitive) 
thought that the world and its objects are waiting ready to be seen and experienced; that all it takes 
for perception and knowledge is for us to be present to experience objects. It also runs counter to 
the rationalist view that the world and its objects may be thought and thereby known by individual 
subjects. By contrast, according to Kant, we act on the objects of experience, by having a priori 
“intuitions” of the forms of perception in general—space and time—which do not arise from 
perception itself. Further, he argues, we synthesise, bring together, the multi-coloured tapestry of 
experience into something ordered and tangible—something which can be experienced as unified 
and objective, and to which we can apply a priori concepts such as causation.  
Thus, where Hume had effectively presupposed the order and unity of experience to provide 
him with the distinct perceptions of (say) a billiard ball’s hitting another billiard ball, Kant held 
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of doctrine”, which therefore in comparison with the other “sciences” did not need to improve (1787, B 
viii). 
32 Or, to be more faithful to Kantian terminology, both concepts and intuitions, which belong to the 
faculties of the understanding and sensibility respectively. Intuitions are understood as unmediated 




that a priori the subject is already synthesising sensory impressions in order to see a ball as a ball, 
and one as hitting another. Moreover, where Hume looked for the sense impression which gave 
rise to the idea of one billiard ball’s causing another to move after hitting it, and came up short, 
Kant saw that the concept of causality is applied a priori by the subject to make possible such 
objective judgements as “Billiard ball A causes billiard ball B to move”. That is not to say, of 
course, that the subject just has a customary feeling which gives rise to his notion of causation—
that is Hume’s conclusion. Rather, while judgements such as “A causes B to move” are first and 
foremost subjective, in that they describe A-[and B-]as-it-seems-to-me,33 after the subject applies the 
concept of causality to perception, such judgements actually attain “objective validity”, as Kant 
puts it in the Prolegomena (1783, §18). And so, by the application of this concept, according to Kant, 
the judgement that A causes B is to hold really and not only seemingly, as one would incline to talk 
about the judgement given Hume’s response to the problem. 
Accordingly, Kant will go on to argue in the exposition which he terms “transcendental” that 
experience of objects, of reality, is possible only if certain a priori conditions are met. By means of 
this exposition, and later what he terms a transcendental deduction, Kant presents a number of 
compelling reasons to think that reality “in itself”—reality as it is unperceived, or in Kantian terms, 
“noumena”—is not what we meet with in the world of experience. Rather, appearances of objects 
are what we encounter—in Kantian terminology, “phenomena”. Properly speaking, according to 
Kant, our knowledge of reality or the objects of which it is composed refers only to the 
phenomenal world. Moreover, he holds, we cannot cognise the noumenal world of things-in-
themselves that lays beyond the phenomenal world of experience (1787, §A30/B45), and so the 
very notion of “object” we are to work with, in examining reason, must be “object for us”. That 
is, an object is only an object within our purview insofar as we have so to speak constructed it—
applied an a priori concept to it. 
Kant wanted to emphasise, however, that though his critical philosophy embodies a kind of 
idealism, termed itself transcendental, this is not the sort of Berkelian idealism which denies the 
existence of matter, in some sense “external” to the subject:  
And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess 
thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is 
in itself but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by 
this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, 
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grants also the existence of things in themselves, and thus far we may say that the 
representation of such things as are the basis of appearances, consequently of mere 
beings of the understanding, is not only admissible but unavoidable. (Kant 1783, §32) 
Thus, because the things-in-themselves are necessarily supposed to exist, Kant argues that in no 
way can he be called an idealist in the Berkelian sense. But it still remains the case that, by Kant’s 
contention, the objects of knowledge are things-for-us: objects which have conformed to our 
reason, via the a priori application of intuitions and concepts. 
This brief exposition wraps up the discussion of Kant’s critical project. In the following, I 
describe the role that Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction plays within this project, and 
consequently what characteristics that distinction takes on by means of its involvement. 
 
§1.3.2 Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction 
Before discussing the analytic-synthetic distinction as it appears in the Critique, it should be noted 
that Kant possibly gives a similar gloss on the distinction, not yet so-named, in his pre-critical 
period. For instance, in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763), 
Kant distinguishes between two types of relation exhibited between “grounds” and “consequents”: 
those where the consequent is found, by analysis, to be contained in the (“logical”) ground because 
the consequent is identical with, or with part of, the ground; and those where there is no such 
identification. The second kind, a relation between “real ground” and consequent, puzzles Kant, 
and looks to take the form of what he would go on in his critical period to call a synthetic 
judgement: “that, because something is, something else is [to be]” (Kant 1763, 2:203). Kant’s worry 
is significant, for it suggests that the topic of causality was an impetus to his critical thought, and 
that an incipient analytic-synthetic distinction provided the form in which he expressed both his 
pre-critical reflections and his central critical problem. (De Pierris and Friedman (2013, §1) 
conjecture that Kant likely read a German translation of Hume’s Enquiry in the 1750s to mid-’60s; 
if so, potentially there is a tangible line of influence to be drawn between Hume’s concern with 
matters of fact purportedly describing causal relations (and thus his distinction between relations 
of ideas and matters of fact), through Kant’s pre-critical worries, leading eventually to Kant’s 
critical project.) 
Now, Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction as it appears in the Critique is from one angle very 
much epistemological in character. (However, cf. Anderson (2015, §1.2.3, 1.3.2) for an argument 
that the epistemological rendering is not what does the heavy lifting.) For according to Kant, an 




§A17/B11). Such a judgement is classified by Kant in his Jäsche Logic (1880, §37) as exhibiting a 
“non-explicit” identity, which, in contrast to tautologous analytic judgements asserting explicit 
identities (such as “Man is man”), clarify what was hidden in the subject-concept.34 For all analytic 
judgements, then, we may say that one’s knowledge is not greatened by the judgement. Those 
judgements which express non-explicit identities, however, lay out more perspicuously something 
which one may or may not already cognise (for example, by predicating “extension” of “body”). 
While analytic judgements, for Kant, are at best explicative, synthetic judgements are by contrast 
ampliative (1787, §A7/B11); they increase what is known about the subject (or in Kant’s terms, 
what is known about the concept of the subject). Accordingly, one way of articulating Kant’s 
analytic-synthetic distinction emphasises these epistemological characteristics.  
But this epistemological contrast is also paralleled and preceded by a logical contrast. As is well-
known, Kant regarded a judgement as analytic when the concept of its predicate is “contained” 
(even “covertly”) in the concept of its subject. This of course recalls Leibniz, though in practice 
the containment is (deliberately) less expansive in Kant. As before, one can analyse a concept into 
its constituent components; if any of these components (or the concept itself) are identical with 
the predicate in the judgement, then that judgement is analytic. So the concept “body in general”, 
Kant tells us, can be analysed into the constituent concepts, “extension”, “impenetrability”, 
“figure”, etc. (1787, §B12). If, however, the predicate is not identical with one of these constituents 
that make up the subject-concept, then the judgement is synthetic. And that deliberately differs 
from Leibniz, for whom an identity or near-identity always holds of every true affirmative 
proposition. Sometimes Kant does not speak in terms of containment: “Analytic judgments 
(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is 
thought through identity” (1787, §A7/B11). However, I take it that as with Leibniz the 
containment metaphor easily applies: a given subject-concept contains constituent concepts, and 
upon analysis we reveal those sub-concepts; next, we compare the predicate-concept to this list of 
sub-concepts, and (in a non-explicit judgement) thereby notice the identity that makes the 
judgement analytic. This is, then, just another way of talking about containment. 
Note that here it is easy to slip from using “analytic” to qualify judgements to talking of analysis 
qua cognitive method. That is, the process by which we discern constituent concepts within more 
complex concepts, as when we discern “unmarried” and “man” within “bachelor”, is itself easily 
cast in terms of analysis. It looks to be a decompositional kind of analysis, which Kant shares with 
                                                 
34 There is perhaps some textual inconsistency here. Burge points out that Kant, in an unfinished 
manuscript, classifies identities as non-analytic, being themselves “the limits of analysis”; Burge argues that 




Leibniz (given his predicate-in-subject principle). In that respect, as a response to Leibniz and 
subsequent rationalists, Kant’s recognition of a new class of judgement—synthetic, let alone 
synthetic a priori—reciprocally makes a substantive claim about cognitive process. Namely, that 
not all truth is arrived at by ascertaining latent containment relations between concepts, but by 
actively synthesising a connection between concepts. 
One way that Kant portrays the method of analysis, in elaborating on the containment 
metaphor, is by use of a logical principle. Some think this in turn provides a more precise 
criterion.35 For some judgement, negate it, and after analysis look for a contradiction: 
All bodies are extended. 
It is not the case that all bodies are extended. 
Is the second judgment a contradiction? Well, the analysis of “body” yields what is “thought in 
the concept”, namely “figure”, “extension”, “impenetrability”, and so on (1787, §B12). 
Accordingly, the second judgement is on analysis a contradiction in terms. A proposition is analytic 
for Kant, therefore, if and only if its denial is a contradiction in terms. Indeed, Kant affirms the 
principle of contradiction as “being the universal and completely sufficient principle of all analytic 
knowledge” (1787, §A151/B191), though he earlier hints at the principle’s importance when 
introducing the analytic-synthetic distinction. Here he mentions also that operating with the 
principle will show an analytic judgement to be necessary. Synthetic judgements, by contrast, need 
not be necessary—though as we shall see, Kant maintains that a class of synthetic judgements are. 
Note again the contrast with Leibniz, who used the law of non-contradiction as a criterion of a 
proposition’s necessity, but not its analyticity. And Hume appears to invoke the same law, yet he 
gives it a psychological gloss, such that one can determine a proposition to concern relations of 
ideas if one cannot imagine or conceive its contrary. 
Summing up, in an analytic judgement (say, a non-explicit one), as with Leibniz, the predicate 
is revealed by analysis to be identical to one of the constituents of the subject-concept; by contrast, 
in a synthetic judgement, such as “All bodies are heavy” (1787, §B11), one synthesises the predicate 
“heavy” with the subject-concept “body” (and this conception of synthesis is foreign to Leibniz—
fatally, in Kant’s view). In analysis, one is only drawing connections between concepts which 
already hold in a relation of containment, but for synthesis, one must go beyond the concepts. 
                                                 
35 Körner argues that the following gloss on Kant’s criterion of analyticity is sufficient to dismiss worries 
that the containment metaphor itself is vague (1955, 22). Moritz Schlick’s (1925, 74–75) clear discussion 
likewise shows how the principle and containment metaphor relate, along with the Vienna Circle’s new 
concern with convention and definition. See James Van Cleve (1999, 18ff) for discussion of the common 




Kant speaks thus of a requirement or condition on the basis of which the understanding 
synthesises predicate and subject (1787, §A8f); in the next subsection we see that it is experience 
which plays that synthesising role in the case of empirical (i.e., a posteriori) synthetic judgements. 
If most of our judgements are synthetic, perhaps we could frame it such: a judgement in general 
requires some basis on which it is made, and analytic judgements provide a limiting case, since the 
understanding relies on nothing other than itself—than logic—to make these explicative moves. 
That is, in an analytic judgement, analysis simply breaks the subject-concept up “into those 
constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it” (1787, §B11). Indeed, Kant contends 
(1787, §B12) that grounding an analytic judgement on experience would simply be absurd 
(Timothy Williamson, the focal point of my Chapter 3, will very much disagree). 
 
§1.3.3 The synthetic a priori 
Given that, on Kant’s view, one does not ground analytic judgements on experience, he classifies 
them as a priori. (And as mentioned above, the test of the principle of contradiction shows analytic 
judgements to be necessary—for Kant, a sufficient condition of apriority.) Yet synthetic 
judgements, he argues, are not so simple. The intuitive thought, I take it, is that since analytic 
judgements contrast with synthetic judgements so far in their logical and especially epistemological 
respects, synthetic judgements should simply be classified as a posteriori. However, famously Kant 
proposes another class of judgement: the synthetic a priori. According to how Kant has introduced 
these terms individually, then, a synthetic a priori judgement is a judgement which is ampliative—
which can expand our knowledge—but which we do not make having relied on experience. Kant’s 
notion of synthesis is relevant here again: synthesis, he contends, is made possible through some 
“X” (1787, §A8). In the case of synthetic a posteriori judgements, that “X” is easy enough to see: 
experience (of an object). It is because I experience, say, bodies to be heavy that I can connect the 
predicate-concept to the subject-concept in the synthesised empirical judgement, “All bodies are 
heavy”. But it is not immediately clear just what “X” can allow the synthesis of an a priori 
judgement, which by stipulation is not analytic. 
Take the synthetic judgement, “Every event has a cause”. This is not analytic, for Kant, because 
the notion of a cause is not, he thinks, contained within the notion of an event or happening. Kant 
contends the judgement is a priori, since it is strictly (i.e., fully) universal; it admits of no exception. 
As Kant earlier explains, inductive judgements arrived at through a posteriori investigation are 
only lent an “assumed and comparative universality” (1787, §B4). Further, as he also contends, 
judgements which are a priori are necessary too (necessity and strict universality are, for Kant, 




must regard “Every event has a cause” as an a priori judgement. Thus, we come to a class of 
judgments which Kant claims neither Hume nor Leibniz before him could make out: that of the 
synthetic a priori. 
To recall the quote opening this section, Kant thinks answering the question how synthetic a 
priori judgements are possible is absolutely vital for metaphysics. And as I discussed shortly 
thereafter, by Kant’s reckoning, Hume has no category of a priori synthetic judgements—“Every 
event has a cause” is not a relation between ideas, since one can conceive its contradictory, and 
therefore it is not a priori. Being a posteriori, we must look to experience as the ground of its 
knowledge. Yet, as Hume found out, there is no impression of necessary connection which gives 
rise to our idea of it. Accordingly, as Hume sees it, “Every event has a cause” has no worldly 
justification. This sceptical consequence is of course damning to the enterprise of metaphysics, 
and its status as a science. One could insist, dogmatically, that causes just do exist in nature, but 
that is no good for metaphysics either. Thus, Kant saw it as crucial for the status of metaphysics 
as a serious subject that it answer properly how such synthetic judgements were knowable a priori, 
since, as he took Hume to show, they cannot be known empirically.  
Kant’s answer to the question how “Every event has a cause” and other synthetic a priori 
judgements are possible has been somewhat anticipated in my discussion of his critical project. In 
a nutshell, subjects actively apply categories (pure36 concepts of the understanding, as well as pure 
intuitions) to experience, and one such category is causality. That application of the category, as 
the missing “X”, turns a subjective judgement about perception (say, of events constantly 
conjoined) into judgements regarded as “objectively valid”. The category of causality thereby 
conditions causal synthetic a posteriori judgements. Accordingly, in the synthetic a priori 
judgement “Every event has a cause”, the notions of event and cause are synthesised in the 
understanding, neither on the basis of experience, which yields synthetic a posteriori judgements, 
nor on the basis of logic or concepts, which yields analytic (a priori) judgements.  
It is time to review the above discussion. Clearly, for Kant, the analytic-synthetic distinction is 
foundational. If I am right in §§1.1-1.2, neither Hume nor Leibniz has a comparable distinction, 
in spite of superficial similarities. Perhaps this is unsurprising, since Kant sees himself as breaking 
with the Leibnizian tradition in allowing there to be synthetic truths at all, and the Humean 
tradition by allowing synthetic judgements to be classified as knowable a priori. And like Hume, 
but to a greater extent, Kant’s distinction forms the bedrock of subsequent investigation for him: 
                                                 




reason must answer, on pain of losing metaphysics for good to dogmatism or scepticism, what 
makes possible synthetic a priori judgements.  
The epistemological character of the distinction is important, since Kant wants to find out how 
metaphysics is possible, how we can attain knowledge of reality in advance of experience. It would 
not be apt simply to say, however, that Kant has an epistemic conception of analyticity. For one 
thing, there are convincing reasons (which we cannot explore) to regard the explicative or 
ampliative function of analytic or synthetic judgements as following from their conceptually different 
natures—see Anderson (2015, §1.2.3). For another, the demands of his project make clear that 
analysis has its role, and that this is a logical exercise. Indeed, Kant regards the implications of his 
own transcendental deduction of the categories as analytic propositions (1787, §B138; cf. Körner 
1955, 68–69). But given that Kant distinguishes explicit identities (tautologies) from non-explicit 
ones, we have no reason to think analyticities on his account are trivialities either. What we do see 
is that given logical analysis has its place in the project, the analytic-synthetic distinction also has a 
logical emphasis, in terms of the principle of contradiction, or the containment metaphor, along 
with the epistemological one. 
 
§2 Recent history: Frege and logical empiricism 
§2.1 Frege 
Frege’s definition of analyticity37 is best understood in the context of his logicism. The aim of 
Frege’s logicist project, which begins with his Begriffsschrift (1879), is to show that arithmetic 
(though not geometry) is reducible to logic; i.e., to show that arithmetical truths can be derived 
deductively from logical truths. This project thus has an explicitly epistemological aim, in 
demonstrating arithmetic to be grounded or secured in logic: grasp of an arithmetical equation is 
explainable by grasp of logic. This aim is not modest, for arithmetical truths are not prima facie 
logical (cf. Kanterian 2012, 20f). For instance, take an equation such as “7+5=12”—an attempt to 
articulate its justification might begin by citing that it is a priori, and logical truths are likely thought 
to be a priori (though, as we shall see shortly, not all for Frege, since logical laws do not require 
justification). But how much further can such an articulation go? It seems that we almost have to 
stop short—seven and five just do make twelve. It is not clear how this is grounded in logic, so 
much as, perhaps, intuition. 
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To show how arithmetic is reducible to logic, Frege adopts an axiomatic method (subsequently 
to be very influential), wherein certain general, basic logical laws are the axioms, and other rules, 
definitions, and ultimately arithmetical equations can be derived from them, as theorems. Take 
“7+5=12”. The axiomatic method requires us first to define the components of the equation (the 
numbers and the operator), then offer the proof of the equation—its “ultimate justification”—the 
premises of which, for the equation to reduce to logic, must be logical truths (1884, §3). In the 
fullest extension of logicism, then, this approach is generalised: all arithmetical concepts (such as 
“number”) need to be defined in terms of logical concepts (such as “implication”, “negation”, and 
so on). The basic logical laws taken as premises in these deductions are thus the “axioms” of 
Frege’s system.  
For Frege, these axioms, the so-called basic truths—general logical laws—“neither need nor 
admit of proof” (Frege 1884, §3), because he takes them to be self-evident. As Kanterian has 
argued, though in the Begriffsschrift Frege seems wary of claiming that the general logical laws are 
known through some intuitive faculty, by the time of the Foundations (1884) it looks as though 
Frege is opening up to the idea (Kanterian 2012, 25ff).38 But the type of intuition involved in 
immediately recognising logical laws to be true must not, for Frege, be the sort of intuition 
involved in recognising general geometrical truths—“spatial intuition” (Kanterian 2012, 40f)—
since, as stated above, the logicist project is epistemological. Accordingly, the aim is to show that 
arithmetic is justified by being based on non-intuitive content; this is why the self-evident character 
of logical laws, Frege’s axioms, are described by him as maximally reliable (Kanterian 2012, 26), 
unlike flimsy intuitions. 
So Frege’s notion of analyticity, I have said, is best understood within his logicist project, and 
as discussed this project proceeds by an axiomatic method to show that arithmetic derives from 
logic. Analyticity is connected with this system in the following way: when a particular truth can 
be shown to rest only on logical laws, rules of inference derived from them, and definitions, then 
for Frege it is analytic. Here is Frege’s definition of the analytic-synthetic distinction: 
When a proposition is called . . . analytic in my sense, . . . it is a judgement about the 
ultimate ground upon which rests the justification for holding it to be true. . . . The 
problem becomes . . . that of finding the proof of the proposition, and of following it 
up right back to the primitive truths. If, in carrying out this process, we come only on 
general logical laws and on definitions, then the truth is an analytic one, bearing in mind 
that we must take account also of all propositions upon which the admissibility of any 
                                                 
38 One wonders also whether a logical intuition for Frege has a parallel in Russell’s idea of acquaintance as 
applied to logic: “in thought we have acquaintance with objects of a more abstract logical character” (B. 




of the definitions depends. If, however, it is impossible to give the proof without 
making use of truths which are not of a general logical nature, but belong to the sphere 
of some special science, then the proposition is a synthetic one. (Frege 1884, §3)  
The terms “analytic” and “synthetic” thus apply, for Frege, not to the content of a true proposition, 
but to the manner of a proposition’s justification—i.e., propositions are either analytic or synthetic 
according as they have the different justifications. Take “7+5=12”. Where Kant held that since 
the concept of “12” is not contained in the concepts “7”, “5”, or their union, the proposition (or 
judgement) is synthetic, Frege holds that because its components, once defined, are deducible only 
from general logical laws (such as the law of identity or the law that “if x, then whatever else y, x 
follows”), the proposition is analytic. 
There is an important difference, then, between Frege’s and Kant’s definitions of analyticity, 
since for Kant, the analytic-synthetic distinction properly applies to the content of judgements. 
That is shown by the fact that Kant specifies a logical criterion of analyticity, which concerns the 
containment-relations between concepts (though it is true that analytic judgements have, on Kant’s 
interpretation, an epistemological difference to the synthetic judgements, due to their 
containment-relations). Moreover, Kant is not wholly concerned with a circumscribed area of 
knowledge, such as arithmetic, and so analyticity is not relative to such a reductive system of proof. 
Frege’s placing analyticity in the context of logicist systems will, however, ultimately change how 
many work with the notion after him.  
In any case, given Frege’s definition of analyticity, one may wonder whether Frege’s axioms, 
the general logical laws, are analytic. But, as Kanterian points out, since for Frege only a truth 
derivable (and thus knowable) from general logical laws and definitions can be analytic, and since 
an a priori truth is one derived exclusively from general laws, for Frege logic itself is neither analytic 
nor a priori (2012, 24). However, Dummett argues it is essentially an oversight on Frege’s part that 
his definition of analyticity did not extend to the basic axioms of his system (1991, 24). And contra 
Dummett, Bar-Elli suggests that though these basic truths do need to come out as analytic for 
Frege’s logicist project to get off the ground, and though Frege indeed admits that general logical 
laws are in no need of proof, Frege must have conceived another method of justification besides 
proof, such that the basic axioms definitely do indeed come out as analytic (Bar-Elli 2010).  
In my view, it is not clear at all why Frege’s axioms need to be analytic: his logicism was an 
epistemological, reductionist project that sought to provide the firmest foundation for arithmetic; 
the axioms’ self-evident character would be thought to provide the sought-after epistemological 
certainty. Self-evidence is thus a constraint on the aptness of a true proposition for being an axiom. 




see also Burge’s (2003a) counter to Dummett that Frege’s characterisation of basic logical laws is 
not an oversight but deliberate.)  
Beyond Frege’s thinking of his basic logical laws as self-evident and neither a priori nor analytic, 
there is one further characterisation of them which proved influential, and is of critical importance 
for this thesis. Namely, he conceived the laws as normative. In the introduction to his Basic Laws, 
Frege laments that this point is too easily lost by the psychologistic logicians of his day:  
The ambiguity of the word “law” here is fatal. In one sense it says what is, in the other 
it prescribes what ought to be. Only in the latter sense can the logical laws be called 
laws of thought, in so far as legislate how one ought to think. Every law stating what is 
the case can be conceived as prescriptive, one should think in accordance with it, and 
in that sense it is accordingly a law of thought. (Frege 1893, 1:xv) 
The temptation, in Frege’s eyes, has been to construe “law” in its descriptive sense, and then to 
think that logical laws are laws related only to individual humans. This opens up the possibility 
that the laws could be otherwise, and fails to capture the normativity of logical thinking: if we want 
our thoughts to be true, then we must follow the most general basic logical laws.  
Frege here signals his commitment to a universal, unchanging logic. In the decades to come, 
others, such as Russell, Wittgenstein, and early Carnap would share in this universalist conception 
of logic, yet later some logicians would forgo this view (see my §2.2.3). Even so, the idea that Frege 
explicitly links to the universalist conception—logic’s being prescriptive, normative—would 
remain for some time.  
 
§2.2 Logical empiricism 
Unfortunately for Frege, his logicist project came to a premature end, after the now infamous blow 
dealt by Russell’s paradox. Without going into detail (since the fate of his logicism is not our main 
concern), the paradox made one of Frege’s “Basic Laws” untenable, forcing him to stall the project. 
Russell, however, took up the torch, along with Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica (1910). 
This huge work set about grounding mathematics in logic without succumbing to the paradox, by 
means of a theory of “types”, which is not our concern to explore here. 
Whatever the status of Frege’s and Russell’s logicism, one thing that remained, and indeed 
bloomed, in philosophical thought over the following decades was a commitment to the use of 
the new logical calculus. Though Ludwig Wittgenstein parted with Russell and Frege on the idea 
that logical laws are self-evident, his first major work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, signalled 




of analysis, partly inspired by Russell’s logical analyses. “Self-evidence,” he had written, can be 
“dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake.—What makes 
logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought” (1921, §5.4731; cf. Hacker 1986, 44–45 for 
discussion). Like Frege, then, though for different reasons, Wittgenstein believed in the universality 
of logic. Moreover, Wittgenstein brought fresh insights into the nature of logical truth: since logical 
propositions are true under all conceivable circumstances, they are, he held, tautologous and empty 
of factual content, and this explains their necessity. Consequently, as Hacker (1986, 46) points out, 
Wittgenstein thought we do not “know” logical truths, since they had no sense (which is not to 
say that they are unknown or nonsensical). Moreover, Wittgenstein thought that the equally 
tautologous status of all logical truths undermines the axiomatisation of logic: none are especially 
primitive, for instance because self-evident as Frege’s (and Russell’s) axioms were regarded 
(Hacker 1996, 33–34; Wittgenstein 1921, §6.127).  
Wittgenstein’s idea that logical truths are tautologous was to prove extremely influential; the 
use of that idea to quash logicism, however, less so. Specifically, the tautology—the emptiness—
of logical truth, along with other aspects of the Tractatus, became pivotal to the project of a group 
of Viennese philosophers39 (and other philosophically minded thinkers), who dubbed themselves 
the “Vienna Circle”. The Circle ambitiously attempted to use the new logic to ground the entire 
edifice of human knowledge, now emboldened by the possibility of extending Wittgenstein’s view 
of logic as contentless to the whole of mathematics (Awodey and Carus 2007, 26). Accordingly, 
rather than following Wittgenstein’s negative lead on the matter, they instead beckoned in a new 
wave of logicism. The philosophy they espoused came to be called “logical positivism”; eventually, 
“logical empiricism”.  
 
§2.2.1 The Vienna Circle 
Logical empiricism was committed to a few central ideas: to the use of the new logic, a radical 
empiricism, a critique of metaphysics, and the so-called “verifiability criterion of meaning” (see 
below). Further, they also shared a broad view of analytic truths as expressing linguistic 
conventions, especially as applied to necessary and putatively metaphysical propositions. Circle 
member Moritz Schlick’s General Theory of Knowledge (1925; German-language first edition published 
in 1918) had prefigured this focus on convention. Schlick took inspiration, in turn, from Hilbert, 
who argued that the discovery of new non-Euclidian geometries showed that the axioms of 
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geometry are chosen (arbitrarily, so long as consistent), and thereby that they “implicitly define” 
the constituent expressions within the axioms (such as “line”, e.g.) (Hacker 1996, 46).  
The new logical calculus seemed to be the perfect tool to fulfil Enlightenment ideals of 
articulating what knowledge really consists in, without succumbing to subjective, Romanticist 
notions. Thus, the Vienna Circle believed a fully deductive approach using the new logic could 
reconstruct our folk concepts from the ground up, thereby issuing scientifically respectable 
alternatives in their place (Carus 2007, 14). One tool of this reconstruction task was the 
aforementioned verifiability criterion of meaning. The Anglophone representative of logical 
positivism,40 A. J. Ayer, expounds the principle in the preface to his Language, Truth and Logic: 
To test whether a sentence expresses a genuine empirical hypothesis, I adopt what may 
be called a modified verification principle. For I require of an empirical hypothesis, not 
indeed that it should be conclusively verifiable, but that some possible sense-experience 
should be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. If a putative 
proposition fails to satisfy this principle, and is not a tautology, then I hold that it is 
metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally 
senseless. (Ayer 1936, 9) 
(The final sentence here is not itself part of the principle, but a hypothetical application of it.) We 
should note here that it is a matter of controversy which kinds of proposition—or indeed, whether 
propositions or sentences—play the verifying role: those reporting sense-data, as Ayer seems to 
believe, or those describing physical objects. 
Problems aside, the basic idea is that when we find ourselves unable to locate the possible 
sense-experiences (or whatever else) which would determine whether or not some proposition, 
such as “God is omnipotent”, is true, and having also found it not to be tautologous, we must 
declare it as void of meaning. Only propositions which are tautologous or verifiable, on this 
criterion, are meaningful. Whereas, in contrast to religious, spiritual, aesthetic, and moral 
propositions, empirical propositions are easily conceived to be verifiable by some (set of) sense 
experiences. It will help to have an example. With a little consideration of the statement 
“Tomorrow at noon, the temperature in the first floor of the university library will be 25oc”, we 
can readily imagine the sorts of sense experiences (or material object statements) with which to 
test, in different ways, its truth or falsehood. We know that a measuring device of a certain sort 
placed in that location (specified more fully than in this proposition) at that given time would, if 
the statement is true, show the measure reaching a mark indicating the number 25; if false, it would 
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read another number. Further, as part of the reconstructive program, apparently subjective terms 
such as “hot” and “cold” could be given, it was thought, precise reconstructions (Carus 2007, 15). 
Analyticity enters the picture here, since, for the Circle, empirical truths are those made true by 
particular experiences, while logical truths, being tautologous, had to be true by virtue of their 
form alone: “made” true by the conventions of the symbolism (see Hacker 1996, 47). Further, as 
we discuss in §3, one way to try and define analyticity is via synonymy, and the verifiability principle 
of meaning also offers a criterion for determining synonymy: since we can give the meaning of an 
empirical statement by specifying the conditions under which it can be made true, statements have 
the same meaning (are synonymous) insofar as they share the same verifiability or falsifiability 
conditions.41  
The above discussion sketches out the general commitments of the Vienna Circle, but in this 
section henceforth, I want to focus on Rudolf Carnap. For one, analyticity remained pivotal to his 
changing philosophical projects; for another, his debates with Quine formed the foundation for 
much of what became analytic philosophy in the decades after (cf. Hacker 1996, 187-89). I will 
outline in brief each of Carnap’s projects, and show how each corresponding analytic-synthetic 
distinction adapted to those projects. 
 
§2.2.2 Carnap: The Aufbau 
Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World (1928)42 was a bold attempt to carry out the logicist 
ambitions of the Circle by securing the foundations of mathematics and the sciences. The system 
he advanced in the Aufbau attempts to reduce the language of physics down to a basic level:  
[I]t attempts a step-by-step derivation or “construction” of all concepts from certain 
fundamental concepts, so that a genealogy of concepts results in which each one has its 
definite place. It is the main thesis of construction theory that all concepts can in this 
way be derived from a few fundamental concepts. (Carnap 1928, §1)  
Accordingly, so-called construction theory aimed to reduce mathematical, logical, and scientific 
statements down to statements which no longer contained the original, problematic concepts, 
showing them to be constructed from the fundamental concepts. The reductions of the Aufbau, 
then, were somewhat like translations, recalling the transformative model of analysis discussed in 
§1. However, these apparent translations are such that one language (the formal language) is to be 
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more fundamental than all others, which brings to mind the decompositional method of analysis. 
Both methods of analysis seem to be present in Frege’s own logicist project also. (Strictly speaking, 
Carnap’s translations or analyses were quasi-analyses, though the distinction is not important for 
our purposes; see Richardson (1998, 51–59) for discussion). Further, the verifiability criterion of 
meaning finds application within this reductive system: any concepts which cannot be 
reconstructed from the base language can duly be proclaimed “nonrational” and “metaphysical” 
(1928, §176). 
The nature of the Aufbau reductions is contested (though not that the Aufbau is reductivist). An 
older interpretation sees Carnap as a radical empiricist who wanted to construct objects out of 
only spatiotemporal sense-data points, conceived as epistemologically privileged—the first, 
justified steps of knowledge. As Juhl and Loomis point out (2009, 24–25), there is some evidence 
that Carnap himself interpreted his Aufbau project this way. The newer interpretation, however, 
represented by Michael Friedman (1987, 1999), A. W. Carus (2007), and Alan Richardson (1998),43 
among others, maintains that this picture is misguided for reasons we explore presently. 
For one, Carnap does not take sense-data as given or primitive; instead, he builds up to them 
after a very lengthy construction which begins (and mostly stays) in the autopsychological domain 
(Friedman 1987, 522–23). The term “autopsychological” denotes, as Carnap describes it, “my” 
experiences; these do include, indeed, such experiences as a shade of blue in a particular place in 
the visual field. However, Carnap is keen to point out that these autopsychological terms are not 
meaningful in advance of the system’s construction—in advance, that is, of the nonpsychological, 
such as the physical, and the “you” having also been constructed (Carnap 1928, §65). 
For another, Carnap is open in the Aufbau about the legitimate bases for constructional systems: 
they could just as well be physical as autopsychological, and each have different advantages. 
Foreshadowing aspects of his later work, it is a matter of choice which base we build from  (Carnap 
1928, §62; Friedman 1987, 524; Richardson 1998, 24). (This aspect of the Aufbau is fairly open, 
then, although the logical side is not: the formal language to be used in the constructions is 
conceived as a universal logic, that of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia; this will soon change for 
Carnap.) Furthermore, Richardson (1998, 23) argues that the early project is guided by the 
epistemological quest for objectivity, having accepted that the logical constructions will begin from 
subjectivity—the “given” in experience—which, contra traditional empiricism, does not qualify as 
knowledge.  
                                                 
43 Richardson (1998, 2–3) provides a good list of sources for the late-twentieth century shift in approaches 




Whatever the best way to interpret and characterise Carnap’s early project, his constitutional 
definitions required much intellectual craft and finesse: the Aufbau painstakingly attempts to 
construct, step-by-step, a description of the world of physics from slender beginnings—from, at 
base, sentences about the recollection of similarity between elementary experiences, and via, inter 
alia, definitions of the individual sense modalities and colour qualities.  
Analyticity features in this grand project when characterising the theorems of its constructional 
(or constitutional) systems; the theorems, Carnap explains, split into analytic and empirical. Any 
such system reconstructs a concept from a formal base; this process thus begins with a definition 
or statement of the construction in the “base logistic language”. The formal definition is 
subsequently followed by re-statements in three auxiliary languages: the “paraphrase”, “realistic”, 
and “fictitious operation” languages (1928, §106). Carus notes that these auxiliary languages 
essentially ease our transition into the formal language, whose statements we cannot accurately 
translate at the informal level: 
The new, reconstructed concepts could still be described or explained or gestured at in 
ordinary language, or even in traditional philosophical language. But such forms of 
discourse can only be a more or less inaccurate approximation, a user interface for 
human users of genuine knowledge, whose precise and canonical statement is in the 
standard logical language. (Carus 2007, 14)  
Thus, natural languages such as German and English were conceived at this stage as imprecise 
tools, a means of accessing the formal language. This was nothing new by Carnap’s time, of course. 
Much of this viewpoint was common to Frege:  
In the first stages of any discipline we cannot avoid the use of ordinary words. But these 
words are, for the most part, not really appropriate for scientific purposes, because they 
are not precise enough and fluctuate in their use. (Frege 1914, 207) 
(Indeed, the similarities do not end there: in the same text, from a lecture, Frege discusses 
“constructive definition” (1914, 210)—which allows one to introduce a new sign to take over the 
complex sense of an older sign—for purposes of constructing a system “from the ground up”.) 
Anyway, with Carnap’s idea of a reconstruction in view, we can now approach his Aufbau 
definition of the analytic-synthetic distinction: 
The statements or theorems of a constructional system are divided into two different 
types . . . The first type of theorem can be deduced from the definitions alone 
(presupposing the axioms of logic, without which no deduction is possible at all). These 




relations between constructed objects which can be ascertained only through 
experience. We call them empirical theorems. (Carnap 1928, §106) 
Shortly, we will absorb this definition by considering its application in practice to some of Carnap’s 
actual constructions. At present, it is apposite to consider in brief its relation to Kant. Just after 
offering this definition of analyticity, Carnap refers to Kant’s own distinction, chiefly to point out 
that he rejects the synthetic a priori; there are “no such” judgments, according to construction 
theory. The matter is perhaps less clear, however, given the function of these judgements, as 
Richardson discusses: “The epistemological role that Carnap assigns to the logical truths embodied 
in his constitutional definitions is the methodological role played in Kantian philosophy by 
synthetic a priori principles: They first make possible objective, empirical knowledge” (Richardson 
1998, 196). At any rate, given Carnap’s above definition, he has no room for the synthetic a priori; 
it would be an invalid type of theorem or statement.  
In §108, Carnap formalises the given at the base of his constructions, which is a basic relation 
denoted by “Rs” in the base logistic language;44 in the paraphrase language, he calls this the 
recollection of similarity between elementary experiences. From this basic relation, Carnap can 
then derive theorems. The first theorem Carnap states is “Rs  as”, which means (in the 
paraphrase language) that the recollection of similarity (Rs) relation between two elementary 
experiences is asymmetrical (which is symbolised as “as”). To understand what this means, 
consider the following two elementary experiences: “y”, that of experiencing an amber colour 
patch before one, and “x”, that of experiencing the memory of an amber patch. By “asymmetrical”, 
then, Carnap means that x may be a recollected experience of—may be partly similar to—y, but 
not the other way around, since there is a temporal order to them. 
Now, we can see the theorem “Rs  as” (that the recollection of similarity between experiences 
is asymmetrical) does not follow from any definition. Accordingly, Carnap classifies it as empirical 
(or synthetic). By contrast, the construction “part-similarity” (§109) in turn is defined45 as follows: 
“if a recollection of similarity holds between elementary experiences x and y, then a part of x is 
similar to a part of y and a part of y is similar to a part of x”. It follows from this definition (when 
written in the base logistic language) that “part-similarity” is symmetrical; i.e., when one experience 
is recollected to be similar to a memory experience, those experiences are to that extent (at least) 
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part-similar. Likewise, every experience is part-similar to itself. Accordingly, the derived theorems 
“Ps  sym” (meaning that the relation of part-similarity is symmetrical) and “Ps  refl” (meaning 
that the relation is reflexive) are analytic: they are deducible from the construction’s definition alone. 
It is thus that an analytic-synthetic distinction finds a role in Carnap’s Aufbau project.  
Before moving on, two points are worth noting about Carnap’s characterisation of analytic and 
synthetic statements. First, he describes analytic theorems as “tautological statements about 
concepts”, while “the empirical theorems express an empirically ascertained state of affairs” (1928, 
§107). So it seems that at this stage, Carnap echoed the Circle’s guiding thought that analytic truths 
are tautologies, and further that “[l]ogic (including mathematics) consists solely of conventions concerning 
the use of symbols, and of tautologies on the basis of these conventions” (1928, §106). Second, 
whether some theorem counts as analytic or not will, for Carnap, depend on the how the 
construction is defined at the base level, which introduces an element of choice.  
Taking these two aspects into account, some comparisons with Frege’s conception are 
forthcoming. First and foremost, Carnap characterises analyticity by a criterion which certainly 
recalls Frege’s own approach—perhaps this is not so surprising, given that both definitions feature 
in logicist projects. Further, as we saw in §2.1, a statement is analytic for Frege when it can be 
derived from logical laws and definitions alone; Carnap notes that we “presuppose” the axioms of 
logic, and so his conception of analyticity appears to be very much influenced by Frege at this 
stage in this thinking. Likewise, on Carnap’s approach, analytic theorems seem relative to the 
chosen definitions at the base of a construction, which in principle could vary, or so it seems to 
me, though both Frege and this early Carnap are committed to the logic of the Begriffsschrift. 
 
§2.2.3 Carnap: Syntax 
By the time of The Logical Syntax of Language (1934), Carnap’s views had changed in some important 
respects. Significantly, he became aware of Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the first of 
which was published in 1931. Gödel had shown that for any axiomatic system, such as a logicist 
construction of arithmetic, there will always exist a true sentence formalisable in that system 
(perhaps, say, Goldbach’s Conjecture that every number greater than two is expressible as the sum 
of two primes) which we cannot prove to be true (or false) within the system; i.e. we cannot derive 
the statement from the axioms. We could always prove (or disprove) the statement trivially, by 
making it (or its negation) an axiom of the system, but then Gödel’s proof taught us that yet 
another statement will always exist which is not provable within this newly expanded system. Thus 
he had shown that no consistent system could be complete; moreover, that no complete system 




Gödel’s proofs changed things drastically for Carnap, as well as for logicism. As Steve Awodey 
notes, the results immediately cast into doubt the very idea of explaining all a priori knowledge in 
terms of analyticity or logical truth, insofar as “analytic” means tautological or trivial (Awodey 
2007, 226–27). Perhaps that alone may not be a problem for, say, Frege, since (as we discussed) 
he did not question the self-evident status of his axioms. Yet more generally there is a problem for 
logicism here, since in both the Aufbau and Frege’s Begriffsschrift, a statement’s analyticity is 
characterised by its demonstrability from (at least) axioms, and Gödel shows that arithmetical 
truths will always exist which are not demonstrable in the basic logic. Accordingly, since Gödel’s 
incompleteness results had shown there was no way forward for a logicism trying to prove all true 
statements of mathematics within a finite system, Carnap sought a wider notion of logical truth 
than is allowed by provability. In essence, then, he looked for a new definition of analyticity. 
We can see how a new definition struck Carnap as possible by means of a useful analogy.46 On 
a chessboard, pieces are arranged in starting positions, which we can imagine as the axioms of a 
formal system; further, chess rules govern permissible moves, which we can analogise as inference 
rules; and finally, series of moves lead to positions of checkmate, and we can think of these entire 
move sequences as theorems. The idea that there could be some stronger conception of logical 
truth than provability, such as analyticity, is here the idea that there are configurations of pieces 
constituting checkmate which cannot be achieved through a permitted chain of moves. One such 
configuration is a row of black pawns, each unmoved from their starting positions, and, behind 
them, a white rook in one corner checking a king in the other. Thereby, we have a position which 
looks to be a legitimate checkmate (a true statement of the system), but which we cannot ever 
demonstrate as culminating via a chain of valid sequential moves from the starting positions (i.e., 
as provable within the system). Nonetheless, the configuration remains checkmate, like a statement 
that is necessarily true but not provable from the axioms. 
What the chess analogy shows is that a new definition of analyticity would have to be formed 
syntactically—i.e., according to the rules of a formal system (not referring at all to the meaning or 
interpretation of its signs), much as the checkmate is valid by virtue of the rules of chess. Carnap 
soon found out, however, that any attempt to define analyticity syntactically within an axiomatic 
system would encounter fatal problems (Awodey 2007, 228), and so Carnap followed Tarski, 
Hilbert, and Gödel in adopting “metalinguistic” systems, able to talk about the original “object” 
language in a so-called meta-language. To avoid contradictions, Carnap had to employ a meta-
language more resourceful or “stronger” than the object-language (the language of science); within 
                                                 




this more expressive language, then, he could define analyticity for the scientific language in terms 
of its rules. And so, in the Syntax, he finally found a way to characterise analytic or logical truth 
which was not vulnerable to incompleteness worries because not cast in terms of provability within 
a system.  
Specifically, in the Syntax, Carnap now uses the meta-language to define analytic sentences for 
the object-language as the consequences of every sentence (or as the consequences of the “empty 
set” of sentences, which is equivalent), thereby picking out those sentences which are true 
whatever the empirical facts are (1934, 39). Thus, analytic (or logically true/“L-true”) sentences 
are not necessarily demonstrable from the axioms, and are instead classifiable as “L-determinate”. 
(Likewise, contradictory sentences, which have every sentence as a consequence, are L-
determinate; a sentence is thus determinate if and only if it is either analytic or contradictory.) 
Carnap then uses determinacy to characterise logic more generally (Carnap 1934, 39–42, 177); this 
manoeuvre allows him methodically to separate out logical from empirical truths while no longer 
being shackled by concerns about provability within a system. 
However, having now ascended to the meta-linguistic level, Carnap no longer saw it necessary 
to commit himself to the universalist conception of logic he took over from the Tractatus. If logical 
truth can only be defined for an object-language, such as the language of science, then the question 
over the “right” definition of logical truth seems to be ill-formed. Of course, he realised in turn, 
different logical systems must be possible, since logical truth or analyticity is always relative to a 
language system. This realisation became the famous “principle of tolerance”. (I think it is fair to 
say, however, that there were shades of the tolerant approach in the Aufbau, especially if the more 
recent interpretation of the Aufbau prevails.) Carnap expounds the principle in the Syntax:47 “It is 
not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions” (1934, §17). He continues: 
In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own 
form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss 
it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical 
arguments. (Carnap 1934, §17) 
The principle of tolerance is thus Carnap’s way of freeing himself from a universal logic. Which 
logic one “chooses”—say, intuitionist or classical logic, will be decided by pragmatic criteria as to 
which is more fruitful. Accordingly, for Carnap by this stage, no single logical framework governs 
rational thought (Friedman 1999, 169).  
                                                 





The impact of tolerance on analyticity is significant. While, in the Aufbau, sentences are only 
analytic relative to the formal framework in which they occur, now, with the principle of tolerance 
in play, many different frameworks are possible, such that quite different sentences could be 
analytic given the different available frameworks. Likewise, it is only within a logico-linguistic 
framework that synthetic sentences are possible, since the analytic-synthetic distinction is provided 
by the framework’s logical structure. Consequently, as Richardson argues, it is not quite right (as 
we may be tempted) to say that logic, for Carnap, is fact-independent: every language has its own 
logical structure, and thereby its own analytic-synthetic distinction which delimits what, ultimately, 
could even count as a fact in the first place (1998, 217).48  
Finally, this pluralism thus extends to working out how best to structure the language of physics, 
which is still Carnap’s aim. That is, the kind of sentence sitting at the bottom of a reduction, a so-
called “protocol sentence”—say “there is green before me now”—is open to decision, constrained 
only by practical criteria (such as relative syntactical complexity) and not by philosophical concerns 
as to ultimate correctness (Carnap 1932, 465). But although the construction of scientific language 
remains the main aim, Carnap no longer conceives the project in epistemological terms: he is not 
working out how to move from a subjective, autopsychological language to objective (or 
intersubjective) scientific language, as he was in the Aufbau. Rather, the protocol sentences are 
already objective, and autopsychological language is not epistemically privileged (Richardson 1998, 
216). 
Further detailed discussion of Carnap’s (rather technical) Syntax project, and the employment 
of analyticity within it, goes far beyond the scope of this chapter. We can, however, briefly mention 
some interesting changes. First, since Carnap disowns the epistemological commitment of the 
Aufbau, analytic sentences are no longer those which are derived from a subjective base language 
(out of which objective language must be constructed). Second, given the new pluralistic approach, 
logical empiricists may choose the (base) protocol language as they like, abiding only by pragmatic 
criteria; this means that the analytic-synthetic distinction is now relative to the chosen formal 
object-language. A further consequence of this fact is that the analytic-synthetic distinction itself 
cannot be defined by some epistemological criterion: epistemic notions, such as confirmation, are 
defined within a framework, and the framework’s very principles are expressed by analytic 
sentences. Thus, it is inaccurate to say that for Carnap analytic sentences are those which have 
some special epistemic authority in the sense of epistemological access (Richardson 1998, 223); 
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the only priority they enjoy is logical, not epistemic—this point will have significance in both §3 
of this chapter, and the next chapter of this thesis.  
 
§2.2.4 Carnap: Semantics 
In Carnap’s later period, analyticity still remained essential to his thinking. This period was 
characterised by a turn toward semantics, and eventually the notion of explication. Heavily 
influenced by Tarski and his disquotational truth-schemas (of the form “ ‘S’ is true iff p”), Carnap 
employed Tarski’s semantical methods to define in the meta-language (for the formal object-
languages) such notions as “truth” and “designation”—notions he disallowed in the Syntax. Over 
time, Carnap became interested in employing semantical methods in order to “explicate” 
troublesome concepts, such as those of truth, designation, and analyticity itself. Carnap explains 
in Meaning and Necessity (1947) that in an explication he replaces a familiar though vague concept 
(the “explicandum”) with a precise alternative (the “explicatum”).  
The explicatum of the apparently vague concept of analyticity is “L-true”, which, he notes, “is 
meant as an explicatum for what Leibniz called necessary truth and Kant analytic truth” (Carnap 
1947, §2). Presumably, given our exposition in §1, Carnap has in mind what may best be described 
for Leibniz as analytic-necessary truth, since (if Leibniz does have a comparable conception of 
analyticity), ordinary factual truths are also analytic for God, in Leibniz’s view, although contingent. 
Analyticity for Kant is a comparatively simple affair, though I think since Carnap would find 
conceptual containment far too ambiguous, he likely has in mind Kant’s epistemological and 
logical characterisations; respectively, that an analytic judgement must not be ampliative and that 
its denial is a contradiction in terms.  
The relationship between explication of analyticity and L-truth is notable. By this later stage in 
his thinking, Carnap clearly still regards analyticity as an important concept, but he deems it in 
need of transformative clarification. Yet for there to be an explicatum of analyticity, there must 
be, as Carnap accepted, an everyday pre-theoretical explicandum—i.e., not one of his prior 
definitions for a formal language, but one in English, say, or German. Beyond those, however, he 
does appeal to the theoretical conceptions as formulated by Kant and Leibniz; perhaps Carnap 
regards these as explicata of more ordinary notions, though not explicata which were exact enough. 
“Enough” is to be cashed out in terms of practical purposes—fruitfulness (as well as exactness) is 
one of the desiderata which constrain the process of explication, for Carnap.49 Another is similarity, 
                                                 





so presumably Carnap had seen in ordinary talk, in philosophical history, and in his own past 
formulations some kernel of analyticity which he wanted to reproduce, but put to a more fruitful 
purpose, given his motivations. In any case, it is only due to this “given” explicandum of analyticity 
that Carnap can provide a definition for its explicatum, L-truth. The definition is as follows: 
2-2. Definition. A sentence Si is L-true (in S1) = Df Si holds in every state-description (in 
S1). (Carnap 1947, §2)
50 
Here, the notion of a “state-description” eliminates and replaces talk about logical truth or 
analyticity. A state-description is a class of sentences in an object-language (here, the language “S1”) 
which contains (and only contains) every atomic sentence of that language or its negation (Carnap 
compares state-descriptions to Leibniz’s possible worlds and early Wittgenstein’s “states of 
affairs”; essentially, a state-description is a line in a truth-table). A state-description thus describes 
a possible state of the respective universe of discourse, and if a sentence holds in a state-
description, this simply means that were the world arranged that way, the sentence would be true. 
Now, grouping every state-description together conjointly would describe all the possible ways the 
world could be arranged. For example, taking classical logic as our framework language, Arnold 
could be proud (“Pa”) or he could not be proud (“¬Pa”); in any given state-description, either of 
those two sentences will be true (within classical logic, at least). Accordingly, “Pa v ¬Pa” holds in 
every state-description, and is thus L-true. And since such a sentence is true in every state-
description, we have no recourse to the “facts of the universe” in order to demonstrate its truth. 
This means in turn that Carnap’s definition of L-truth satisfies his general motivating idea of 
analyticity, which he spells out in an adequacy condition: 
2-1. Convention. A sentence Si is L-true in a semantical system S1 if and only if Si is true in 
S1 in such a way that its truth can be established on the basis of the semantical rules of 
the system S1 alone, without any reference to (extra-linguistic) facts. (Carnap 1947, §2) 
This convention is plausibly that very kernel of prior formulations which Carnap wanted to retain 
in his explications: the basic thought that some truths, relative to a logico-linguistic system, are 
true because of the rules of that system, and thus make no mention of facts. This motivating idea 
is that which Quine will object to the most, and the underlying distinction between facts and logic 
that it relies on. Indeed, we turn to Quine’s criticisms shortly.  
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Having surveyed the different projects to which Carnap was committed, we can see that 
analyticity was pivotal to each of them. Further, the main differences between the conceptions are 
those which allow ways for certain core ideas to persist, given new obstacles. For example, 
throughout these projects, analyticity always remains relative to a language system, but that 
relativity is cashed out differently in response to challenges and opportunities presented by 
contemporary thought at the time. Likewise, Carnap always wants to isolate the notion of logical 
truth for the purposes of grounding the language of science. Both commitments remain central 
through successive stages of his philosophical career.  
In the Aufbau, a sentence in the base logistic language is analytic when it follows from the 
axioms of logic and arithmetic; true, the only logical language he has in mind at this stage is 
classical, but the analytic-synthetic distinction is still a technical device relative to the framework 
we employ, and it allows us to tell apart the theorems whose truth we can verify by empirical means 
from those we cannot. However, Gödel had shown that we cannot derive from such a formal 
system’s axioms every true statement, and so Carnap adapted analyticity in response. In the Syntax, 
no longer wedded to the universality of classical logic, Carnap argues that sentences are analytic 
relative to any of the different logical languages we choose, so long as their rules are clearly and 
exactly spelt out. Carnap thus employs the analytic-synthetic distinction only when using a 
resourceful meta-language for a given object-language: an object-language sentence can then be 
specified as analytic when it follows from every one of its sentences; i.e., when it is a consequence 
of the empty set. Thereby, the thought once again that analyticity and logical truth precede 
empirical matters is retained.51 Finally, that crucial separation is just as relevant in Carnap’s later 
period, too, where he now uses a meta-language to specify a sentence as L-true in the object-
language iff it holds in every state-description of that language. Accordingly, there are no 
possibilities in which that sentence is false, such that factual matters are not relevant to its truth.   
There is much left to say about the success of Carnap’s use of the analytic-synthetic distinction 
as it pertains to the goal of his projects. We cannot engage with most of the appraisal even from 
the literature, but we would be remiss not to recite and discuss Quine’s basic objections to Carnap’s 
use of the distinction. 
 
 
                                                 
51 I choose “precedes” rather than “do not depend on” to be mindful of Richardson’s point as discussed, 






The analytic-synthetic distinction enjoyed a heyday under the logical empiricists, and especially 
under Carnap. But it fell into disrepute not long after, as is well known, due to the criticisms of 
Quine. It is apt to reflect, briefly, on Quine’s legacy in this respect. 
 
§3.1 The impact of Quine 
Although the distinction is still employed in contemporary analytic philosophy, it is not wisely 
employed without safeguards. For example, Amie Thomasson (2007) argues that recent intractable 
metaphysical debates about the composition of objects are dissolvable by consideration of the 
analytic interrelations between statements about objects and statements about the “simples” of 
which objects are supposedly composed. But in order to offer that critique, Thomasson first 
spends a methodological chapter justifying her use of the analytic-synthetic distinction, directly 
attacking Quine’s arguments (2007, chap.2). Such a procedure, after Quine, makes sense, and this 
really speaks to his influence. 
But it seems that more than Quine’s arguments themselves, the general feeling which Quine 
engendered—that the analytic-synthetic distinction could not be taken for granted—is what led to 
its relative absence in the contemporary setting. For instance, while Timothy Williamson finds he 
cannot rely on Quine’s arguments against the notion of analyticity in his Philosophy of Philosophy, 
because he finds them no longer compelling (2007, 50), he does admit wanting to stay true to 
something of a Quinean spirit with his own arguments: “There is something robust about ‘Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism’: insights remain even when its skepticism towards meaning is stripped 
away” (2007, 52). Indeed, in the next chapter, I highlight just how a point commonly cited in 
material about analyticity today has an ancestor in Quine’s discussion. 
Were Quine’s attack to land—were the analytic-synthetic distinction to be disregarded 
entirely—one would come to see just how important the distinction was. As we have surveyed it 
in this chapter, the distinction forms a central part of several philosophical projects. Leibniz’s 
metaphysics of substance is articulated by means of the notion of analysis, which may well imply 
that all truth is analytic, even if not logically necessary. It is highly questionable whether Hume 
divided truth into analytic and synthetic, yet the distinction he does own, between relations of 
ideas and matters of fact, helps him formulate in his later philosophy his investigative intentions. 
For example, if causal sentences clearly expressed relations between ideas, Hume would not find 
them troubling; yet if, as he suggested, they express propositions concerning matters of fact, then 




nonetheless influenced Kant, whose conception of transcendental philosophy—its entire point 
and purpose—is expressed in terms of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements, which, he 
held, condition the possibility of experience. Next Frege, as a logician and mathematician, wanted 
to secure arithmetic in logic—to bring its theorems out from the synthetic cold as Kant had left 
them; to show arithmetic to be fully analytic. The Fregean project ultimately failed, but Carnap 
was nevertheless determined to find a way to construct from mathematical and logical axioms the 
language of science, including physics, arithmetic, and geometry. His various attempts each made 
use of some conception of analyticity, which unfailingly formed the bedrock of those attempts. 
There is no doubt, then, of the historical significance of the analytic-synthetic distinction, under 
its different guises. 
Even today, although the term “analytic” is not always happily invoked (with the exception of 
the “epistemic analyticity” advocates, such as Boghossian, whom we discuss next chapter), there 
is a sense that some distinction between truth which is conceptual and truth which is empirical 
must undergird the point and purpose of philosophy as its own discipline. And this is why 
Williamson’s battle against the distinction is the main thrust of his war on what he terms 
“philosophical exceptionalism” (2007, 3). Contra Williamson, it is an underlying theme of my 
thesis that there is a compelling way to spell out how philosophy should be thought of as especially 
conceptual, and so, relatively, exceptional in its turn. But before we can scrutinise Williamson’s 
attack on philosophy as a discipline independent from the sciences, we must finally finish tracing 
the historical roots of the analytic-synthetic distinction by investigating Quine’s influential critique. 
 
§3.2 Quine’s epistemological holism 
Quine’s arguments against analyticity invoke his epistemological holism, which he offers in order 
to criticise the view of confirmation he thinks is implicit in the verification principle of meaning. 
It is worth noting that this is only one way in which Quine attacks analyticity, albeit perhaps the 
most direct way, insofar as that notion is put forward by logical empiricists. For this reason, I cover 
it here before Quine’s other criticisms which might threaten not just the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, but meaning itself.  
As elsewhere in his seminal article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951), Quine thinks the 
best route to attacking a given notion is to see what light (or darkness) it casts on related notions. 
So here he investigates the verification principle of meaning in terms of its effect on synonymy (a 
notion of which Quine is sceptical to begin with). He thinks that if the verification principle of 
meaning can offer us a coherent account of when statements are synonymous, it can thereby give 




to synonymy: two statements are synonymous when (and, I presume, only when) they are 
confirmed or falsified by the exact same conditions. On this view, then, “Tomorrow at noon, the 
temperature in the first floor of the university library will be 25oc” means the same as “By midday, 
it will be 25oc on floor two inside the Templeman building”,52 since the conditions which would 
verify or falsify the one would equally as well the other.  
Yet, as Quine points out (1951, 38), by offering this account of statement synonymy we have 
tacitly presumed a very particular view of how it is that individual statements, or hypotheses, are 
verified by experience. Quine sees the paradigm example of this kind of view as embodied in 
Carnap’s Aufbau, which, according to Quine, promoted the translation of “significant discourse” 
into a specified sense-datum language which took statements as primary units of meaning (1951, 
39).53 This explicit reductionism is held by Quine to have engendered a reductivist assumption in 
the epistemology of his day: “The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each 
statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all” 
(1951, 41). 
Now, the reason this apparent dogma is relevant is because, Quine claims, it is “intimately 
connected” with the dogmatic belief in the analytic-synthetic distinction, and in fact that they are 
“at root identical” (1951, 41). He takes them to be related since he deems the idea of analyticity to 
depict a limiting case of truth—i.e., given the verification principle of meaning, a statement is 
meaningful when we can specify the conditions which would verify or falsify it, except for those 
(analytic) statements which are verified “come what may” (1951, 41). Quine demonstrates this 
limiting case in another way by saying that statements in general are made true by two components: 
one which specifies, empirically, the way the world is, and the other which specifies the way 
language is. So, Quine thinks, another definition of “analytic statement” is a statement which has 
a null factual component. This, as we have seen, does not stray far from the Viennese conception, 
especially by the point of Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity definition, that analytic propositions are 
the consequences of every proposition, which makes them true “come what may” (to use Quine’s 
terms).  
At this juncture, I wish to pause and prefigure concerns essential to this thesis (and to the next 
three chapters in particular). If we commit to this view of “truth-making” in general—that 
                                                 
52 The required context for this similarity to be transparent, of course, is that the phrase “the university 
library” is a definite description uttered on the campus of The University of Kent, whose library is named 
the “Templeman building”.  
53 There is reason to regard Quine’s influential reading of the Aufbau as significantly skewed by his awareness 




declarative sentences or other truthbearers are made true by separate linguistic and factual 
components—then we implicitly assume two deeply problematic thoughts. First, this general view 
of truth-making tends to presuppose that normative sentences are also descriptive; this is 
something which I show in the next chapter is present in the work of Chisholm, Boghossian, 
Williamson, and others (see §2 of my Chapter 2). I find this view very much mistaken, and I take 
rejecting it to unlock much confusion surrounding the idea of conceptual truth. Second, there is a 
problem contained in the very idea that a sentence is made true by separable components, language 
and fact, which beckons a troubling philosophical anxiety about the epistemological relationship 
between ourselves and the world. Quine certainly succumbs to this second problem, inherent at it 
is in his picture of intentionality and truth; the relationship between analyticity and this picture will 
motivate much of Chapter 4. But it is open to question whether we can attribute the problematic 
first view to Quine, since his epistemological holism, as we see presently, leads him to see the 
limiting case definition as unintelligible.  
Indeed, Quine thinks that this way of framing analyticity is at bottom nonsense because it 
presumes that individual statements are base elements of a larger, divisible whole: “what I am now 
urging is that even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our grid too finely. The unit of 
empirical significance is the whole of science” (1951, 42). Let us use one of Quine’s analogies to 
explain this view. Imagine all humanity’s efforts to know the world—be they those in the 
humanities, sciences, social disciplines, or mathematics—as forming a large fabric. The fabric as 
constructed will have a peripheral border, and so pieces of knowledge will be scattered about the 
fabric closer to the border or further back from it. What lies outside the border is, in this analogy, 
experience itself, so that only some pieces of knowledge or belief actually “touch up” against 
experience. Where it does this, pieces of belief at the periphery are bound at times to conflict with 
pieces of experience, which will occasion change: 
A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior [of 
the fabric]. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Re-
evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical 
interconnections—the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of 
the system, certain further elements of the field. (Quine 1951, 42) 
The idea here is that any statement in the system is open to revision, including logical laws (1951, 
43). In principle, even statements close to the periphery can be maintained while those we are 
more committed to near the centre are changed. This possibility, Quine thought, rendered the 





But, to be fair to Carnap, aspects of this holism and freedom of choice over revision echo some 
of his own views. For we saw that, at least by the time of the Syntax, Carnap thought that the L-
true sentences of an object-language were to be specified using a meta-language, and that we had 
a choice, given the principle of tolerance, to adopt different languages, which thereby changes 
which sentences count as L-true (analytic in the object-language). Thus, given tolerance, the law 
of non-contradiction could be true in one language, and not in another. Hylton points out, 
however, that the principle of tolerance epitomises the problem for Quine: the principle reinforces 
the epistemological difference between analytic and synthetic truth (it treats some parts of the 
fabric as entirely separate), since although we are free to choose the analytic principles which in 
effect constitute the language, our choosing them is supposed to circumscribe them, and prevent 
them from verification or falsification within the language (Hylton 2016, §3.1). And that, Quine 
argues, simply is not so.   
 
§3.3 The second dogma 
Let us move on to Quine’s attack on the other dogma. He begins by covering different ways to 
draw the analytic-synthetic distinction. Unsatisfied with Kant’s containment metaphor, he suggests 
that it really comes to the following: that a judgement is analytic when true in virtue of meaning 
and independently of fact (1951, 21). To become more precise, Quine distinguishes between those 
analytic statements which are logical truths (“No unmarried man is married”) and those which are 
reducible to logical truths by the substitution of synonyms for synonyms (“No bachelor is 
married”). It is the latter kind on which Quine focuses his critique. 
As an aside, note that this latter kind of analyticity, on which Quine focuses, is that which 
Boghossian more recently termed “Frege-analyticity” (1997, 337). However, in spite of 
Boghossian’s preferred terminology, this is not actually Frege’s definition of analyticity, for 
Boghossian’s rendering does not individuate analytic truths according to the method of proof 
involved in their “ultimate” justification.54 The method of proof requisite to show a judgement to 
be analytic is one in which we consult only logical laws and definitions. (I think Frege-analyticity 
is more aptly ascribed to Leibniz, since it does resemble the process as he elaborated on it for 
demonstrating a truth by analysis; see my §1.1.) Incidentally, Boghossian shows some reservation 
in a footnote that his so-called Frege-analyticity may not be Frege’s, but thinks the important thing 
“is not who came up with the idea, but rather the philosophical role it has played” (1997, n.13). 
                                                 
54 See my §2.1. Cf. Van Cleve (1999, 20–21) for a different view—that Kant’s logical criterion is essentially 




However, one overarching point of this chapter has been to show that understanding the role 
which different conceptions of analyticity play is, partly, understanding the projects and ambitions 
of those who employ it; thus, misattributing technical conceptions to a thinker is not as innocent 
as it appears. 
At any rate, the important feature of “Frege-analyticity”—i.e., the claim that a sentence is 
analytic iff reducible to the form of a logical truth by the substitution of synonym for synonym—
is that it specifies a semantical criterion. That is, the definition relies on the interpretations of what 
words mean. This is significant for Quine’s attack because he argues that this notion of analyticity 
relies on a problematically circular group of intensional, and thus semantic, concepts. An 
“extension” is said to be the class of objects that fall under a given concept; e.g., the general 
concept “football” has as its extension the set of all footballs. An “intension”, by contrast, is meant 
to be the rule we might follow to pick out extensions—the rule in virtue of which we discriminate 
footballs as footballs.55 An intensional notion, then, is one which concerns not extensions and 
referents directly, but how they are picked out: “meaning”, “concept”, “proposition”, “synonymy”, 
and so forth. As Quine notes, synonymy between two expressions cannot be cashed out in terms 
of which objects fall under them, for the same objects fall under “creature with a kidney” as 
“creature with a heart” and yet the terms are not synonymous; thus, he concludes, synonymy is 
not extensional (1951, 21). 
The next move in Quine’s argument, then, is to demand that we clarify synonymy (since the 
definition of analyticity invokes it) and to do so in a way which is extensional. Quine thought that 
the natural attempt to clarify the notion of synonymy would be to invoke the notion of definition. 
For, by definition “unmarried men” is substitutable for “bachelors”. But, he then objected, 
depending on how we understand “definition”, we get ourselves into further trouble. For, on the 
one hand, “definition” may mean the entry in the dictionary we look up, but if so this would 
actually presuppose synonymy, since the lexicographer plausibly first finds pre-existent facts about 
synonymies and then compiles them. Or, on the other hand, a “definition” may be something we 
explicitly stipulate or legislate (“This term: ‘. . .’, will henceforth mean this object: . . .”). However, 
although for Quine this stipulative case counts as legitimate analyticity, he believes this to be 
limited to few scenarios—“would that all species of synonymy were as intelligible” (1951, 26). 
                                                 
55 Incidentally, that rule might not be so easy to specify (which, to my mind, also affects what the extension 
is); for all intents and purposes, a discarded aluminium can in many parts of the world, within a game, is 
most definitely a football, as would be the conventional football on the shelves of a sports shop or in a 
factory. Then there is the complication that such a ball might not count as a football when thrown onto the 
pitch during a game in which players already possess and play with a ball; the latter is in a sense eligible—it 




Quine hopes, then, to demonstrate that subsequent attempts to clarify the notion of synonymy 
fail too—for instance, if we try to use “interchangeable”, with caveats, Quine reasons we must slip 
into an intensional “necessarily” (1951, 29–31). Accordingly, taking these points all together, Quine 
levies a circularity charge at those who wield an analytic-synthetic distinction, insofar as analyticity 
goes beyond “logically true”. That is, according to Quine, it is impossible to define “analyticity” 
without reference to intensional notions, which each stand in need (he thinks) of extensional 
clarification. Thus, by Quine’s lights, the notion of analyticity suffers two fatal problems: it assumes 
an untenable (because atomic) picture of the relationship between language and the world, and it 
suffers a vagueness which it cannot clarify except by use of notions themselves unclear. 
There are many points of criticism against these arguments which we could rehearse.56 
However, as mentioned, the contemporary mistrust of analyticity does not have so much its source 
in Quine’s arguments as in the atmosphere which those arguments brought in their wake. Perhaps 
that is not entirely fair; it is the meaning-scepticism which most subsequent attacks sought not to 
reproduce. For example, Williamson’s own criticism, as we discuss in Chapter 3, invokes an 
epistemological holism, which naturally has a Quinean shape. And both Boghossian and 
Williamson, respectively an advocate and critic of analyticity, subscribe to a view which I think is 
at least latent in Quine as well: that descriptions and prescriptions are not logically exclusive. 
Indeed, come Chapter 4 we see that Quine’s own conception of how language or theory and the 
world relate is implicit in the way he thinks analyticity must be, and this has terrible consequences 
for our justificatory place in the empirical world. 
My concern in the following chapter is to scrutinise Boghossian’s present-day attempt to 
recover analyticity from a weakened state by carving off its apparently more problematic aspects 
into a separate, unviable conception, leaving behind a workable notion. I argue that this approach 
is instructively wrong-headed.  
  
                                                 
56 For example, see Grice and Strawson (1956) for a direct response, as well as Putnam (1962) for a critical 




Chapter Two  
The normativity of analytic truth 
In the first chapter, we surveyed several conceptions of analyticity or associated analytic-synthetic 
distinctions. There are three main results to take from the chapter and to keep in mind throughout 
the rest of this thesis. 
First, the distinction is pivotal to various philosophical projects or systems, often in being used 
to help articulate the nature or domain of philosophy itself, or some special part of philosophy. 
For example, Kant thought the future of metaphysics lay with the question how synthetic a priori 
judgments are possible. Or consider Carnap, who at first construed epistemology as construction 
of the scientific language, which includes showing which of the language’s sentences are analytic 
or synthetic. Later, although he thought epistemology itself should be replaced by what he called 
logical syntax, or the logic of science, the logicist constructional project remained, which again 
required distinguishing the logical from the empirical parts of some framework language by appeal 
to analyticity (or L-truth, its explicated concept). There is no question, then, that historically the 
analytic-synthetic distinction has been fundamental to major areas of philosophical thought. 
Second, as can be gleaned again from the difference between Kant and Carnap, conceptions of 
analyticity are not equivalent. Even though Frege (1884, §3) saw himself as utilising Kant’s notion, 
and Carnap (1947, §2) as (later) explicating those of Kant and Leibniz, rarely do criteria for 
analyticity coincide neatly across projects. For example, despite much surface similarity, Leibniz 
and Kant discuss conceptual containment in quite different terms: for Leibniz, not only are some 
predicate notions contained within subject notions (which for Kant are only the analytic ones), all 
predicate notions are contained in their relevant subject notions, meaning that for Leibniz and not 
Kant all true affirmative propositions are analytic (though not all necessary). Or consider how the 
criterial role of logical non-contradiction in Kant and Leibniz differs to Hume (and is not explicitly 
part of Frege’s or Carnap’s conceptions): in Hume, the emphasis is predominantly psychological, 
depicting the impossibility of our being able to imagine contrary ideas at once, such as “red” and 
“green”; Kant, by contrast, employs a logical principle, and uses it to cash out the idea of 
conceptual containment. Furthermore, Kant applies an epistemological criterion absent from the 
other thinkers’ conceptions as discussed, since a judgement is synthetic, for Kant, whenever it 
increases our knowledge (i.e., is ampliative, not explicative), although Anderson argues this is a 
consequence of the containment criterion and not a criterion itself (2015, §1.2.3).  
Mention of Hume’s psychological principle brings to mind the third and final point: if we fail 




and by which they are motivated, then we have an attenuated and often misguided interpretation 
of them. For there is good reason, as I argued, not to take Hume’s epistemological fork as a version 
of the analytic-synthetic distinction at all, once we understand that the Humean “ideas” between 
which he thinks certain a priori relations hold lack the discursive nature of Kantian “concepts”. 
That is, ideas are not, in the manner of Kant’s concepts, applied by the understanding to empirical 
sense-data, thereby rendering perceptions intelligible; rather, they are such sense-data, intelligible 
as is, and mentally processed via perception (in Kant’s terms, by sensibility). Accordingly, Hume’s 
fork ought to be understood as part of his empiricism, and when taken as such, we have good 
reason to doubt its reputation as an incipient analytic-synthetic distinction. Moreover, even 
distinctions explicitly cast between the analytic and synthetic call on us to examine the theoretical 
detail which surrounds them. For example, the common catchphrase “truth in virtue of meaning” 
is not an especially helpful gloss on Carnap’s differing conceptions of analyticity without at least a 
glimpse into his evolving logicism. And so, to make a fair appraisal of some conception, it is 
imperative that we examine its surrounding philosophical project and purpose. 
Now, having surveyed these different historical conceptions of analyticity, we might compare 
them in terms of their most prominent criteria or aspects. Thus, we could say that Leibniz had an 
ontological conception, Kant an epistemological conception, and Carnap a logical conception. I 
do not think this would be an especially fruitful or indeed accurate means of description, except 
as perhaps a useful shorthand. Yet contemporary discussion is framed in terms of just such a 
general division—specifically, a divide is proposed between two apparently distinct “metaphysical” 
and “epistemic” conceptions of analyticity. Immediately this seems odd.  
In §§1.3-1.4, after exploring Boghossian’s discussion, I argue that in fact the distinction between 
so-called metaphysical and epistemic analyticity is, historically speaking, unwarranted. More 
problematically, however, it is badly conceived. I show that the attempt to distinguish metaphysical 
from epistemic analyticity fails to take seriously a fundamental point about the logic of our 
language: that rules are not, and cannot be, descriptions. To argue this point, I begin in §2 by 
examining a famous example from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953)—a discussion on 
whether we should or should not say that a standard metre is itself a metre in length. I use this 
example because Paul Boghossian (1996, 1997)57 himself cites a Kripkean interpretation of it to 
motivate the claim that some rules also describe facts.58  
                                                 
57 Boghossian (1996) contains the core arguments, but since Boghossian (1997) contained the same material, 
with expansions, I will henceforth reference this later article. 
58 For what it is worth, even though Boghossian is in some respects loyal to Kripke’s work, Kripke himself 




However, I find this attempt unsuccessful though instructive, and turn in §§3-4 to examining 
more generally why norms may not be descriptions. This involves discussing analytic truth with a 
normative focus that thus far I have not emphasised, and responding to an objection which opens 
up a pragmatic way of thinking about normativity. Finally, in §5, I bring the narrative back to the 
supposed division between metaphysical and epistemic analyticity; with arguments at hand for the 
normativity of analytic truth, we can see exactly why contemporary attempts to carve it up along 
these lines will never do justice to the idea of specifically conceptual truth.   
 
§1 Boghossian 
§1.1 Two kinds of analyticity? 
We have seen in the first chapter that, similar to Kant, the way Frege defines analytic truths is 
partly epistemological. Though no reference is made by Frege in his definition of analyticity to 
how we do in fact know an analytic truth, the notion of an “ultimate ground” for an analytic truth 
is epistemic. (We should not forget though that the criterion Frege applies is as much logical as 
epistemological; e.g., “[i]f, in carrying out this process [of proof], we come only on general logical 
laws and on definitions, then the truth is an analytic one” (Frege 1884, §3).) Let us look in more 
detail at why we might care that Frege’s definition of analyticity is wholly or partly epistemological 
in nature.  
The recent tradition which splits the characteristics of analyticity into metaphysical and 
epistemological conceptions goes back to Boghossian (1997). His concern is to defend a notion 
of analyticity against Quine’s arguments, because he thinks analyticity allows us to explain the 
possibility of a priori knowledge—particularly, for his purposes, the apriority of sentences which 
implicitly define the logical constants. Boghossian agrees with the main thrust of Quine’s 
arguments against analyticity (Boghossian 1997, 335); however, he thinks that they apply not to 
analyticity simpliciter, but a particular, “metaphysical” conception of it. Before we discuss these 
terms, I note that Boghossian is right to suggest that there are different conceptions of analyticity, 
but he splits them only into two general camps—as the first chapter showed us, we might add 
“conceptual”, “logical”, and “semantic” to the list too, if we are in the game of naming a conception 
after its most prominent aspect. 
                                                 
epistemic conceptions. Though brief and sketchy, an analytic truth for Kripke (1972, 122f, n. 63) is both a 




But that is just the point. As I soon argue, these labels are only emphases: traditionally, thinkers 
who stress the epistemological aspect of their conception of analyticity are still committed to 
metaphysical, or non-metaphysical, views. Indeed, for reasons I make clearer later, Boghossian’s 
attempt to divorce aspects of any given conception of analyticity into distinct conceptions in 
themselves fails. Moreover, seeing analyticity aright shows us that there is indeed something 
interesting, on a metaphysical level, about a plausible notion of analyticity, though, as hinted, that 
detail is more aptly described as non-metaphysical. Before I can offer these arguments, however, 
we must first get to grips with Boghossian’s terminology and aims. 
Boghossian introduces these two conceptions—metaphysical and epistemological—by 
outlining two motivations for the introduction of an analytic-synthetic distinction, especially as 
conceived by the Vienna Circle. The first motivation he cites is that of explaining how a priori 
knowledge about the world is possible—e.g., how we can know logical and mathematical 
statements, as well as conceptual truths. The second of the Circle’s motivations, Boghossian 
claims, is the problem of explaining de re, a priori necessities: i.e., how there can be necessary, 
language-independent connections, known independently of experience. I do not want to dwell 
much on these attributed motivations, but we can briefly reflect on the first, given the discussion 
in the last chapter. 
As we have seen, the empiricist leanings of the Viennese group certainly made them concerned 
about such a priori systems as mathematics, logic, and metaphysics, which they sought to explain 
(or else obviate). Indeed, they were not satisfied with their predecessors’ attempts to account for 
the a priori. We have already seen that Kant appealed partly to a priori intuitions to explain our 
knowledge of reality. Further, he argued that while our access to mathematics is a priori, 
mathematical judgements are synthetic. Accordingly, Moritz Schlick made it a key point to deny 
the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements (1925, 74; also §38). And although Frege, as per his 
logicism, saw arithmetic as analytic because reducible to logic, we discussed evidence to suggest 
that Frege believed in logical intuition (see Kanterian 2012, 25ff). Moreover, he still appealed to 
spatial intuition to explain geometry, which he saw as synthetic a priori, but post Hilbert, naturally, 
the Viennese saw geometry as analytic (Schlick 1925, §38). So certainly the Circle had something 
approaching the first motivation Boghossian attributes to them, namely that of explaining a priori 
knowledge. 
Anyway, it is against these two worries—the apriority of mathematics and logic, and the 
metaphysical status of necessities—that Boghossian wants us to see how the different conceptions 
arose. First, then, the epistemological conception of analyticity is introduced, on Boghossian’s 




of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth” (1997, 334—emphases added). Take a 
candidate analytic sentence, such as “All adults are grown-ups”, and consider how it is known. A 
sufficiently competent English speaker need not consult surveys of adults to find out whether they 
are predominantly, or all, grown-ups. No: one only has to know the meaning of “adult” and 
“grown-up” (and, of course, the logical vocabulary) in order to be justified in believing that the 
sentence is true (or so many claim59)—this is what makes the analyticity involved here 
epistemological, according to Boghossian. 
Next, Boghossian claims the metaphysical conception of analyticity is introduced to explain 
away the strangeness of de re necessities. On this conception, a statement is true by virtue of its 
meaning “provided that, in some appropriate sense, it owes its truth-value completely to its meaning, and 
not at all to ‘the facts.’ ” (1997, 334). Thus, on the so-called metaphysical conception, no 
(important) reference is made to how the truth is known, but rather how it is “made true”—this, 
I presume, is what makes the conception metaphysical. (Though, as we shall shortly see, I regard 
this as a misdescription.)  
As a side note, I think we should already be concerned about Boghossian’s story here. As 
discussed previously, it is not clear at all that there were distinct motivations (here, metaphysical; 
there, epistemological) which, as it were, fully guided thinkers either to metaphysical or 
epistemological conceptions. It is likewise unclear that individual philosophers employing some 
notion of analyticity were not simultaneously committed both to its metaphysical and 
epistemological characteristics. Boghossian’s account of the history, then, raises a preliminary 
doubt about the coherence of the distinction to which he ultimately cleaves. (Glüer (2003) also 
casts doubt, en passant, about the historical accuracy of Boghossian’s logical empiricist survey.) 
Nonetheless, having articulated the different conceptions of analyticity, Boghossian then argues 
in favour of epistemological analyticity and against metaphysical analyticity. Accordingly, 
Boghossian asserts that we can explain the possibility of a priori knowledge—specifically our 
knowledge of certain basic sentences which define the logical constants—without committing 
ourselves to explaining away de re necessities. Only in §1.3 will I argue that Boghossian’s distinction 
between kinds of analyticity does not bear critical scrutiny. At present, I rehearse his positive 
argument for how we can explain a priori knowledge by use of this so-called epistemic conception. 
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§1.2 Explaining a priori knowledge 
To begin his explanation of epistemic analyticity, Boghossian focuses on what he terms “Frege-
analyticity”: a statement is analytic if and only if it is reducible to a logical truth by the substitution 
of synonyms for synonyms. This particular notion of analyticity is one which Quine attacks in 
“Two Dogmas” (1951), but it in fact goes back past Kant to Leibniz (Glock 2003, 154; Burge 
2003b, 200); the caveat with the Leibniz attribution is that, in his writings, this process of analysis 
is not something finite minds can undertake in the case of contingent truths, which require a so-
called infinite analysis.  
Its basic application is this: an analytic sentence is one which is reducible to the form of a logical 
truth, e.g.,  
(褐x岻 岫Ax ａ Gx岻 蝦 Gx 
by the substitution of synonyms for synonyms—thus, “All adults are grown-ups” reduces to “All 
grown-ups are grown-ups” (given that “grown-up” is synonymous with “adult”). 
Boghossian takes Frege-analyticity to specify a “semantical condition”, because it explains how 
analytic sentences are known by appeal to something about their meaning; this, he thinks, could 
be the only general method of explaining epistemic analyticity (1997, 337). Accordingly, Frege-
analyticity aims to explain, on Boghossian’s reading, how a cognising subject could come to know 
the truth of certain statements by recognising and substituting synonyms in the appropriate way.60 
However, Boghossian worries that appealing to Frege-analyticity in order to explain how a priori 
claims are epistemically analytic encounters an obstacle. Namely, that logical truth—specifically 
the elementary laws of first-order logic—would also need to be a priori for the explanation to 
work (1997, 345–46).  
According to Boghossian, Frege simply assumed the apriority of logic in response to this worry. 
In fact, this is incorrect, given (as I pointed out in the first chapter) that Frege held a truth to be a 
priori if it is derivable exclusively from general laws. Thus, for Frege, the basic axioms of his system 
(general logical laws such as the law of identity) could neither be analytic nor a priori; rather, they 
are self-evident, which is sufficient in Frege’s view for their epistemological purpose. Nevertheless, 
I suspect Boghossian would be just as unsatisfied with this response as he is with the response he 
attributes to Frege (cf. Boghossian 1997, 337–38). For derivability from self-evident general logical 
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laws would be too narrow a definition of apriority for Boghossian, whose aim is to explain how 
we can grasp logical truths independently of experience.  
Indeed, Boghossian argues that Frege-analyticity ultimately provides an incomplete explanation, 
because it fails to explain precisely the analyticity of logical truths themselves. Moreover, he points 
out, Frege-analyticity cannot explain the analyticity of “Whatever is red all over is not green” and 
other conceptual truths, since they are not amenable to this synonym-substituting procedure (1997, 
338–39). Such sentences he regards as “Carnap-analytic”.61 And it is a Carnapian or 
Wittgensteinian solution which, Boghossian claims, can provide the requisite semantical condition 
to explain how any sentence is epistemically analytic. Although Boghossian’s aim is ostensibly to 
explain epistemic analyticity tout court, as already hinted, Boghossian thinks any semantical 
condition we put forward will reduce down to logical truth, such that we must explain the a priori 
grasp of logic if we are to explain how any proposition is epistemically analytic (1997, 345). 
By Boghossian’s lights, the semantical condition which can explain the apriority of logic, and 
eventually epistemic analyticity, is “Implicit Definition”. This thesis62 maintains that logical 
constants acquire their particular meaning via our stipulating that certain sentences involving them 
are true.  
Implicit definition: It is by arbitrarily stipulating that certain sentences of logic are to be 
true, or that certain inferences are to be valid, that we attach a meaning to the logical 
constants. More specifically, a particular constant means that logical object, if any, 
which would make valid a specified set of sentences and/or inferences involving it. 
(Boghossian 1997, 348) 
Kathrin Glüer (2003, 44) points out that this process of implicit definition is unlikely to be the 
origin story for any given piece of logical vocabulary; on her recommendation, then, we should 
interpret Boghossian as spelling out how “and”, etc. could come to mean what they do. (This does, 
however, prompt a question over why we should be concerned over some alternative way that 
words acquire meaning, and not their actual way.) In any case, Boghossian’s statement of the thesis 
is somewhat obscure, and I shortly explore some of its issues; a clearer expression is offered by 
Bob Hale and Crispin Wright: 
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We take some sentence containing—in the simplest case—just one hitherto 
unexplained expression. We stipulate that this sentence is to count as true. The effect is 
somehow to bring it about that the unexplained expression acquires a meaning of such 
a kind that a true thought is indeed expressed by the sentence—a thought which we 
understand and moreover know to be true, without incurring any further 
epistemological responsibility, just in virtue of the stipulation. (Hale and Wright 2000, 
288) 
Let us take an example. On this view of implicit definition, the negation symbol, 
¬ 
comes to mean “negation” because a certain sentence (or set of sentences), such as  
¬ (p ^ ¬ p) 
is said to be true. 
Inevitably, then, there is a pre-existing notion in the picture, though the symbol being defined 
does not yet call it to mind; the pre-existing notion (in Boghossian’s language, “object”) just has 
particular logical properties (e.g., that it negates). Accordingly, stipulating the truth of some 
canonical sentence involving the symbol—supposing this is an intelligible process, prior to 
interpreting one of the symbols—casts light on which notion the symbol must depict, given the 
logical properties in play. The thesis claims that by the stipulative move, I attain at once an a priori 
knowledge of the sentence’s truth and knowledge of its meaning; moreover, I know the sentence 
is true given only this meaning-knowledge.  
A natural way of reading this stipulating scenario is that by making the stipulation I am 
reminded of the meaning of some other symbol—that, as it were, the meaning which I already 
know is made transparent to me and I just see that it must carry over to the new symbol. However, 
Hale and Wright argue otherwise—that I need to think of myself as “so far innocent of the 
conceptual resource which the implicit definition affords” (2000, 300). Accordingly, the implicit 
definition account of logical constants is meant to show that anyone really could grasp the meaning 
of logical constants through this procedure. 
The reason Boghossian invokes this implicit definition thesis is to explain the apriority of logical 
truth, our knowledge of which in turn is supposed to explain how epistemic analyticity is possible. 
Let us see how he proposes implicit definition suffices to explain a priori grasp of logical truth in 
general; we can call it the Boghossian argument (hereafter, BOG): 
1. If logical constant C is to mean what it does, then argument-form A has to be 




2. C means what it does. 
Therefore,  
3. A is valid. 
(Boghossian 1997, 348) 
Before making this less abstract, observe BOG’s logical structure. I suppose Boghossian intends 
the argument to have the following form: 




Yet really there is a third proposition, conjoined with the first to provide a conjoined antecedent, 
so that to (P) “logical constant C is to mean what it does” is added (Q) “C in fact means whatever 
logical object makes A valid”. (I sweep aside, here, issues we ought to raise over just what is meant 
by an object, logical or otherwise, “making” an argument-form valid.)  
Accordingly, we now have the following form: 




Yet, if that is BOG’s form, it is invalid. For (Q) needs to be included in the second premise; i.e., 
for Boghossian to conclude that some argument-form A is valid, he needs it to be the case both 
that C means what it does and that C makes A valid. (This problem recurs in the following 
exposition.) 
With the more formal concerns out the way, let us try to make BOG (more) concrete. To 
interpret its first premise, imagine an argument-form in which the constant C appears, which 
implicitly defines that constant; C is stipulated to mean whatever makes that argument-form valid. 
Suppose we try inserting the conjunction symbol into the following form,  
p  
Therefore, 
p C q 






p ^ q 
The latter form is clearly invalid, given the meaning of conjunction (a meaning which we do not 
yet know, when making the implicit definition). So when C “makes the form of argument valid”, 
according to Boghossian’s thesis of implicit definition, it is because the meaning of C is disjunction 
and not conjunction. 
The second premise of BOG—that C means what it does—is meant to be fairly 
straightforward. (Though, in an appendix, Boghossian (1997, 358–62) deals at length with the 
worry that this premise is unknowable a priori.) I confess, however, to being unsure as to what it 
really asserts, for lack of seeing a sensible contrary here. Presumably, it is impossible (or worse, 
simply meaningless) for a term not to mean what it means, at least insofar as we think of “term” 
in a conceptual and not merely orthographical manner. I am unsure, therefore, that BOG’s second 
premise is any more informative than “C has a meaning”. Indeed, to recall the above point about 
logical form, Boghossian here needs (Q)—i.e., “C means what makes A valid”. Without that, and 
if (2) is ultimately uninformative, in turn we ought to doubt (1), since its antecedent contains the 
phrasing “if C is to mean what it does”—as opposed, exactly, to what? I will not follow up this 
issue here, and simply jot it down as notational awkwardness on Boghossian’s part. And for the 
time being, at least, let us presume BOG is valid. 
Boghossian’s application of the implicit definition thesis in BOG is supposed to explain how 
we have an a priori grasp of sentences which implicitly define the logical constants, which are 
logical truths, by consideration only of their meaning; in turn, this is to explain the idea of epistemic 
analyticity. For example, take some candidate analytic sentence, the kind which Boghossian calls a 
conceptual truth: “All adults are grown-ups”. Boghossian thinks this is Frege-analytic, where that 
means it is reducible to the form of a logical truth by substitution of synonym for synonym; e.g., 
again 
(褐x) (Ax ａ Gx岻 蝦 Gx 
And if BOG is valid, it can apparently then be deployed to show that this logical truth is knowable 
a priori, since we can know the meaning of the logical vocabulary involved simply by stipulating 
as true the sentences implicitly defining them. Thus, only by means of stipulation and our awareness 
of meanings are we entitled to knowledge of an analytic truth, which all remains an a priori exercise. 
Incidentally, it remains utterly obscure how this argument helps us to explain the analyticity of 
other conceptual truths to which Boghossian gives lip-service, such as colour-exclusion 




same concern). This is something else we shall have to brush over, in order to cover Boghossian’s 
more fundamental points, at which point we encounter a significant problem.  
The first main stage of Boghossian’s argument is thus over. The second is his denial that the 
implicit definition thesis has two apparently troubling consequences: (either or both of) 
“conventionalism” and “logical non-factualism”. In §1.4, I contend that Boghossian’s argument 
to this effect is badly misconceived. But in order to grasp that point, we shall first have to expose 
another (related) mistake, exhibited by Boghossian’s refusal of the non-metaphysical characteristic 
of analyticity. In this respect, what we soon see is that Boghossian’s argument recalls an old critique 
of analyticity, and this basic argument itself fails to motivate the divorce of (non-)metaphysical 
from the epistemological aspects of any notion of analyticity. Instead, as the remaining sections 
aim to show, the argument to which Boghossian appeals makes a fundamental error in assuming 
that rules may describe or report facts. 
 
§1.3 Analyticity and the non-metaphysical 
The first thing to note about the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity is that 
Boghossian’s terminology is misleading (though it has, to be sure, caught on63). It is not clear how 
the conception is metaphysical; it seems, rather, that the logical empiricists to whom Boghossian 
credits the notion had an anti-metaphysical aim: to show that analytic statements were not made 
true by some worldly state of affairs. Viewed this way, the metaphysical conception of analyticity 
is non-metaphysical. To avoid that obscurity or potential confusion, I will use Burge’s suggested 
terminology henceforth—the “vacuousness” conception of analyticity (2003b, 200).64 This label 
helps articulate the idea that analytic statements are true “come what may”, in a non-factual 
manner; an adult is a grown-up, and no changes in the world could have affected this. 
Boghossian thinks that arguments derived from Quine successfully show the vacuousness 
conception to be untenable. He attempts to undermine the conception ultimately by appeal to a 
principle he thinks we all ought to accept; as it turns out, this principle has a fairly long history. It 
only seems to be hinted at by Quine when, in “Carnap and Logical Truth”, he motivates the notion 
of (logical) truth in virtue of meaning by noting “that sheer verbal usage is in general a major 
determinant of truth” (1962, 351). That is, Quine thinks, every sentence is true partly in virtue of 
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what the words in it mean (for, the thought goes, if they meant something different, a different 
claim would be made). And so the parallel thought, which is only implicit in Quine’s 1962 article,65 
is that the world is also, in general, a major determinant of truth. (This “two-factor” picture of 
language and world is something we pick apart, with the help of Davidson and McDowell, in 
Chapter 4.) 
Eventually Roderick Chisholm (1966, 37–38) took Quine as his cue when he argued that though 
truths about the empirical world are true partly in virtue of meaning, analytic sentences are also 
true partly in virtue of the facts.66 For example, Chisholm suggests that the English sentence “Being 
round excludes being square” is true “if and only if, being square excludes being round.” Thus, 
since the right-side of the bi-conditional refers “to a relationship among properties and not to rules 
of language or ways in which we use words,” the sentence “cannot be said to be true solely in 
virtue of the ways in which we use words” (1966, 38). Boghossian’s point is very similar to 
Chisholm’s:67 
Isn’t it in general true – indeed, isn’t it in general a truism – that for any statement S, “S 
is true iff for some p, S means that p and p”? How could the mere fact that S means 
that p make it the case that S is true? Doesn’t it also have to be the case that p? 
(Boghossian 1997, 335) 
So convinced is Boghossian by this point that he refers to it subsequently as a “meaning-truth 
truism” (1997, 336). The putative truism holds that no sentence is true solely in virtue of what 
words mean, or how we use them—rather, every sentence must be true because of what the words 
mean and something factual, or “how things are” (Williamson 2007, 59). I contend that 
Boghossian’s reliance on this much-invoked principle begs the question against anyone who does 
not view the notion of a priori necessities that exist “in the world” or otherwise factually as 
intelligible to begin with. 
For, one should press, what fact about the world helps make true a sentence such as “Adults 
are grown-ups”? Pace Mill, we know that this sentence is not used on the basis of an inductive 
generalisation. So we ought to wonder how the facts are arranged to “make” this sentence true. 
Boghossian has in mind retorts such as this: adults are grown-ups by definition, and the truth of 
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“Adults are grown-ups” depends on the self-identical nature of everything in the world 
(Boghossian 1997, 335). The problem with this retort is that it presumes what it sets out to prove, 
again. It presupposes that there is some substantial, worldly property called “self-identity”, and it 
asserts that every item in the world has this property as a matter of fact. But this is just to say, of 
what may equally be regarded as a rule—e.g., that one cannot sensibly deny that something is 
itself—that “Adults are grown-ups” reports a fact. And the factual status of rules is the very point 
at issue! (It may turn out that rules are descriptive after all, but one could not hope to demonstrate 
this by restating the point.) 
In any case, Boghossian wields the above principle against the idea that any declarative sentence 
is capable of being vacuously true or non-factual. So we should at least stop to ask how this 
vacuousness conception comes about, according to Boghossian’s story. He has it that the logical 
empiricists were right to focus on the explanatory role that could be played by the idea of implicit 
definition—specifically, on its explaining some a priori knowledge. However, he believes they 
fatally took implicit definition to have two consequences: conventionalism and (logical) non-
factualism. (Essentially, then, the vacuousness conception is defined by its embrace of these two 
principles.)  
In Boghossian’s terms, “conventionalism” holds that analytic sentences are made true by 
convention, or definition, while “non-factualism” maintains that such sentences do not express 
claims. Accordingly, Boghossian’s rejection of the vacuousness conception consists in attempting 
to show that implicit definition entails neither of these theses. Thus, he thinks, one can make an 
epistemological point about how we know certain basic logical truths without thereby committing 
to some non-metaphysical account of logical truth. This is how, Boghossian argues, the analytic 
theory of the a priori can be “salvaged from the wreckage of the linguistic theory of necessity” 
(1997, 332). (I admit to finding Boghossian’s partitioning of these two “consequences” itself rather 
baffling. For, as I will argue over the course of this chapter, when a proposition is conventional 
(i.e., normative), it is necessarily not descriptive—prescribing and describing are distinct sorts of 
logical move.) 
 
§1.4 Conventionalism and non-factualism 
Let us hear more about so-called conventionalism and non-factualism, then. Boghossian is not 
concerned to identify any particular representative of these positions; he is opposed generally to 
any thesis according to which some statements are both true by convention and not made true by 
the facts. I am sure, nonetheless, it will not harm us to take a brief look at how the conventional 




characterised logical truth, since these are the figures to whom Boghossian attributes the implicit 
definition thesis: “I want to worry about the fact that neither Carnap nor Wittgenstein was content 
. . . with Implicit Definition. Typically, both writers went on to embrace some form of irrealism 
about logic” (1997, 348). 
Propounded in his later phase, Carnap’s definition of an analytic sentence as one that holds in 
every state-description—as true, corresponding to every row of a truth table—is a nice gloss on 
the idea that analytic sentences are true come what may, no matter how things stand in the world 
of facts. And we saw in the prior chapter that the logical empiricists used convention to explain 
mathematics. Partly influenced by Hilbert, and partly by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1921), Carnap 
and others held that analytic sentences were tautologies, because consequences of truth-tabular 
definitions, which are conventions of symbolism. For example, in the Aufbau (1928), Carnap 
regards a theorem as analytic when it is deducible from the conventional axioms of a constructional 
system; that is, an analytic truth follows from a definition, which is conventional. So, indeed, 
Carnap’s conceptions of analyticity were generally characterised as non-factual and conventional. 
The idea that logical truths follow from arbitrary conventions of symbolism is what the Circle 
apparently took from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In this work, Wittgenstein had argued that logical 
propositions were tautologous, if not contradictory, as could be displayed in truth-tabular notation. 
Yet, as Baker and Hacker discuss (2009, 356–70), Wittgenstein did not see logical propositions as 
seriously arbitrary, for such propositions, he held (at this stage of his thinking), “flow from the 
essence of the elementary proposition – not from arbitrary conventions, but from the essential 
bipolarity of the elementary proposition” (2009, 362). That is, Wittgenstein regarded the most 
basic proposition, which “asserts the existence of a state of affairs” (1921, §4.21), as essentially 
true or false, and this is because it depicts an atomic fact, which must either obtain or fail to obtain, 
depending on the arrangement of the world. Given this essential “bipolarity” of an atomic 
proposition, the idea of negation, he held, lies latent within it—for the elementary proposition 
must be either true or false; a proposition’s being false is equivalent to its being negated. In a like 
manner, Wittgenstein argues that all of logic emerges from the logical structure of this most 
elementary proposition. And of this structure, only its signs are to be regarded as conventional:  
 
logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather 
one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself. (Wittgenstein 




So much for the idea that Wittgenstein saw logical truth as conventional, in the manner of the 
logical empiricists. But what about its non-factual character? 
Wittgenstein indeed saw logical propositions as non-factual in the Tractatus, and this is 
something that remained in his later philosophy. Although, in §6.124, he says that logical 
propositions “describe the scaffolding of the world”, he clarifies this as a representing. In the 
context of the Tractatus, the idea must be that they “show” the necessary structure of the world, 
while not being descriptions: they are strictly speaking “about” nothing; their constituents lack 
sense (cf. Hacker 1986, 53). And it is precisely this view which separated him from, inter alia, 
Russell, who held that logical constants were the names of logical objects (Baker and Hacker 2009, 
311). Thus, when Boghossian writes into his idea of implicit definition that a constant, C, “means 
whatever logical object in fact makes [its argument-form] A valid” (1997, 348—emphases added), 
given that he thinks Wittgenstein would accept “logical objects” into his ontology, it is not 
surprising that he is puzzled about why Wittgenstein would think logical propositions are non-
factual. At first, Wittgenstein is committed to the idea that logical propositions, being tautologous 
and strictly saying nothing, have no sense. By his middle period, Wittgenstein argues that they do 
indeed have sense, which is constituted by their formal rules. It is this idea which entices 
Boghossian, and indeed prompts him to cite Wittgenstein on the matter:68 
It looks as if one could infer from the meaning of negation that “~~p” means “p”. As 
if the rules for the negation sign follow from the nature of negation. So that in a certain 
sense there is first of all negation, and then the rules of grammar. (Wittgenstein 1974, 
53) 
(Note the “as if”.) And 
[w]e would like to say: “Negation has the property that when it is doubled it yields an 
affirmation,” But the rule doesn’t give a further description of negation, it constitutes 
negation. (Wittgenstein 1974, 52) 
Boghossian wants to retain this constitutive view of the negation operator, but to divorce it from 
Carnap’s conventionalism and early Wittgenstein’s non-factualism. (Later Wittgenstein does not 
think logical propositions are factual either, but not for the same reason: he accepts that they are 
either normative or systematically related to inference rules; see Baker and Hacker (2009, 252), and 
my §3.) Yet even in this very citation, Wittgenstein urges the reader away from seeing the rule of 
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negation as describing anything, precisely because it constitutes negation; a rule for a symbol is not 
descriptive because it is constitutive. 
As we have seen, Boghossian hopes to show that his attempt to explain epistemic analyticity—
i.e., that some sentences are knowable in virtue of their meaning alone—via arguing that we can 
grasp meaning of logical constants via implicit definition does not entail either that analytic 
sentences are conventional or non-factual. How does he hope to do so? Largely (and fatally), he 
relies on a Kripkean take on later Wittgenstein’s “standard metre” example, which we examine in 
§2. Some preliminary marks are in order first. 
Boghossian accepts that logical truth is at least partly conventional: 
according to Implicit Definition, “If, then”, for example, comes to mean the conditional 
precisely by my assigning the truth-value True to certain basic sentences involving it; 
for example, to “If, if p then q, and p, then q”. And in an important sense, my assigning 
this sentence the value True is arbitrary. (Boghossian 1997, 351)   
As he continues, the decision to say that the “implicit definer” is true (I prefer to say that modus 
ponens reasoning is valid) is what gives the expression “if, then” the meaning that it does, such 
that prior to that decision, it simply did not have that meaning (or its meaning was incomplete). 
Yet, he argues, from our (apparently) choosing to make this sentence true it does not follow that 
conventionalism is true. Against the conventionalist, Boghossian argues that conventions only 
determine what a sentence expresses and not the facts which make what is expressed true.  
At the outset this looks confused. Consider Boghossian’s example sentence, “Snow is white”.69 
He thinks that by “assigning the truth value ‘true’ ” to the sentence, we determine what it expresses 
(that snow is white), but that we do not thereby determine snow’s being white. Something else has to 
do that, he reasonably opines: what makes snow white has nothing to do with our linguistic 
conventions. Quite. But look again: determining snow’s being white is just another way of 
determining that “Snow is white” is true. But apparently we can “assign” truth to the sentence; so 
which is it? There is a contradiction here. 
The whole line of thought, in my view, is tangled. The argument may initially seem compelling 
because it draws on the now influential principle we discussed above, as offered by Chisholm (and 
others). Here is that principle simplified:  
(P) For any given true sentence S, S is true because it expresses some proposition P, and P is true.  
                                                 
69 He also cautions this sentence may not be an implicit definer, but presumably thinks it inessential to the 




Applying (P) to some substitution instances renders some examples. “Snow is white” is said to 
express Snow is white, and, of course, snow is white. Likewise, “Adults are grown-ups” is said to 
express Adults are grown-ups, and adults are grown-ups.  
However, the blanket principle (P), despite its wider acceptance, is deeply problematic. For it 
conceals the actual function of supposed analytic sentences under the innocent-looking term 
“sentence”, which is necessarily mute to the function of sentences in practice. I argue that we must 
attend to this special function if we are to understand what it means when we say that such 
sentences are true (see esp. §5). This function is normative, which is necessarily not descriptive.  
That point has been recognised, historically, to differing degrees. We saw in Ch. 1 that Frege 
acknowledged the normativity of the most general logical laws, though it seems for him they still 
described a Platonic realm of logical objects, with which we are intuitionally acquainted. However, 
in the Begriffsschrift Frege occupies a curious position in regards specifically to definitions of new 
signs (1879, §55). He acknowledges them as prescriptions which are therefore not yet judgements, 
but once the definition has been made, they are “transformed” into analytic judgements (which, it 
seems, makes them descriptive). Normativity is in the frame at this point, then, but it did not 
extend to analytic judgements. More relevant still is Carnap, whom we saw, at least by his pluralist 
period, did not think of analytic sentences as factually true, since we are free to choose different 
logics. Likewise, the early Wittgenstein certainly thought that the propositions of logic had no 
content (though they do show or represent the scaffolding of the world; see my Ch. 1, §2.2 on 
these points). Indeed, Alberto Coffa, whose account of Wittgenstein and Carnap inspires 
Boghossian’s implicit definition thesis, claims exactly this: that since sentences which implicitly 
define their constituents function as rules which we are “free to endorse”, they thereby do not “tell 
us anything that is the case” (Coffa 1991, 266; cited in Boghossian 1997, 350).  
Yet this point—that logical propositions are rules without factual content—is exactly what 
Boghossian rejects: 
I don’t see that there is any inconsistency between supposing that a given logical 
principle – for instance, the law of excluded middle – serves to implicitly define an 
ingredient logical constant, and supposing that that very sentence expresses a factual 
statement capable of genuine truth and falsity. (Boghossian 1997, 350) 
It turns out that the whole weight of Boghossian’s argument against the vacuousness (i.e., non-
factual) conception of analyticity is placed on this rejection. Accordingly, it must be probed further. 
I side here with Coffa and against Boghossian: a sentence cannot simultaneously be a rule (e.g., a 
definition) and a description of the facts. In what follows, we examine the sentence on which 




§2 The standard metre 
§2.1 Abstract standards 
Boghossian argues that his implicit definition thesis entails neither conventionalism nor what he 
terms non-factualism—the thesis that analytic sentences do not report facts. To make his case, 
Boghossian cites Kripke’s reflections on the “standard metre in Paris” scenario discussed in 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953, §50). There, Wittgenstein argues that one object can 
neither be described as one metre long, nor described as not one metre long, and that is the 
standard in Paris which was then used to determine what is to count as a metre.  
Kripke, in response, thinks Wittgenstein “must be wrong” (Kripke 1972, 54). After offering his 
reasoning (which we scrutinise shortly), Kripke goes on to reveal that the sentence “S [the standard 
metre in Paris] is one meter long at time t0 [the time of its stipulation]” is both contingent and a 
priori (1972, 54). It is contingent, he claims, because the stick used to define “one metre” could 
have actually not been a metre: it is a contingent matter of fact that the stick S was the length that 
it actually was at time t0—it could, for example, have had heat applied to it, and stretched. And he 
thinks it is a priori because it can be known at the point of stipulation (for example, by the person 
who stipulates it) without any further investigation (1972, 55).70 Thus, in one fell swoop Kripke 
appears to have severed the fork between apriority, analyticity, and necessity on the one hand, and 
aposteriority, syntheticity, and contingency on the other. So there is much at stake: if investigation 
may be a priori but still issue in contingent truths about the world, then armchair reasoning is 
much more powerful than it prima facie seems (cf. Schroeder 2006, 245).71 
In order to make his case that implicit definition entails neither conventionalism nor non-
factualism, Boghossian needs it to be possible that individual sentences may at once describe facts 
about the world and function as (expressions of) norms. With Kripke as his support, this is indeed 
what Boghossian asserts: “there appears to be no inconsistency whatsoever between claiming that 
a given sentence serves to implicitly define an ingredient term and claiming that that very sentence 
expresses something factual” (1997, 350). So it is crucial that Kripke’s reading of the standard 
metre case is intelligible, and further, that it justifiably leads to Boghossian’s conclusion. 
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contingent, such that its truth would depend on some state of affairs. 
71 Albeit slightly less powerful than on Kant’s view that philosophy can deliver synthetic a priori truths. For 
since necessity is a criterion of apriority, for Kant, critical philosophy can tell us truths which not only go 




But Kripke missed the point of Wittgenstein’s remark. Following his claim that the standard 
metre in Paris is describable neither as one metre nor as not one metre in length, Wittgenstein 
remarks that “this is, of course, not to ascribe any remarkable property to it, but only to mark its 
peculiar role in the game of measuring with a metre-rule” (1953, §50). Kripke responds confusedly: 
This seems to be a very “extraordinary property”, actually, for any stick to have. I think 
he must be wrong. If the stick is a stick, for example, 39.37 inches long (I assume we 
have some different standard for inches), why isn’t it one meter long? Anyway, let’s 
suppose that he is wrong and that the stick is one meter long. (Kripke 1972, 54)  
This is far too quick. As Baker and Hacker have argued, focussing on the role played by the stick 
in practice allows us to see where Kripke goes wrong (2005, 195ff). The standard metre bar in 
Paris, when it was indeed used as the standard, acted as a canonical sample. That is, though other 
metre bars measured against the bar in Paris (or just outside Paris, initially, in Sèvres) are standards 
against which to measure the length of various objects and spaces, the bar in Paris itself is the one 
to which all such metric standards are subject.72 The moment at which the bar is given this 
canonical status is the moment at which the phrase “one metre” should call forth “the length of 
the standard metre bar in Paris”.73 Prior to this, of course, the phrase “one metre” would not have 
that significance. To be historically accurate, it should have called forth “the length of the ‘mètre 
des Archives’,” but this metre as a provisional standard was subject to problematic variations which 
the international standard in Sèvres was designed to overcome. (We might say, insofar as our 
purposes go, the original meaning was vague or ill-defined—sometimes it is good for our terms to 
be vague; for standards of measurement, it is very often a bad thing.)  
I have just claimed that the phrase “one metre” only receives its particular meaning at the point 
of stipulation. It is consistent with this claim that “one metre” had a different meaning prior to 
the stipulation, just not the same one as at the point of stipulation. Or we can simplify the issue 
by thinking of a fictional scenario. If the British standards authorities were so inclined, they could 
ratify a new unit, the “Metryard”, by use of a canonical sample. Then the phrase qua unit of 
measurement would only have a meaning at the point of stipulation, since ex hypothesi it had none 
before. Therefore, it is easy enough to see that stipulated terms and phrases receive their meaning 
at, and not before, the moment of their stipulation. 
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as we will see, it does map fairly accurately onto the historical development and dissemination of the 
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Now, the reason it is significant that the phrase “one metre” only means what it does at the 
point of stipulation is that while the bar soon to become the standard metre obviously has a length, 
it does not, prior to attaining its status as the measure for other items, have the length of one metre. 
It might seem that Kripke (and Boghossian with him) would grant as much. But actually, given 
that Kripke thinks the phrase “one metre” has a referent (namely, the length), which the bar itself 
happens to instantiate—which we use as an attempt to “fix” the reference of the phrase “one 
metre”—presumably, he cannot even grant this much (1972, 55). So, for Kripke, even before the 
bar in Paris is stipulated to be the canonical sample for “one metre” (before it is defined as such), 
it is, if a good example (and how would we know?), already a metre long. But this is not fully 
intelligible. For it so radically breaks with how we understand and operate with measurements. 
One is left to wonder how we would ever know whether a standard matches up to its abstract 
form. We would need, per impossibile, to hold the stick alongside the abstract, non-physical form. 
Let us return, again, to see how the unit of measurement is used and designated, how it 
functions in practice; for there we come to realise that an abstract length is of precisely no 
significance. Baker and Hacker broach these points by way of noting that the standard metre bar 
became not an example (of the length), but the sample by means of which the length is to be 
determined (2005, 195). If we ask what the bar is supposed to be an example of, and we are told 
“the length of one metre”, it becomes plain that (insofar as this is intelligible), what the stick is an 
example of is completely out of our (material) hands. But this simply fails to accord with the facts: 
as recounted, the bar decided in Sèvres to function as the canonical standard for measuring one 
metre replaced the mètre des Archives formerly so used, and it was decided that the new bar should 
match the exact length of the mètre des Archives in whatever state it then currently was in. That 
is, owing to the unreliable nature of the former measure, the new standard was not designed to 
pick out an ideal which the last one tried and failed to pick out; rather, the new standard, for ease 
and relevance, was determined to be the same length as the last one because, with better 
construction and standardisation, the new stick would do a better job at being canonical than the 
old one. 
 
§2.2 Breaking standards 
There is one important caveat to this discussion, which deserves attention. There is perhaps a 
legitimate sense in which we may describe the standard metre bar as not in fact being one metre 
long, and indeed such that this description has normative weight. Any standard which loses its 
place must do so because it is not deemed fit for purpose. The purpose for which a metre standard 




is not up to the task. Imagine the conversation had by the appropriate board of measurement 
authorities. It is plausible they would remark, “The stick is not a metre today—look! Something 
must be done about this.” Now, is this a completely illicit remark? One would be tempted to say 
so given the apparently strict Wittgensteinian view that one must not predicate “of the thing what 
lies in the mode of representation” (1953, §104). But in that case we run into a tension, because 
such remarks are surely intelligible, and play a motivating role in the changes of standards. 
My response to this problem is to urge, first, that we see the nature of Wittgenstein’s example 
as an idealisation of a point. That point remains firm: if there is one and only one sample of x, 
against which another item y, is measured, then while y is in fact degrees of x-ish, x itself cannot 
be. My second response is to note how the standard metre case, in practice, likely enters into 
greater complexity. For consider that the length designated by the standard metre has, as it were, 
trickled down from such places as Sèvres into general population familiarity. There is a tangible 
sense as to what counts as a metre in day-to-day dealings with lengths. Not least because our world 
is fairly rigid, so far as we can tell: our bodies and other objects are not constantly in flux, changing 
lengths (Baker and Hacker 2005, 191); in part the everyday objects of the world become standards 
of each other (Wittgenstein 1956, §§93–94); it is all very familiar. Occasionally, standards are 
appealed to in order to settle disputes about lengths. Suppose then (as is true) that many metre 
sticks in circulation are regularly being used for accuracy and to settle arguments; what then if the 
canonical standard starts to change its length (cf. Wittgenstein 1956, §5)? The measuring practices 
would continue, and within an intact normative structure. It is likely we would hold up against the 
canonical sample our standards and note that the sample is not really a metre in length. I think 
what this would demonstrate is not the looseness of our talk, but how normativity in many cases 
is itself much more diffuse and pliant than we might think. The authority of the performance at 
stipulation does not stretch forever into the distance; rather, it is in part divested and spread as 
communities begin to authorise their own standards. But this makes for a much less punchy 
example. 
In any case, with this detour, we can affirm that prior to stipulation the bar shortly to become 
the canonical standard metre bar was not one metre in length. And we can maintain this, without 
contradiction, even if we note that it matched the length of the then-current standard for a metre; 
for when it matched up to the metre standard, the bar itself indeed was a metre, but that was prior 
to its becoming the standard. All the same, cannot Kripke still maintain that after stipulation the 
bar is one metre in length? One route to maintaining this has now been blocked; i.e., the attempt 
to maintain that the metre after stipulation is a metre in length for the reason that the metre already 




presumably, that route can only begin with the stipulation itself. That is, something must be 
significant about the moment where it is decided, ratified, that this particular bar is to serve as the 
canonical sample of one metre, with which to measure any derivative standards of a metre. Indeed, 
paying attention to what this moment achieves sheds light on the whole problem. 
 
§2.3 Stipulating standards 
As we saw in §1.4, Boghossian suggested that “if, then” only gets its meaning when certain basic 
sentences in which it figures (such as the tautologous expression of modus ponens)—the implicit 
definers—are called “true”. But he then professes his puzzlement at the fact that both Wittgenstein 
and Carnap apparently thought the sentences used to implicitly define a term are not factually true, 
or are only true by convention (Boghossian 1997, 348). In order to maintain that a thesis of implicit 
definition (for example, about the logical constants) does not entail such a “logical non-factualism” 
or conventionalism, Boghossian appeals to the just rehearsed argument from Kripke against 
Wittgenstein regarding the standard metre.  
Here, I want to point out that it is prima facie inconsistent for Boghossian to cite Kripke in 
defence of this claim, for Kripke, as we just discussed, maintains that the standard metre before 
stipulation already either is or is not a metre in length. By contrast, presumably Boghossian has to 
take the same tack as with “if, then”, and is committed to saying that prior to stipulation the term 
“one metre” did not have a meaning. Instead, he needs to say that the stipulation itself is what 
gives the phrase its meaning. This reveals the difficulty that Boghossian gives himself by offering 
a Kripkean defence. For we now have a situation where Boghossian and I agree that, contra 
Kripke, the stipulation made in France that that platinum-iridium bar is to count as the standard 
metre is what now gives the phrase “one metre” its meaning, yet we disagree over what this means 
about the sentence which expresses that stipulative definition, “This stick is one metre long”. It is 
worth, then, exploring the argument in a little more detail. 
Boghossian asserts that a sentence which implicitly defines an ingredient term may, consistently, 
also express a fact about the world (1997, 350). Why does Boghossian think this would be 
consistent? Presumably he has something like the following scenario in mind. The bar itself prior 
to stipulation as the standard metre of course has a length which can be measured by some existent 
unit (if there is one), but it cannot yet be one metre unless we are, like Kripke, Platonists about 
length (and then we have other problems to face). So we must ask what is special about the (act 
of) stipulation itself which allows that particular bar to be described as a metre in length. I take it 
Boghossian, and many others, would think this: there is nothing “special” about that moment, 




metric measurement; without that moment, we have no warrant to call anything “a metre”. But 
after that moment, as a trivial matter, any measurable item whatsoever, including the standard 
metre, is susceptible of being either one metre or not in length. 
I agree entirely with the claim that any measurable item whatsoever is susceptible of being either 
one metre or not in length after “one metre” is defined as “the length of the standard metre bar”. 
It just depends on how we understand “measurable”. Are tables measurable by metre rules? They 
certainly are. Are metre rules measurable by metre rules? Indeed, sometimes. Are stretches of 
gloopy, thick oil measurable by metre rules? Possibly not—it depends. What, then, is the sense in 
which the standard metre bar is not measurable? It is clearly not the sense in which thick gloopy 
oil cannot be measured by a stick. To resolve this, we need to notice that it is not just the item being 
measured which determines whether it is measurable, it is also the item doing the measuring. And not 
just in terms of the physical suitability of the measuring tool, but sometimes for a deeper, non-
physical reason. That is, the standard metre bar, though perfectly able to measure other items, is 
necessarily unable to measure itself: this is a logical feature of its role in our measuring practices. 
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein wonders about a strange scenario: “Imagine someone saying, 
‘But I know how tall I am!’ and laying his hand on top of his head to indicate it!” (1953, §279). 
The remark is humorous because such a person, if he intends to be taken seriously, has failed to 
tell us anything. Certainly, if the situation had called on him to demonstrate his knowledge of 
heights, or his height in particular, he has resolutely failed. He may as well say that he is as tall as 
himself. His case is analogous to the standard metre case. If we want to maintain that the definition 
of the phrase “one metre” entails that the stick used in that ostensive definition is itself one metre, 
we are committed to saying that this stick is “as long as itself”. Well, insofar as that is an intelligible 
form of words here, it is certainly not informative.74 A builder measuring a doorway would not 
accept from his assistant the answer that the doorway is as wide as it is without perhaps presuming 
his assistant was indicating it was time for a break. 
We can throw light on this situation by finding the main source of ambiguity: “is”.  Schroeder 
argues that Kripke performs a “conceptual sleight of hand” which exploits precisely the ambiguity 
that Wittgenstein sought to show his reader with the example (Schroeder 2006, 246). “This stick 
is one metre long” can mean either “This stick is (as a matter of fact) one metre long” or “This 
stick is (to be called) one metre long”. As Schroeder explains, when Wittgenstein says that the 
metre bar in Paris is not a metre long, he means to deny the former, factual sense of the copula, 
not (what Schroeder calls) the “analytic”, latter sense. Hence the sense to the claim that the 
                                                 




standard metre in Paris is not (in fact) one metre long, but is (to be called) one metre long (cf. 
Wittgenstein 1974, 53–54). And if one wants to maintain that the factual and definitional senses 
of the copula are unified, one only has to consider the man who is as tall as himself: what fact is 
conveyed by saying that “this stick is as long as this stick”, where both occurrences of “this” point 
to the same exact stick? (Schroeder  makes a similar point in a later piece (2009, 96) in connection 
with the truth “A young swan is a young swan”—it gives us no information.) 
In response to this question, one could not cite, say, a general logical truth about identity as the 
fact conveyed, without begging the question (this is the point I made in §1.3 against Boghossian’s 
Russellian retort). That is because one would, as a prior matter, have to establish that logical truths 
were facts and not norms, or that what expresses a norm may also simultaneously describe a fact. 
 
§3 Why norms may not be descriptions 
In the previous section, I showed that a particular sentence token—“Stick S is a meter long at time 
t0”—may never be, on one occasion of its utterance, both descriptive and normative. This is 
helpful for my broader aim because it undermines Boghossian’s positive argument for a coherently 
distinct epistemic conception of analyticity. Still, Boghossian may retort, I have not ruled out any 
sentence or proposition as simultaneously normative and descriptive; rather, I have only focused 
on propositions about canonical standards. I tackle that challenge in this section by progressively 
expanding my case. First, I show that the class of sentences which can only express either (but not 
both) descriptive or normative propositions is wider than that containing only canonical standard-
measure sentences. This offers preliminary support for the thought that no sentence may express 
a proposition with a dual descriptive and normative character. Following this point, I show that, 
in fact, it is impossible for any sentence to play both these normative and descriptive roles at once. 
Work on the normativity of propositions today largely finds its roots in one of two sources: the 
later philosophy of Wittgenstein or Wilfrid Sellars. For example, Glock (2003), Baker and Hacker 
(2005, 2009), and Schroeder (2006, 2009) fall into the first camp; the “Pittsburgh” school75 
comprising (alongside Sellars) Brandom and McDowell, and, more generally, global inferentialists76 
fall into the second camp—e.g., Brandom (1994, 2001), Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1997), 
and Whiting (2007). There is a fair amount of explicit and implicit crossover between these two 
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camps; for example, very commonly, the notion of an “inference ticket” is employed in writings 
of both groups. (The notion of an inference ticket—a license that allows one to infer one 
proposition on the basis of another—was coined by Gilbert Ryle (1949, 105).) I focus on the 
Wittgensteinian strain here for ease of exposition. 
Baker and Hacker (2009) discuss Wittgenstein’s work on what he called “grammatical” 
propositions—those traditionally classed by philosophers as necessary. The range of necessary 
propositions is made up of different types: mathematical, logical, and “metaphysical”. Examples 
such as “2+2=4”, tautologies, and “Nothing is red and green all over” fall respectively into those 
types. Baker and Hacker maintain that necessary propositions are normative and not (unless used 
to make different moves) descriptive; moreover, they hold that their normative status makes them 
“concept-forming” and “partly constitutive of the meanings of their constituent terms” (2009, 
259). They also point out that the distinction between grammatical (necessary) sentences and 
empirical ones is not to be understood as a distinction between sentence types, but sentence 
tokens. That is, what determines that a given sentence expresses a grammatical proposition instead 
of an empirical one will not be the form that the sentence takes—declarative, let us say—but 
rather, its particular uses. The authors claim, e.g., that the sentence “Water is (= consists of) H2O” 
was once used as an empirical conjecture but later hardened into a rule (2009, 249), and so now 
plays a role in concept-determination; i.e., the concept “water” is now partly determined by the 
rule (2009, 260).77 The first of these claims—that a particular use of a sentence may not be both 
descriptive and normative—is prima facie not the most intuitive. At least insofar as Boghossian is 
concerned:  
Intuitively, the statements of logic appear to be fully factual statements, expressing 
objective truths about the world, even if necessary and (on occasion) obvious ones. 
(Boghossian 1997, 348) 
This is not intuitive to me (quite the opposite), but clearly the claim needs further support. Not 
least, also, because it is the fulcrum on which my larger argument is balanced. In explaining the 
idea themselves, Baker and Hacker use the example of a rule of chess, and in what follows I play 
with the example further. 
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cannot be the sort of thing we only come to know through experience (a posteriori—with caveats) yet 
which simultaneously attains a necessary status (because it describes the way the world must be). See Baker 




Consider “The chess king moves one square at a time” (2009, 263). This sentence could be 
used to describe, empirically, the happenings on a chess board. Imagine a chess examiner (I do not 
suppose such characters exist) whose role is to overview a set of games and ensure that the chess 
kings are used only to move one square at a time (except when castling). We can imagine that she 
utters the sentence as a description of the occurrences she sees, and ticks her box accordingly. 
Consider next, however, the sentence as used in a rather different way, as written in the chess 
manual, or dictated by a chess-teacher. The sentence “The chess king moves one square at a time” 
written or spoken in those circumstances does not describe empirical happenings, and does not 
correspond to a fact; there is no chess board, king, or player in mind, or in the relevant context.  
Indeed, for pedagogic purposes it would be catastrophic if there were particular facts to which 
rules corresponded—for teaching the roles of chess pieces is to be generic, thereby allowing a 
person to play the game at an unspecified range of boards. It is distinctive of most manuals that 
they are not only historical; it is distinctive of many helpful beginners’ manuals that they are, 
further, ahistorical. A questionable manual it would be, if a manual at all, which mostly described 
practices rather than prescribing how effectively to practise. This is not to say that one cannot read 
off the rules of a practice from that practice; to the contrary, this must be possible, and is the main 
point argued for in Ryle’s (1949, chap.2) work on knowing-how and knowing-that. My point is 
only that manuals principally help those who are struggling to pick up rules simply from what they 
experience; they can expedite this normative learning. 
Here we might object that it is, nevertheless, an empirical matter of fact that people do use the 
king to move one square at a time (or so the chess examiner hopes), and so the rule is simply a 
description of the fact that within chess communities, the king is to move only one square at a 
time. This is a view similar to that held by A. J. Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic (1936), where he 
saw analytic propositions as a subset of empirical propositions which describe how we use 
symbols.78 He later abandoned the view, recognising it as a mistake to equate empirical with 
analytic (and in his view, a priori) propositions. As Glock notes, “[o]ne must distinguish between 
the expression of a rule and an empirical proposition to the effect that a community follows certain 
linguistic rules” (2003, 162). That is, statements about which rules are active do not place 
obligations on anyone, as those rules do: if I recount the rule “In England, the red traffic light 
signals cars, lorries, and bicycles to stop”, I have not thereby told my audience to stop in such 
circumstances—though given antecedent knowledge of rule-following and laws, they should infer 
that they ought to stop when at a red light in England.  
                                                 




Keeping in mind, however, that normativity applies to sentence tokens, one must remember to 
attend to the function of the sentence in discourse. Were I to utter, as a frustrated driving 
instructor, “In England, the red traffic light signals cars, lorries, and bicycles to stop” to my speed-
hungry trainee at the wheel, I may well be placing a normative constraint on him by sardonically 
expressing the rule. Taken out of context, my words may seem to form a description of a section 
of the highway code. However, anyone who responded in such circumstances by continuing to 
run through red lights, simply acknowledging “yes, that is the meaning of the red light in England”, 
is either being rude or has taken grammatical surface structure too seriously and thereby failed to 
take the normative hint. 
This much shows, I think, that sentences normally expressing rules of chess and of the highway 
code may have descriptive uses in addition to their standard normative uses, and that grammatical 
form is not a foolproof guide to the real purport of a sentence. Further, we have seen that the 
sentences in focus here, when functioning as rules, do not describe any circumstances, so they 
share this feature with standard-measure sentences. All the same, we have not conclusively shown 
that a sentence on one occasion of utterance absolutely cannot be normative and descriptive 
simultaneously. This negative, general claim is one for which Baker and Hacker argue; to do so, 
they urge us always to question what possible state of affairs or facts a given rule is supposed to 
describe. As we saw in the above example, a chess rule no longer expresses a rule if it is used to 
refer to particular chess boards and pieces (unlike, e.g., an explanation of such a rule). Rules are 
prohibitions, licenses, guides; these seem to require generic application, and it is not clear how a 
description—a sentence actually used to describe (and not simply a declarative sentence)—can 
ever play such roles.  
For a contrast, consider an apparently metaphysical proposition: “Nothing can be red all over 
and green all over”. Baker and Hacker observe that this proposition is often thought to express an 
internal relation between the natures or essences of red and green (2009, 264ff); or, if it is different, 
that it describes the necessary structure of the world. They draw on Wittgenstein, however, to 
show it rather acts as an “inference ticket” (2009, 263), licensing us to infer, e.g., that if this chair 
is green all over, therefore it is not also red. We do, with our descriptions, present the world as 
being a certain way, and we do after offering such a presentation often “travel” from that 
presentation to another. However, we license ourselves to do so not by the use of further 
descriptions on which we fall back, but rather with rules or norms for “re-presenting” the way the 
world is (2009, 250). I am justified or licensed to describe a man as a bachelor, having presented 





It seems to me there is a crossover here with those thinkers, such as Sellars, who argue that 
there is a form of inference which appears enthymematic, and so formally invalid, but is yet valid 
in a “material” sense (Sellars 1953, 313). E.g., consider the following argument: 
The ball is red. 
Therefore, the ball is coloured. 
A natural instinct (natural for many philosophers, in any event) is to say that the argument is 
missing an implicit premise; informally phrased, something such as “Whatever is red is coloured”. 
Sellars argues, however, that the argument as displayed is already valid, prior to inserting an 
apparently missing premise. His claim is that the missing premise is in fact a rule of inference—a 
rule that concerns the content or “matter” of the concepts in play, which is thus a “material rule 
of inference”. The rule in our example is of course a famously discussed truth of the kind that 
puzzled Carnap, and which Boghossian calls “Carnap-analytic”. It is the paradigmatic example of 
a grammatical proposition as discussed by Baker and Hacker, and, as we just saw, it is the sort of 
proposition they see as a norm of representation, allowing us to travel from one premise to 
another. For Sellars, the rule is implicit because it is a propriety already embedded in linguistic 
practice (as norms of representation are supposed to be also); it is a part of the content of the 
employed concepts, and therefore plays a crucial rule in constituting conceptual content (1953, 
334).79 
Likewise, Baker and Hacker are at pains to emphasise that looking into the normative role of 
necessary truths reveals their concept-determining role. The chess rule “The king moves one 
square at a time” is a rule at all because, indeed, it is constitutive of a chess king that it moves one 
square at a time (2009, 263). “Red is darker than pink” is again partly determinative of the concepts 
“red” and “pink”, and therefore the proposition entitles me to say of an object which is red that it 
is darker than another which is pink (2009, 263–64). However, one still wants to object further: is 
it not the case that red is, in fact, darker than pink, such that I can legitimately use the sentence as 
a description of the world—indeed, of the necessary structure of the world? Baker and Hacker’s 
own tactic for explaining disanalogies between obviously empirical propositions (say, “London is 
cold in December”) and necessary propositions is to show how we treat them differently when we 
ascribe truth or (more significantly) falsity to them. We are invited to notice that understanding an 
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empirical proposition (a description) partly consists80 in knowing “what is the case if it is true and 
what is the case if it is false” (2009, 273). Yet, of course, this cannot carry over to “Red is darker 
than pink”—for how can we conceive of a world in which red is not darker than pink? That is the 
point of its being necessary. 
As a side note, I am sure there are contexts in which it is apt to describe bright reds as lighter 
than dark pinks, so this example likely needs adjustment—either in the form of a clause about 
paradigm cases, places on a colour spectrum, or a total change. In the lattermost case, I have in 
mind “Red is closer to orange than it is to yellow”. Hume uses such an example as one of his 
relations of ideas, which as discussed in Chapter 1 are psychologically conceived: i.e., according to 
Hume, we cannot imagine the ideas obtaining in a manner other than the relation depicts them. 
In what follows, I think we can use this Humean example in place of Baker and Hacker’s favoured 
proposition, without much trouble. In Chapter 5, however, we shall have occasion to doubt the 
rigidity even of such propositions; regrettably, this is a complication we cannot enter into at 
present. Suffice it to say that given my argument here, grammatical propositions do not reflect the 
necessary structure of the world, and so a change in what is properly grammatical does not entail 
a change in how things must be; it does not reflect some kind of metaphysical instability or 
inconsistency.  
Indeed, rules change. Recall an earlier example which Baker and Hacker suggest had 
“hardened” from being an empirical proposition into a rule: “Water is H2O”. We can imagine a 
world in which water is not H2O; Putnam’s (1975) famous thought-experiment trades on this 
imagined possibility. In my view, we ought to recognise that some necessary propositions, in virtue 
of having a traceable history back to their pre-normative employments, tempt us more easily into 
treating them as descriptive even while normative. See how this sentence is notably different to 
“No square is round”. It seems to me there is a rough, though useful, distinction to be made here 
between a subset of necessary propositions which have had pre-normative employments, and a 
subset which have always (or very nearly always) had normative status.81 “Water is H2O” is 
employed now as a rule, and not as a description; its former non-normative status helps deceive 
us into thinking it also functions descriptively now. Having made this distinction, let us notice how 
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make the latter qualification to avoid the statement of a crude verificationism about understanding. Cf. 
Baker and Hacker (2009, 273f). 
81 The number of members in this latter subset might appear to be quite low, until one considers the huge 




the apparent possibility of these dual descriptive-normative necessary truths tempts us to think, 
like Quine, that all necessary truths must partake of both descriptive and normative character: 
the lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences [which] develops and changes, through 
more or less arbitrary and deliberate revisions and additions of our own. . . . It is a pale 
grey lore, black with fact and white with convention. But I have found no substantial 
reasons for concluding that there are any quite black threads in it, or any white ones. 
(Quine 1962, 374)  
This is an attractive picture of the matter. But it is neither the only, nor the best one available. 
Indeed, as discussed above, the reasons for denying this picture are several and compelling.  
Let us adjust our view: some type-sentences will, in their lifetime, begin as token descriptions 
but eventually express rules; some might go back the other way; but none of them will function at 
once both to describe and to prescribe. That is a fact of their logical role in our shared linguistic 
practices. Seeing things this way, we retain a certain insight from Quine: diachronically, the threads 
in our webs of belief are pale and grey. But synchronically, those threads are quite black and white. 
 
§4 A pragmatic objection 
I want to pause to take account of an underlying worry that practical matters call for a re-evaluation 
of this line of thought. The following example makes the case that the standard metre really is, in 
fact, a metre in length precisely because (and not, as I have been arguing, in spite) of the role it 
plays or could play in practice. So that, actually, it is possible for a proposition to be synchronically 
both part-rule and part-fact. 
Imagine a scenario in which, during the Great Measurement War, the young “metric division” is 
under siege from the ageing “imperial division”. During the imperial siege, the metric division find 
themselves cornered, with just their prime weapon left: a canon which only fires rods the length 
of a metre (and the width of a specified thickness—though other dimensions will not be in focus 
here, for simplicity). As their stock of sticks runs low, they strike a near fatal blow to the invading 
imperial forces. But it is of paramount importance that the metric division fire off their next stick 
urgently and accurately. Any nearby rods which are not exactly one metre in length will not suffice 
for the purpose. Their luck appears to have run out: there are no longer any metre sticks in their 
location. 
Distraught, A has an idea: 





B┺ ╉But this will not work┸ because this stick is not a metre long┹ we are doomed┻╊ 
 A┺ ╉But surely it is a metre long┻ It╆s the same length as all the other sticks we╆ve been firing┻ So it╆s 
a metre long. Now quicklyをload the canon┿╊ 
 B┺ ╉No┸ we really are doomed┺ it is not a metre long because it is the stick with which we measure 
or determine what is to count as a metre long in our measuring practices┼╊ 
 A┺ ╉Butを╊ 
 B┺ ╉┼When you say┸ ╅it is a metre long╆┸ you at best may mean┸ ╅it is to be called a metre long╆┸ thereby reiterating a normative stipulation┻╊ 
Anyone in these circumstances would think B’s protestations rather silly. Indeed, in the moment, 
B’s pedantry is dangerous. The consequences of something’s being a metre long are many; in some 
cases, those consequences could be extremely important.82 If my interpretation of the canonical 
standard metre proposition as having only normative force does not also bear those consequences, 
then the interpretation would run into serious trouble. Sticking resolutely to the line of thought I 
have been pushing would appear to obstruct sensible and practical aims. That sort of disconnect 
between thought and action is antithetical to the broadly pragmatic notion of analyticity I have 
presented thus far; a notion which emphasises the role of analytic sentences in practice. 
So what are we to say about this case? Are we ultimately to concede that “This stick [the 
canonical standard] is in fact a metre long” is a true description? That would be hasty. What is at 
stake here is, first, my critique of Boghossian’s distinction between epistemic and “metaphysical” 
(or, in my terminology, vacuous) analyticity—the thought that some sentences may be justified 
purely by virtue of their meaning while no sentences may be true solely because of meaning (or 
language, or convention). In turn, at stake is a vision of philosophy according to which the 
discipline articulates our socio-linguistic norms—and not, primarily, “facts about the world”. 
Boghossian’s attempt to carve off an epistemic conception of analyticity is, after all, an attempt to 
secure the role of a priori reflection about logic, without denying that those reflections issue in 
factual truths. Thus, for Boghossian, with respect to at least the subject matter of logic, philosophy 
takes a seat alongside other disciplines whose investigations lead to factual truths about subject 
matters. But if what I have maintained against Boghossian is correct—that analytic sentences are 
rules, and that rules may not be descriptions—then insofar as philosophy investigates analytic 
                                                 
82 In the scenario we discuss, of course, the important consequence is rather contrived. But we do not have 
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sentences, or (if there is a difference) norms, it does not reveal, by a priori means, truths about a 
non-conceptual world. So much, then, is at stake. 
Our response to this case must be twofold, in recognition of its idealised nature. First, we 
should treat the example as though it were not idealised; that is, to pretend, as in Wittgenstein’s 
initial example (1953, §50), that there really is only one object to which we can compare metre 
sticks (namely, the hermetically sealed, canonical standard metre). The second response, however, 
shall be guided by the discussion in §2.2 and §3 above, in which we recognised the often diffuse 
nature of normativity in practice, and in turn the idealised nature of Wittgenstein’s example. 
According to this more grounded understanding, the authority of a stipulation not only stretches 
but fades into the future, whereupon authority is taken up at different points in an intricate 
normative web. Let us now take the example at face value first.  
 
§4.1 The idealised case 
The problem of the canonical standard metre typically exhibits the following contradiction. 
Suppose a canonical standard, Stick S, determines what a metre is to be83 (which, ex hypothesi, is not 
itself a metre in length). Then suppose that another rod, Stick Sひ, matches up to S; thus, Sひ is a 
metre in length. Coupled with the premise that rods which match up to each other will have the 
same length, it seems we must conclude that S is also a metre in length, contra the first supposition. 
We can quickly resolve this contradiction by eliminating the first claim that S is not a metre in 
length. (This is what Kripke has done.) But there are other ways to go. Should we eliminate the 
premise that rods which match in length have the same length? That would be too great and 
unintuitive a burden to bear. Indeed, notice from the discussion in this chapter that neither I nor 
my interlocutors have denied that rods may have “the same length”, nor the more basic thought 
that the canonical standard metre rod “has a length”.  
Incidentally, however, it seems as though Kripke thinks this is what Wittgenstein must have 
believed about the standard metre: 
Part of the problem which is bothering Wittgenstein is, of course, that this stick serves 
as a standard of length and so we can’t attribute length to it. Be this as it may (well, it 
may not be) . . . (Kripke 1972, 54)  
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I have not found evidence that this is what Wittgenstein thought of the standard metre stick; it 
would be rather odd for him to think that the stick had no length at all. Indeed, for reasons given 
below, the stick’s having a length is what made it apt for being a standard in the first place. (At 
least, in its historical context; for of course the contemporary standard defines a metre according 
to the distance light travels in a vacuum over a certain time.) 
So we can argue, as I have, that the rod’s status as a standard for a given unit prevents it from 
being measureable by that very same unit, without implying that it cannot be measured by another 
unit, or that more fundamentally it is not the sort of thing which has a length. All may consistently 
acknowledge, too, that anything which matches the length of S will “have the same length”. 
Examining these two locutions—having a length and having the same length—will help us 
overcome the seeming contradiction here.  
The contradiction generated by the standard metre case, relayed above, employs insights that 
we should expect anyone competent with “length discourse” to acknowledge: that both S and Sひ 
have lengths, and that any two rods Sn…i which match in size have the same lengths. These 
platitudes about length do not ordinarily come into question; no-one is seriously perplexed about 
everyday, length-based transactions, which make use of or implicate such basic truths. Wire leads 
have lengths, brick walls have lengths; the idea of cheddar cheese does not have a length, and nor 
does anguish (though anguish may persist for a lengthy time). Since it is clear that all rods have a 
length (you might say it is analytic that they do), so it is clear too that S has a length—regardless 
of its being a standard of length for a particular unit. Accordingly, it is clear that no-one ought to 
resolve the contradiction presented by the standard metre case by means of argument that S has 
no length. Notice further that something which has a length, in virtue of its having a length, can 
be put to a number of purposes. Inter alia, it can fill gaps and holes that are themselves of “the 
same length” or shape, in the way that the idea of cheddar cheese or the phenomenon of anguish 
simply cannot (though, speaking less strictly, the idea of cheese may well “fit” the moment).  
As with S’s having a length, I likewise think one will not want to deny that S and Sひ are of the 
same lengths. If we examine talk about the sameness of lengths, we can actually find ourselves 
close to a solution. And it is not difficult to see what it is for two items to have the same length. 
Turning to just why we might require items to be of the same length is a useful cue here. The legs 
on a table should (if it is a normal table) be the same length so that they each stand perpendicular 
to a level floor and thereby support a surface parallel to the angle of that floor. Or the length of a 
timber, say, should be the same length as the distance between two walls so that the walls and 
timber provide mutual support to each other. In short, we tend to require items to be of the same 




is significant in the first instance. It is natural to surmise, following these remarks, that items have 
the same length insofar as they fulfil the same purpose for which having a length is significant. 
(Obviously this is rough, because items do not only have lengths but depths, widths, density, and 
more besides.) 
Given this rough criterion for length, it would be incoherent to maintain that, as introduced in 
our example, even though S and Sひ both have lengths, they do not have the same length. In our 
example, the role for which it is relevant that an item has a length is to fill a particular canon. Of 
course S will fill that canon, because the canon gap is the same length as S; it was measured to be 
the same length! In general, it is intrinsic to canonical standards of lengths that they fit in the gaps 
they are used to measure—they would be rather useless otherwise (notwithstanding, as noted 
above, the non-physical standard used today). So neither pointing out that S and Sひ both have 
lengths, nor, further, that they have the same lengths, forces us to say that the length they both 
have is “one metre”. (I said Kripke’s argument was too quick; it is these points that he did not take 
into consideration.) All it urges us to do is to acknowledge what their having the same lengths 
amounts to; among other things, it amounts to the fact that both are suitable fodder for the metric 
canon.  
One might still be unsatisfied: “The lengths are not the same if different things follow from 
them; e.g., if I can describe one rod truly as a metre in length, and the other not.” The point of 
emphasis here is the culprit. Functioning as an adjective or pronoun, “same” attaches to a noun 
of a particular type—a person, idea, material object, etc. Even when attaching to one general 
category noun (a material object noun, say), further ambiguity persists: this apple is the same 
(colour, variety, taste, molecular structure) as that one; the book so-and-so mentioned is the same 
(copy, version, binding) as the book on the shelf. It is plausible that in ordinary scenarios, context 
implicitly sets the relevant aspect of sameness attributed to two or more items. But in philosophical 
cases, it normally helps resolve apparent paradox by making the hidden aspect(s) explicit. Consider: 
The first apple is the same as the second; the first when ingested makes one ill while the second 
does not; so they are not the same after all. Well, the first apple is a granny-smith—just as is the 
second—but the first had turned bad, so they were not qualitatively the same in respect of their 
nutritional aspects. Likewise, the lengths are the same stretches of matter, or distance between 
marking points, but they are not the same in units, for one length determines what the unit is to 
be, while the other does not. 
Had A or B phrased their initial difficulty in terms of needing something to fill the metre canon, 
and not needing a stick a metre in length, then the solution would have been non-controversially 




have a stick a metre in length: the canonical standard. Given what we have uncovered above, we 
can see that really A speaks loosely—a looseness for which she is entirely forgiven (B’s strictness, 
by contrast, in these circumstances manifests his own kind of, more worrying, incompetence). What 
A could have said is more cumbersome: “We don’t have something a metre long but we do have 
something which determines the length of a metre and therefore fulfils the same purpose!” The 
latter formulation sacrifices usefulness for exactitude (and suffers for it). But ordinarily, this 
laborious phrasing would be unnecessary, owing to what should be a tacit awareness that the 
canonical standard is the same length as the other rods being used as fodder. That is, of course the 
standard metre rod will fit the canon, for it is the very stick after whose mould the fodder were 
designed! Likewise, B could have responded to A’s claim by saying “It’s not a metre, but it is the 
same length, so let’s use it indeed”. (However, maybe A would be best saving that comment until 
after the siege is over.)  
In any case, the resolution of the apparent contradiction presented by this problem case has 
shown us that a standard of length must be the same length as the units made to its figure; indeed, 
that is a fact of everyday physics. But it has also kept true to the thought that we cannot describe 
the length of a standard and the lengths made in line with the standard, jointly, in the metric system.  
 
§4.2 The grounded case 
Certainly the “definition” which is the lexicographer’s report of an observed synonymy 
cannot be taken as the ground of the synonymy. (Quine 1951, 24) 
As I pointed out in §3, the authority of stipulated norms does not work in practice in the clear-cut 
way suggested by Wittgenstein’s idealised example. Stipulations can have, rather, a tendency to 
disperse and then weaken in their authority, travelling as they do across ever further plains of 
usage. Sometimes, too, as new variations on standards are formed, authority is sent back in the 
other direction: as Quine noted, lexicographers are faced primarily with the task of detecting those 
new standards. On Quine’s view, judging the lexicographer as stipulating the meaning of terms 
would be to put the “cart before the horse” (1951, 24). However, this seems to me only half right: 
for after all, lexicographers solidify and codify the loose normative webs formed by usage, and 
thereby provide touchstones of authority for competent language-users and language-learners 
going forward. (The game of Scrabble is no fun without giving the full weight of authority to the 
dictionary.) 
There is, then, an intricate back-and-forth between those who stipulate, articulate, follow, 




represented by the quote above, however, Quine is lured into searching (unsuccessfully) for the 
ground of synonymy, without which it is thought analyticity cannot gain a footing. If I am right, 
here and in many cases, it is folly to search for the ground to which norms can be reduced, unless 
the ground is something as very general as “practice”. Contained within practice are those just 
noted contributors, who may interact—as when dealing with definitions and synonymy—in a non-
hierarchical fashion; that is, neither exclusively top-down from legislators to rule-followers, nor 
solely bottom-up in the other direction. Accordingly, we should now wonder whether this model 
accurately depicts the standard metre case too. 
In truth, there are few completely general claims to make about normative structures, such that 
we cannot assume what goes for one goes for all. For some rules are within systems relatively easy 
to change, with immediate and lasting effect—lawmakers sometimes have this ability, for example 
(though note how the system of precedents in common law legal jurisdictions allows for a bottom-
up change of sorts). Centralised banks can change financial norms, as when they introduce or run-
down a new unit of currency. Measurement norms, however, do indeed appear to be more like 
those governing words than those governing pennies. As we have seen, national standard metre 
rods were cut to the canonical international standard; from there, presumably regional and 
commercial sub-standards are cut to the national standards, and so on. As the standards spread 
out, each begins to reign over its respective jurisdiction, as it were. In this process, it is at some 
point inevitable that the notion of a metre becomes in a sense abstract.84  
That is, participants in socio-linguistic measuring practices come to understand “one metre” as 
a rough-and-ready length of such-and-such distance. When they need to be more precise, they 
bring measured and measuring rods into play. But if a magician’s rod were used for such a purpose, 
which subtly shrank when placed alongside objects, those in the practice would baulk at the 
authority of the stick. It would be less of a joke, of course, were all metre standards sold 
commercially to begin exhibiting the same shrinking features. For at that point, regular metre-
stick-users—carpenters, let us say—are perfectly within their rights to proclaim: that’s not a metre. 
How should carpenters go on, at this point? They could of course approach a shrinking canonical 
standard and remark that’s not a metre, and still be warranted to make the claim. Given that the 
“force” of the canonical rod, in setting what counts as a metre, has dispersed, carpenters do not 
have to acquiesce to its authority when faced with it shrinking; they do not have to carry over a 
similar frailty to the length of one metre. It is not clear how they should go on. But the point is 
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this: it is a coherent dilemma they would face; they would have a certain amount of choice in the 
matter, and they could intelligibly describe the canonical standard metre as not in fact one metre 
long. 
With these insights to hand, let us return to the Great Measurement War. If A and B work within 
a sociolinguistic practice much like ours, where the groundswell of usage plays a significant role in 
setting measurement norms, it is not necessarily wrong of A to claim that the canonical standard 
is in fact a metre long. On this less idealised interpretation, B’s responses may not just be 
infelicitous: he is sticking too rigidly to an earlier articulation of a norm. The authority of the 
seniors in the metric division, over what counts as a metre, has waned for some time; the rod 
which is hermetically sealed is not the one which has final say—or at least in many circumstances 
would not be. The authority of the seniors is not that of a centralised bank when determining a 
new a unit of currency. 
There are, thus, two ways to handle the pragmatic objection to the standard metre case. One 
way is to take the notion that there is one and only one criterion for what counts as a metre quite 
literally. When the challenge to employ the canonical standard metre in a practical situation arises, 
we can account for why it still functions in the way that other metre sticks do—why it must function 
that way. All rods have a length; all rods which match in length have the same length. These are 
more primitive truths than those articulated by conventions which stipulate what a particular unit-
term is to designate by means of a certain sample of length. Those conventions do prohibit, 
however, our ability to talk about samples or criteria of units in terms of those very units 
themselves. Thus the standard metre, in the idealised case, is not itself a metre in length. 
That point holds true of the more realistic way of handling the problem, too. On that 
interpretation, the then so-called canonical standard did not have the same authority it may once 
have had. Owing to how much traction the abstract notion of a metre has gained over time in 
public usage, it is no longer clear that the only recourse we have to what counts as a metre is the 
canonical standard. Perhaps the canonical standard could be reintroduced as the defining, 
unwavering standard among a sea of radically unreliable metres. In such a scenario, the first 
response to the pragmatic objection is once again directly relevant.  
The relevance of both responses, however, cannot be underestimated. They allow us not to 
forsake basic truths about lengths, while retaining the thought that norms of measurement cannot, 







§5 Back to Boghossian and Kripke 
It is time to return to our starting point. To recall, I had established previously that there is little 
reason to think that, historically, the conceptions of analyticity employed by philosophers in the 
past divide into two broad camps: epistemic and metaphysically vacuous. Philosophers such as 
Kant and Frege embedded their conceptions of analyticity within unique philosophical projects, 
and the character of those projects inevitably left its marks on how they conceived analyticity. I 
suggested that the best way, then, to frame these many different conceptions was in terms of 
emphasis or aspect: Frege emphasises the logical and epistemological character of analyticity, to 
suit his logicism; Kant focuses on the epistemological difference between synthetic and analytic 
judgements, in a bid to firm up the foundations of metaphysics, and so he also emphasised the 
explicative nature of analytic judgements, and the transcendental role of synthetic a priori 
judgements. 
It is in the context of historical uses of “analyticity”, especially by the logical empiricists, that 
Boghossian’s distinction is supposed to have a home. Boghossian maintains that one conception 
of analyticity holds a sentence is analytic when it is true in virtue of meaning. Thus, “Adults are 
grown-ups” is analytic according to this conception, given the supposition that “adult” means the 
same as, or means part of, what “grown-up” means. The other conception is claimed to hold that 
a sentence is analytic when it is justified in virtue of meaning; i.e., when one can know it to be true 
only on account of knowing what its constituent terms mean. The motivating thought behind this 
epistemic conception is that regardless of how sentences turn out to be true, one can always know 
a subset of them (the analytic ones) on the basis of one’s linguistic competence. Thus, also on this 
conception, “Adults are grown-ups” is analytic, because one’s familiarity with what the sentence 
(and its component parts) means simply mandates one’s knowledge of it. The claimed benefit to 
distinguishing these two aspects of analyticity is that one can ostensibly keep hold of the 
epistemological queerness of analyticity while rejecting the metaphysically vacuous consequences. 
That is, Boghossian wants to be able to say that basic sentences (those that implicitly define the 
logical constants) are known to be true by competent speakers on the basis of their knowledge of 
the logical language, which in turn explains their Frege-analytic knowledge of sentences such as 
“All bachelors are unmarried”. And he wants to say this without maintaining also that strictly 
speaking such implicit definers are not factually true; that they do not correspond to some worldly 
fact. 
The purported upshot of Boghossian’s position, then, is that he can support the a priori 
methodology of philosophy, or logic, while evading certain criticisms historically and forcefully 




character. For, Boghossian retorts, how could it be that even one sentence is true simply because 
of what it means? Surely, he thinks, every sentence is true on account, first, of its having some 
meaning, and, second, of that meaning’s aligning with the way things are.85 Boghossian is in good 
company in making this argument. As discussed, it has its roots in Quine, and later, Chisholm; 
moreover, critics of analyticity and conceptual truth more widely, such as Williamson, have 
adopted it too (see my Chapter 3, §3). 
The problem is that this argument presupposes something false. It is not the case that all 
sentences are true in the canonical way imagined by Boghossian and others. (To anticipate an 
objection by Williamson, this is not the same as saying that there are different senses of “true”; we 
deal with this accusation in detail next chapter.) Of some sentences, to say that they are true is to 
reaffirm their status as norms, not to describe some situation that makes them true. Grammatical 
form can play a misleading role here, as with sentences such as “The chess king moves one square 
at a time”, which is declarative in form. However, when one attends to the function of such 
sentences, when used on a particular occasion normatively, one finds that they do not purport to 
describe anything, even though some such sentences may be used on other occasions to do so.  
Now, Boghossian supports his argument for dividing analyticity into vacuous and epistemic 
variants by attempting to show that a sentence may be epistemically analytic without its truth either 
having been established by convention or failing to correspond to some worldly fact. To show 
that instances of epistemic analyticity have neither of those consequences, in both cases, 
Boghossian cites Kripke’s reading of the standard metre case.  
As I have shown, Kripke’s reading of this argument effectively presupposes at the outset that 
a norm (“S is a metre long at t0”) must still describe how things are; indeed, it is unclear from 
Kripke’s text whether he recognises that the stipulative definition is supposed to be normative.86 
Recall, in Kripke’s scenario, the stick S simply serves as an example of a length which the phrase 
“one metre” picks out across all possible worlds—that is, in Kripke’s terms, it rigidly designates 
(1972, 55). So “one metre” is a rigid designator, yet the sentence used to ordain the stick with this 
status, “S is a metre long at t0”, is held to be a flaccid designator, meaning that what it “picks out” 
could easily have been different: the stick could have shrunk or expanded, e.g. (putting aside, as I 
am not sure Kripke is entitled to do, the fact that variables such as temperature were historically 
                                                 
85 I do not think this position could only be cast in terms of a correspondence theory of truth, but the 
details are vague, and this kind of perspective on truth fulfils the purpose for the example’s sake. 
86 Note, this is hardly an obvious form for a norm to take. Indeed, it is quite telling that Kripke imagines 
this form of words for the statement uttered at the crowning moment of the metre standard’s introduction, 




allowed for in the determining of standards). On Kripke’s view, then, it is a contingent matter of 
fact that the definition “S is a metre long at t0” is true: the stick S could have been longer or shorter 
than the length it is supposed to fix the reference of.  
But—and this is the crucial point—it is only intelligible that the stipulative definition was a 
contingent statement if one supposes that it functioned as a description. For descriptions may be 
wrong; that to which a definite description refers, e.g., could vary across different possible worlds, 
and so is not “rigid”, in Kripke’s terms. Accordingly, were the world and its contents arranged 
differently, any given description (true in “this world”) is susceptible of becoming false. However, 
norms are not descriptions. As we have seen in this chapter, they are prescriptions for how to 
describe. Consequently, introducing a standard of measurement by the phrase “This stick is (to be 
called) one metre long” is not to describe the length of a stick (indeed, not to describe such a stick 
in terms of a unit not yet introduced!); rather, it is to say something akin to “This stick is what we 
will use henceforth to determine whether some other item is one metre in length.” 
Accordingly, I cannot find any support for Boghossian’s arguments against the metaphysically 
vacuous aspects of analyticity. An appeal to Kripke’s reading of the standard metre case is of no 
help, since it begs the very question at issue. The question at issue is whether a sentence’s being a 
definition has the consequences either that it is not “in fact” true, or is conventional in nature. 
Boghossian argues that a definition has neither of these consequences, and does so by citing 
Kripke, who himself presupposes that something’s being a definition does not preclude its being 
descriptive. Kripke is right to point out that a sentence’s being descriptive leaves it susceptible of 
contingency, and of truth or falsity in fact. But he is wrong to treat a definition as a description, 
and Boghossian is likewise wrong to reproduce this error. 
Moreover, one does not get out of the struggle here by pointing to the pliant and flexible nature 
of norms. It is true that in practice, formerly established norms have a fading and varying authority 
over the aptness and correctness of what we say and do. And it is instructive to recognise this. A 
proper appreciation of how norms actually function helps us overcome simplistic models, for 
example, of what a word means; how meaning changes; and how disagreement surfaces and is 
resolved. But none of this takes away from the fact that where a statement is normative, it is not 
descriptive, and so sentences which express norms—the analytic ones—express in a sense 
something conceptually true: they express the normative employment of concepts in practice, as 






The context┽sensitivity of analytic truth 
Like Boghossian, Williamson also holds that analytic truths can be conceived in two main ways—
metaphysically and epistemologically—although in his view neither way of conceiving analytic 
truth makes it any more useful in philosophy. In Chapter Two, I criticised this distinction. For one 
thing, I pointed out that the distinction is arbitrary; that is, historically, conceptions of analyticity 
have not fallen either side of this dividing line. For another, I showed how looking at historical 
conceptions with this distinction in mind only obscures how those conceptions were employed. 
Finally, and most importantly, I argued that the distinction, on its own grounds, does not hold 
water. That is because Boghossian’s arguments against the so-called metaphysical conception of 
analyticity (which I prefer to call the vacuousness or non-factual conception), which motivate the 
distinction in the first place, rely problematically on an untenable presupposition: that sentences 
used to prescribe may also, at once, describe.  
Given that prescription and description are exclusive, I take it that the work of my previous 
two chapters culminates in the following thought: it should not be controversial to claim that some 
sentences may be conceptually true; i.e., that they are expressions of practical norms. Accordingly, 
on my view, much of the literature is simply confused when it talks about “metaphysical 
analyticity”. I prefer to speak instead in terms of the metaphysical aspect (or vacuous aspect) of 
analytic sentences. The supposed metaphysical conception, as we have seen, is often articulated in 
a worry such as this: How can any sentence be true solely on account of what its words mean? But 
by emphasising that an analytic sentence simply expresses a norm, I try to diffuse the mystery that 
inspires and compels this question.  
But all the same, there are other, related, concerns—we will see in this chapter specifically that 
the worry over the purported metaphysical queerness of analyticity resurfaces in Williamson’s own 
attack on analytic truth, in both of its putative general forms (vacuous and epistemological). And 
so a predominant concern of this chapter concerns what Timothy Williamson has to say about 
analyticity. In his book The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007), Williamson takes aim at both the vacuous 
and epistemologically distinct aspects of analytic sentences. This attack forms the crux of his 
negative arguments against any view which regards philosophy as distinctively conceptual. 
Accordingly, some background is needed first in order to place his arguments in a wider narrative.  
In his philosophical methodology, Williamson defends both the claim that philosophy is an 
“armchair” discipline—i.e., that it does not fruitfully engage in experiment, measurement, and 




distinguished from those of other modes of enquiry. “Philosophical exceptionalism” is the name 
which Williamson gives to the opposite position, which claims that philosophy’s methodology is 
sharply distinct from other disciplines, like those of the natural sciences; it is this position which 
he takes as his primary target. Williamson understands exceptionalism as arguing, for example, 
against naturalism that philosophy does not ask questions about the world (as a posteriori 
disciplines like the natural sciences do), but rather that it investigates what we bring to such a 
posteriori forms of enquiry; i.e., “our conceptual or linguistic competence” (2007, 2). So-called 
exceptionalist philosophers are said by Williamson to have taken the “linguistic” or “conceptual 
turn”, depending on whether they take language or thought as the more “fundamental level of 
analysis” (where thought is, presumably, considered notionally distinct from language), which both 
usher in the same conclusion: “philosophical questions turn out to be in some sense conceptual 
questions” (2007, 2). 
Now, §3 of this chapter onwards explains and criticises Williamson’s arguments against any 
attempt to say that some sentences are not made true by the facts, or that one could grasp the 
truth of a sentence as soon as one grasps what it expresses. Williamson thinks that analyticity must 
prop up any defence of philosophy as an especially conceptual discipline, and so his arguments are 
naturally of interest to this thesis. However, the earlier sections of this chapter—§§1-2—criticise 
the general outline and motivation of Williamson’s project. This is also directly relevant to my 
overarching aim because, as suggested above, the thrust of Williamson’s work on philosophical 
methodology is to show that philosophy need have no special concern with concepts, whether 
that concern is cashed out in terms of subject matter or method.  
In spelling out his project, Williamson groups together targets according as they each take the 
linguistic or conceptual turn; as an antidote to this move, he offers an insight from David Wiggins. 
However, I think Williamson’s use of Wiggins here muddies the waters considerably. Accordingly, 
in §1.2, I discuss Wiggins’s point in greater detail, and show how it is consonant with the 
methodologies of philosophers who also seem to have taken the turn by Williamson’s own 
criterion. Following this, in §2, I tackle Williamson’s arguments against the linguistic and 
conceptual turns in much more detail; this gives us good reason to think that philosophy really is, 
contra Williamson, in some sense a conceptual discipline. 
More work must be done, however, since, as indicated, Williamson maintains two further points 
of interest to us here: first, that the best attempt to articulate what “linguistic” or “conceptual 
philosophers” take themselves to be doing is focussing on analytic truths; and second, that no 
conception of analyticity can provide philosophy with its sought-after conceptual credentials. 




is centrally concerned with analytic truths, or (if the class of analytic truths is felt to be smaller than 
that of norms in general) with expressions of norms; in my own way, I also sing this line, though 
to quite a different tune. However, as we will see in §3, it becomes apparent that Williamson does 
not seriously have in view a conception of analyticity which appreciates normativity. For example, 
even though Williamson criticises “Wittgensteinians” for apparently proceeding as if “true” were 
equivocal between analytic and synthetic senses (2007, 54), his argument to show that truth is 
unequivocal is entirely insensitive to the normative character of some truths. Moreover, his 
accusation that Wittgensteinians think of analytic and synthetic truth as forming two distinct senses 
finds no footing, especially given an appropriately normative construal of analyticity. 
What comes to the fore, then, by §4 is that the conception of analyticity he criticises is nowhere 
near sufficiently nuanced. This point grows out of the last chapter, where I emphasised that 
analytic truths, being practical linguistic norms, are more diffuse than is commonly imagined. A 
natural concomitant to the thought that normative practices wane and cease to be normative is the 
thought that they change, bend, and develop offshoots. For all that, normativity remains within 
contextually restricted areas; indeed, it must do so, on pain of semantic meaning and understanding 
becoming impossible. So if we fail to notice the context-sensitivity of analytic truth, the very notion 
that some sentence could be analytic in an epistemological rendering looks extremely suspect. And 
this is just what Williamson argues: that it is always possible for a competent speaker to understand 
a sentence of his language and yet dissent from it, whether that sentence is characterised as analytic 
(even logically true) or otherwise. Thus, according to Williamson, it is possible for a speaker to 
disagree that adults are grown-ups while fully understanding the content of that proposition.  
Now, in my previous chapter, I argued that analytic propositions are not, in fact, true: they are 
true expressions of norms. This is to say that one who disagrees that adults are grown-ups is in 
effect denying a norm.87 On the face of it, this looks to be a typical case of misunderstanding, since 
one would be contradicting a norm. I explore this idea as a response to Williamson’s criticisms, 
and in the process I discover again that normativity is far more sophisticated than is accounted for 
by both Williamson and his opponents (such as Boghossian). Finally, in the last part of this section 
and chapter, §4.3, I appeal to this subtler picture of practical normativity to undermine 
Williamson’s reliance on a key device in his dialectic—that of semantic competence. Accordingly, 
I show that Williamson supports his arguments with an untenable view of semantic understanding, 
according to which one can always be in a position to deny norms without betokening any 
misunderstanding. 
                                                 
87 If, indeed, that specification is correct about some contextually specified area of discourse; this is a 




As indicated, however, first we turn to look at the general shape of Williamson’s methodological 
project. 
 
§1 The centrality of language 
Following Richard Rorty (1967), Williamson uses the phrase “the linguistic turn” to characterise 
“linguistic philosophy”.  Those who have held that language is “somehow the central theme of 
philosophy” have, by Williamson’s lights, taken such a turn (2007, 10). According to Williamson, 
the general feeling among analytic philosophers is that this turn has passed its sell-by date. Yet, he 
explains, part of his aim with the book is to find out how moribund it really is, and whether we 
should restore it to health (2007, 10). 
 
§1.1 Who has taken the linguistic or conceptual turn? 
To get a handle on what the linguistic turn involves, Williamson briefly discusses how some who 
have taken it considered language to be central. For instance, he cites A. J. Ayer, who at one time 
held that the “propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character . . . they express 
definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions” (Ayer 1936, 44). Williamson recounts how 
Ayer’s division of investigation into “descriptions of objects” and “definitions of words” is 
avowedly derived from Hume’s between “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas”. Williamson 
seems to endorse this view of Hume, calling the analytic-synthetic distinction a “linguistic 
analogue” of Hume’s (Williamson 2007, 11). This is, of course, the same exegetical move we 
criticised in my Ch. 1, §1.2.1. Further, and also problematically, it is home to a way of thinking that 
presumes the analytic-synthetic distinction is easily extracted from specific projects and moved 
wholly to others, as one might unearth and replant a growing vegetable in a new patch. This 
presumed exportability can give rise to a false impression that one can appraise analyticity tout court 
without paying specific attention to how a particular conception is employed. (And by “particular,” 
of course, I mean conceptions more specific than the alleged metaphysical and epistemological 
variants.) 
Ayer’s claim that philosophical propositions are linguistic and not factual is classified by 
Williamson as being about the method of philosophy (cf. Ayer 1956, 1). But moving forward in 
his survey, he portrays Michael Dummett’s Fregean linguistic turn as concerned both with the 
method and the subject matter of philosophy (Williamson 2007, 12–13). For instance, he points 
out, Dummett holds that philosophy analyses the structure of thought (not to be conceived 




that when others maintained instead that philosophy should analyse thought “directly”, not via 
language, so the “conceptual turn” was born, where the constituents of thought are called 
“concepts” (2007, 13). 
Yet according to Williamson, “linguistic philosophers” still nonetheless spoke of concepts 
(understood as “what synonymous expressions had in common”), and in his view, any philosophy 
which makes intentionality (i.e., the “aboutness of thought and talk”) central to philosophy has 
taken the conceptual turn too (2007, 13). Having sketched what it means to be a conceptual 
philosopher, Williamson suggests that not all philosophy should be deemed “conceptual”. He 
argues that if we accept a mind-independent reality then we should accept that concepts only take 
up a small portion of it, and, given this, that it is by no means obvious that philosophy’s task is to 
analyse only that small section (2007, 14). 
Williamson thus views philosophy in this regard as similar to other disciplines, such as those to 
which we (apparently) have no problem assigning a nonconceptual subject matter: 
The practitioners of any discipline have thoughts and communicate them, but they are 
rarely studying those very thoughts: rather, they are studying what their thoughts are 
about. Most thoughts are not about thoughts. To make philosophy the study of thought 
is to insist that philosophers’ thoughts should be about thoughts. (Williamson 2007, 
17–18) 
As Williamson sees it, however, much contemporary philosophy seems to go beyond “thoughts 
about thoughts”. He maintains that naturalists in the philosophy of mind study thought as part of 
the natural world, so that those who theorise about qualia have interests “primarily in the nature 
of the sensations or qualia themselves, not in our concepts of them” (2007, 18).  A fortiori, he 
opines, the case holds for contemporary metaphysicians, whom he thinks are concerned to detect 
what the basic constituents of our reality are and the relations between them—“not to study the 
structure of our thought about them” (2007, 19). But even here in metaphysical theorising, 
Williamson notes, “the armchair” remains pivotal, as do our modal concepts; empirical findings 
may place constraints on the work, but thought experiments nonetheless remain crucial in 
Williamson’s vision of philosophy (2007, 19). According to Williamson, then, the philosopher’s 
questions somehow treat of “the world”, yet do so from an armchair. So perceived, philosophy 
should, he thinks, be considered an “armchair science”, of a kind with mathematics, which is “a 







§1.2 Which way does Wiggins turn? 
In the course of tracing a short history of the linguistic or conceptual turn, Williamson briefly 
stops to cite Wiggins. He professes to find in Wiggins an insight that should make us hesitant to 
pursue “the analysis of thought or language . . . autonomously with any kind of methodological 
priority” (Williamson 2007, 20). Specifically, Williamson cites the following remark:  
Let us forget once and for all the very idea of some knowledge of language or meaning 
that is not knowledge of the world itself. (Wiggins 2001, 12) 
Williamson interprets this point as saying that in order for us to define, say, natural kind terms, we 
must be able to point to real-world exemplars. And since, he suggests, “[w]hat there is determines 
what there is for us to mean”, he concludes that when we know what it is that we mean we thereby 
know “something about what there is” (2007, 20).  
This is a bit quick—as exegesis and as an argument. I suggest that if Wiggins’s point (as I 
understand it) is to count against the linguistic or conceptual turn, it remains quite unclear who 
actually has taken the turn as Williamson conceives it, because philosophers including later 
Wittgenstein and Austin broadly agree with it. More on that shortly. Presently, let us pad out the 
Wiggins point with a little detail. 
At first glance, the isolated Wiggins line, cited above, does appear to fit with such of 
Williamson’s claims as “few philosophical questions are conceptual questions in any distinctive 
sense” (2007, 3). And it is true that Wiggins relates his own point to Quine’s “Two Dogmas”, 
which at least inspires Williamson’s later suspicion of analyticity, so there is some overlap here. 
The Wiggins point features in his Sameness and Substance Renewed, which aims to elaborate a “theory 
of individuation”, or singling-out of continuants (2001, 1). The remark occurs in a very brief 
section anticipating the use of the terms “real” and “nominal” as employed in a later chapter. This 
distinction has Lockean origins and it is not important for our purposes, so I will treat it roughly. 
Wiggins thinks of real definitions (or rather, explanations) as those which we could not perform 
without making some essential reference to the thing to be explained or defined. Think of how we 
point to something in the world in order to explain the meaning of a predicate—say, “This is a 
hedgehog”. By contrast, he describes a nominal explanation as readily performable without any 
sort of ostensive or demonstrative device. It is typified linguistically by “if and only if” definitions 
which specify non-circular conditions, such as “x is a human if and only if x is a rational animal”.  
Wiggins notes two things about real, as opposed to nominal, explanations (put aside the 
nominal case, since it is not important here). First, our real “elucidations” of predicates (“is a 




(hedgehogs). I presume what Wiggins means in this case is that when I try to explain the meaning 
of “hedgehog”, my (real) explanation ought to pick out a hedgehog (or, I should think, some 
suitable representation of one). Second, however, Wiggins maintains that despite this factual 
condition on the explanation, “real definitions lie within the province of semantics, and of 
empirical fact. No lifelike elucidation of ordinary discourse could be contrived without them” 
(2001, 12). The natural reading of this point as it occurs to me is that ostensive explanations play 
a role in our linguistic practices. Hence, in some philosophical pursuit, we should not sensibly 
think that talk of language and talk of the world could be principally separated. For example, I 
cannot hope to learn a first language independently of learning the world about me, because even 
though much of language might not require us to attend to the world, still a significant proportion 
of it does. So much seems innocent and sensible. 
Another point, which Wiggins may not have in mind, is that to explain some worldly 
phenomenon, I will have to do so under some or other understanding of my words:88 e.g., when I 
say, “This is a hedgehog”, perhaps it is sufficient to point to specimen which is no longer living 
(at the side of the road or in a taxidermist’s display). Or maybe I can use a plastic facsimile to 
explain what a hedgehog is. In short, we need to know what will count as my pointing to a 
hedgehog, or indeed as explaining what one is via an ostensive gesture. These normative concerns 
belong, at least, in the realm of language; to explain what I mean I shall have to make use of 
linguistic abilities, and to do so I shall very likely have to use parts of my environment as samples. 
And so yes, we should abandon the view that knowledge of language is not knowledge of the 
world. At the same time, we ought to acknowledge that speaking thus of our concepts is precisely 
a way of coming into touch with “the world”, with things as they actually are. Accordingly, if 
philosophy wants to understand, say, the mind, knowledge, or the self, investigating and clarifying 
concepts of these phenomena (and related ones) is something philosophy ought to do. 
Indeed, for Wiggins, examining the use of concepts is a non-negotiable starting point for 
enquiry, even if (as he sometimes suggests), we could “explicate” those concepts through 
philosophical work: 
[W]e have rudimentary pretheoretical ideas of identity, persistence through change, and 
the singling out of changeable things. By means of these, we may arrive at a provisional 
or first explication of what “same” means and of the actual application of this relation-
word. So soon as that is achieved, there is a basis from which to scrutinize afresh and 
then consolidate our logical and participative understanding of the individuative 
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practices that a thinker’s grasp of the concepts of substance, sameness and persistence 
through change makes possible for him. At the end of this second phase, nothing will 
be recognizable as the philosophical analysis of “=”. . . . Provided we do not despise the 
ordinary ideas by which we conduct the untheoretical business of the individuation and 
reidentification of particulars, we can remind ourselves well enough of what regulates 
the principled employment of “=”. (Wiggins 2001, 2–3) 
This approach respects our discourse and practice as both a starting point and a constraint on the 
investigation. It seems, contra Williamson, precisely to place some kind of methodological priority 
on investigating language and linguistic practices. For all that, it does not disconnect our concepts 
from what they are about. Accordingly, Wiggins is committed to the view that philosophy begins 
with concepts of phenomena, while also maintaining that investigating concepts is reflective of 
phenomena. But exactly those two commitments are shared by many philosophers who, by 
Williamson’s criterion, have taken the linguistic or conceptual turn (because they consider concepts 
central to philosophy).  
Hacker contends a similar point: 
The idea that a linguistic investigation of the use of “X” and a conceptual investigation 
of X were not also investigations into the nature of Xs would have struck analytic 
philosophers of the day as perverse. (Hacker 2009, 338) 
Hacker cites passages from Wittgenstein, Austin, and Hart in which they each make similar claims. 
For example, Austin held that examining linguistic norms was not “merely” to look at words, “but 
also at the realities we use the words to talk about”; primarily, that is, to bring into focus the 
phenomena in which we are interested (Austin 1961, 130). Such a view of the nature of 
philosophical investigation, indeed, is not uncommon. Especially so among those philosophers of 
a certain generation most renowned for focussing on linguistic intricacies. For example, in his 
review of Ryle’s republished work, Constantine Sandis summarises Ryle’s concern with the 
concept of mind(s)89 as one of honing focus: 
What Ryle [demonstrated] is that one cannot separate questions about minds from 
questions about mental concepts. The argument here is not, as is sometimes imagined, 
that the question “what is X?” is a linguistic or conceptual one, but, rather, that we need 
to settle upon an agreed concept of X before we can even begin to ask questions about 
it. (Sandis 2011, 456) 
                                                 





But if the sort of claim that Wiggins makes is also fairly attributed to philosophers who very clearly 
took the linguistic or conceptual turn as Williamson conceives it (such as Ryle, Austin, and 
Wittgenstein), and if Williamson thinks this claim counts against that turn, then I cannot see whom 
he is targeting.  
Further, and more worryingly, it is unclear whether Williamson has fairly characterised either 
what taking these turns consists in, or why it would be problematic to do so. Indeed, Sandis’s point 
is particularly apt, since Williamson, in his second chapter, labours precisely over how to find sense 
in just this thought: that philosophical questions are conceptual questions (2007, chap.2). Thus 
perhaps, right off the bat, Williamson’s framing of his task misleadingly characterises the concern 
with concepts in philosophy—at least as that concern avowedly manifests among a major 
contingent of philosophy. 
 
§2 Was Mars always either dry or not dry? 
As I have anticipated, the majority of Williamson’s critique of “conceptual philosophy” (2007, 14) 
focuses on the notion of analyticity; he thinks that attempts to articulate how language or concepts 
are central to philosophy ultimately narrow down to claiming that philosophical propositions are 
analytic (see, e.g., 2007, 48). Prior to this part of his critique, however, Williamson considers more 
general ways in which philosophical statements or questions might turn out to be only conceptual 
or linguistic questions—especially by investigating the claim that philosophical questions are about 
language or concepts. He argues that even those philosophical questions which most plausibly 
would be regarded as being about language or concepts in some way are not, on inspection, really 
so—no more at least than ordinary, non-philosophical questions are about language or concepts. 
 
§2.1 The Mars question 
So what, then, makes a question distinctively philosophical for Williamson? Unsurprisingly, 
Williamson has no definitive answer to this question; after all, he is arguing that philosophy is not 
special as a discipline; that it has no unique subject matter or method. Nonetheless, the question 
Williamson takes as a test case, “Was Mars always either dry or not dry?”, is, he claims, likely 
philosophical. His main reasons for considering it such are that he and other philosophers are 
interested in it; that to answer it, we tend to invoke classically philosophical concerns; and that it 
is fundamentally tied up with vagueness—a philosophical and logical problem (2007, 24). On that 
last point, consider the logical form of the proposition about which the question asks: 




That is, for any time t, at that time, Mars was either dry or it was not dry. Since the predicate “dry” 
has borderline cases, as do “bald”, “heap”, “orange”, and so on, it is prone to generating the sorts 
of puzzles which concern philosophers. And as we see shortly, Williamson thinks it essential to 
answering puzzles about vagueness, such as that posed by the “Mars” question (as I will call it), 
that we arbitrate between different logics. 
For the purposes of investigating the Mars question, Williamson supposes that Mars at one 
time certainly was wet (or not dry), and that it gradually dehydrated to its current dry state; there 
is not some specific time at which Mars was first dry or not dry. Accordingly (and plausibly), he 
says, empirical measures would be of no use to solving the question—finding out that a given 
volume of water was present on Mars at some time and not another, e.g., would not help, though 
were circumstances such that water had never been on Mars, of course, we would have an answer. 
Since the Mars question’s constituent words appear in many non-philosophical questions 
(though not, one should point out, so arranged), Williamson does not suppose it to be 
philosophical on account of its vocabulary; nonetheless, the foregoing general reasons apparently 
attest to its being philosophical. Yet, he argues, nothing about the question should lead us to view 
it as explicitly linguistic or conceptual: the referents of “Mars” and “dry” are worldly phenomena, 
he suggests (in his view, Mars and dryness, respectively). Likewise, it is not implicitly so: e.g., the 
Mars question is not equivalent to some explicitly metalinguistic sentence such as the following:  
Is the sentence “Mars was always either dry or not dry” true? (Does it express a truth 
as used in this context?) (Williamson 2007, 26) 
For, Williamson points out, we can convert and insert apparently unphilosophical questions into 
this metalinguistic frame (such as “Was Mars always either uninhabited or not dry?”) and we would 
not thereby have shown such sentences to be implicitly about language. Or, more strikingly, if we 
had shown such unphilosophical questions to be in a sense implicitly about language, then we 
could equally maintain that the metalinguistic question is in some similar sense implicitly not about 
language (2007, 27). 
Williamson pursues other strategies in a bid to show that the Mars question is implicitly 
linguistic or conceptual, but in each case, ultimately, he shows these strategies not to work. Instead, 
Williamson changes tack; he proceeds to assess competing answers to the question by considering 
the different logics they spring from: classical, intuitionistic, three-valued, and fuzzy. Each 
approach to logic recommends a different truth evaluation of sentences involving vague 
predicates. Williamson himself endorses classical logic, and so thinks the answer to the Mars 




excluded middle, P or not-P, for various times (2007, 31).90 Nonetheless, as he admits, such an 
answer is still contentious and does not rule out further debate on the issue, which prompts a 
discussion about the different kinds of logic. 
So Williamson’s point in raising and discussing this question is not predominantly to answer it, 
or even to assess its possible answers. One point is to show us just why “semantic considerations” 
(2007, 31) are relevant in answering philosophical questions, albeit questions not themselves about 
language or concepts. Another, more significant, reason seems to be to foreshadow the 
conclusions of the following chapters. For Williamson emphasises that different thinkers, each 
competent with the use of vague predicates, have different beliefs about vagueness and therefore 
about the Mars question. And so he is urging suspicion over the linguistic or conceptual turn’s 
apparent claim that the method to solve a philosophical puzzle is merely to retreat back to the 
concepts with which one is competent: 
We already speak the language of the original question; we understand those words and 
how they are put together; we possess the concepts they express; we grasp what is being 
asked. That semantic knowledge may be necessary if we are to know the answer to the 
original question. It is not sufficient, for it does not by itself put one in a position to 
arbitrate between conflicting theories of vagueness. For each of those theories has been 
endorsed by some competent speakers of English who fully grasp the question. 
(Williamson 2007, 39–40) 
There are presuppositions here which certainly need unpacking. For example, what is the picture 
of “semantic knowledge” that Williamson employs? He points out that theorists of vagueness are 
competent English speakers, as though those who favour a view of philosophical method as 
especially conceptual or linguistic must have in mind that the best English-speaking philosophers 
are simply the best English-speakers. Williamson’s picture of semantic competency and its 
relevance to philosophical enquiry must be probed further, in the later sections. 
 
§2.2 Investigating the question 
For now, I wish to work with this Mars question—“Was Mars always either dry or not dry?”—
and see whether some philosophical approaches towards it are not, contra Williamson’s claims, 
                                                 
90 Williamson gives a fuller treatment of vagueness in his book of the same name (1994), along with 
discussions on other logics and alternative approaches to vagueness. Williamson’s own view—the 
“epistemic” view—is that there is indeed a precise point at which, say, a heap is no longer a heap after the 
removal of some particular grain of sand, but we simply cannot know it. Even so, he thinks in principle 




usefully or centrally concerned with concepts or language. For it should become clear that 
Williamson’s own attempts to gloss the Mars question as conceptual or linguistic, either by being 
implicitly or explicitly “about” language, hardly exhaust the ways in which we might require 
conceptual resources to respond to this question. 
Let us think, then, about this question for a short time. Was Mars always either dry or not dry? 
By hypothesis we take it as given that Mars used to be wet (or not dry, to be precise) and that now 
it is dry, after the water gradually evaporated from the surface. Surely, then, this set-up all but 
guarantees that on some times the surface of Mars might more aptly be described as being dryish 
or “sort of wet”—at least, in practice, that is how we tend to describe states in between these 
extremes. It does not seem to me that there commonly is a clear guideline for how to apply such 
intermediate terms, or even their apparently more defined extremes. (It is, moreover, unlikely that 
we need such guidelines except on particular occasions.) Suppose an astronaut is testing such 
material; when ought he to say, “This is [sort of] wet”? (Let us suppose, in line with the strangeness 
of the example, that the astronaut is not interested in more precise measures, such as humidity 
levels.) A precise rule may not exist, though factors would influence the astronaut’s decision; 
indeed, the same factors as those that might lend the question significance in the first place. That 
is, the reason for his testing Mars materials for moisture will set some constraints on the wider 
implications of the substance being dry or not dry.91  
Thus, one thing to attend to, here, is why we reach for in-between words, which may not yet 
even be recognised by an authoritative dictionary. If one employs a novel term like “dryish” (which 
is probably not all that novel), one extends the language, so to speak. The need to so extend often 
responds precisely to feeling ill-served by a given pair of opposing predicates, or a predicate and 
its negation. (Did the cake taste good or bad? It was somewhere in-between, and so “good” and 
“bad” do not cut it.) And with respect to the Mars question, we are ill-served by a pair which seem 
to depict the two extremes in between which exist many sludgy states. There is something rather 
unnatural, then, right at the start, with constraining answers to the question in the way Williamson 
wants to. For if we answer that on some time Mars was “dryish”, Williamson will press on: “Okay, 
but is this dryish state dry or not dry?” One wants to reply that one says “dryish” because Mars 
was not clearly dry or not dry at that time. 
                                                 
91 What I am saying here seems compatible with claims by Avner Baz, who argues that “everyday” questions 
always have a point: “The point of the question guides us in answering it, and everyday questions that are 
competently raised have a point: they are expressive in some suitable way of some particular interest in the 




But let us grant this artificial restriction not to use “in-between” words. Even so, we should 
stop to ask: What recommends a decision one way or the other here? Consider occasions on which 
it is a pressing matter to decide whether or not some vague predicate has more or less definite 
boundaries. It seems pretty clear to me that such decisions are usually made with respect to 
overriding concerns, normally salient within and specific to a given context. For example, is 15°C 
a mild or not mild temperature? The answer depends at least on whether we are discussing, e.g., 
climate, cooking, or storage conditions for some heat-sensitive material.  
The answer to the question whether 15°C is mild or not mild, of course, might well not be 
forthcoming, even having explicitly specified the theme of discussion. For even individuals 
acclimatised, say, to British temperatures could find 15°C warm for a spring day and yet cold for 
a summer day. Or, if that example is felt to involve too subjective an employment of the predicate, 
we can consider an apparently more objective one. Both atmospheric and core body temperatures 
may change by very small (and unfelt) amounts with disastrous consequences, and so in those 
contexts we have need to be very precise about otherwise vague terms such as “warm” and “hot”, 
and, indeed, would probably stop using such terms in those scenarios. Likewise, recipe instructions 
can be frustratingly opaque when they use terms such as “low heat”, signifying quite different 
temperatures according to what is being cooked, among other variables. 
One should like to say, then, that “warm” simpliciter, taken to apply externally to any given 
context, is a predicate without application—insofar as predicates are intelligibly applicable only 
within some context.92 I cannot see “dry” as escaping the same conclusion. Of course, there is 
much discussion on whether or not parts of language have a context-sensitive meaning or content. 
Many concede that indexical expressions such as “I” and “here” have such content (e.g., Herman 
Cappelen and Ernest Lepore’s (2005) “semantic minimalism”), and others extend that thought to 
specific terms such as “know” (as Keith DeRose (1992) does). Some of the semantic contextualist 
school might then classify “dry” and other vague predicates as indexical (Jason Stanley (2003) 
thinks contextualists do just this, but Diana Raffman (2005) disagrees). However, the view I 
recommend is different, and shares much with Travis’s (2008b) perspective. Travis argues that the 
circumstance of evaluating some statement plays an essential role in determining what is said by 
that statement. Accordingly, with all terms and a fortiori with apparently vague terms, context is to 
determine the content of a statement containing them, because, if detailed enough, context can 
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clarify the specific understanding of some term used. Williamson’s example, of course, gives us no 
context, and so we are left clueless as to what will count as “dry” when the Mars question is posed. 
Williamson himself allows a limited role for context, since he recognises that “aboutness”, a 
key notion in his discussion, is context-dependent: “ ‘About’ is not a precise term. On the most 
straightforward interpretation, a sentence in a context is about whatever its constituents refer to 
in that context” (2007, 26). I will soon air my issues with this claim, but let us run with it here. It 
does not seem a gigantic stretch to go from saying that sentences are context-dependent for their 
“aboutness” to saying that the constituents of sentences (words), and what they express (concepts), 
take on different significances depending on those same contexts. For example, taking Williamson 
at his word, let us say that the Mars question is (in some sense) about Mars and dryness. Perhaps, 
then, one can only get an adequate idea of what dryness amounts to, with respect to what the 
sentence is about, when we are thinking about dryness and Mars, planetary surfaces (indeed, 
Earth’s surfaces), and so on. That sort of reflection will consist, inter alia, of recalling, working 
with, and critiquing norms that govern our contextual employment of the concept “dry” and 
cognate concepts over a range of discourse, as I have gestured at above. For instance, it is patently 
clear that the correctly uttered “This chicken is dry” (in one circumstance) employs the predicate 
“dry” according to different standards than “The surface of Mars is dry” (or more differently, 
“Summer this year was dry”), and so some particular, context-dependent standards or norms must 
be in play if we are to evaluate “The surface of Mars is dry”. 
 
§2.3 What is the question about? 
As we just saw, for Williamson, a sentence is most plausibly about whatever its constituent words 
refer to in a context. With that idea in mind, he argues that the question whether Mars was always 
either dry or not dry is not about words or concepts. Now, I do not exactly want to argue for the 
opposite claim here. It may be true that philosophical questions are about language or concepts, 
on some or other understanding of “about”. Because that is what must first be established when asking 
what the Mars question is about: we must first know how “about” is being used in the demand 
made of us. The point of this subsection, then, is to show how in the process of tackling a 
philosophical question, we are required to conduct an overview of normative conceptual 
employment (here, that of “about”), while attending carefully to the contextual nuance of concept-
application. In turn, this discussion begins to show in practice, contra Williamson’s overriding 
point, that philosophy is a conceptual discipline—even though that point is likely not best captured 




Gilbert Ryle (1933) once distinguished between different “senses” of “about”. His distinctions 
were far from exhaustive, but I think they open up a path for us to take. First, Ryle identifies the 
“nominative” sense of “about” which the term enjoys when a sentence’s grammatical subject 
denotes its topic; the subject is thus usually a noun or pronoun. The sentence “Jane drives a 
Ferrari” is “about(n)” Jane. Second, since sentences can also be about any of what their constituent 
nouns or pronouns denote, there is a substantive (we might say, predicative) sense; thus, the 
sentence “Jane drives a Ferrari” is also “about(s)” some Ferrari. However, Ryle points out, in a 
conversation a sentence is joined with others. Among the various sentences of a conversation, he 
says, is often some expression which they have in common (if not directly, then in paraphrases 
and synonyms, he suggests). And so sometimes a sentence is properly said to be about something 
when the relevant expressions feature commonly among the sentences of the conversation. Thus, 
“Jane drives a Ferrari” is not only about(s) Ferraris and about(n) Jane, but also conversationally 
about—about(c)—driving, cars, Jane’s hobbies, Jane’s preferences, Jane’s activities, and so on 
(depending on the central topic of conversation in which this sentence features). Notice, this sense 
is distinct from Williamson’s, in that a sentence (in a conversation) may be about a topic even 
though it contains no nouns or other expressions which signify it (Ryle 1933, 87).93 
How do Ryle’s distinctions apply to the Mars question? Of course, we could say, in line with 
Williamson, that it is about(n) or about(s) Mars, or dryness. And, consequently, that the Mars 
question is not about(n/s) words or concepts, at least not in the way that a metalinguistic question 
such as “How should I pronounce, ‘Mars’?” perhaps is. But we should stop here and re-examine 
this supposedly simple relational use of “about”—for how do we decide that the Mars question is 
about Mars and not dryness, or vice versa? Or is it about them both? When would a question 
properly be about what its subject denotes but not be about what its predicate expresses? And so 
on. Ryle provides a clue here when he reminds us that a sentence may be about some topic even 
though its expressions do not signify it, on account of its being part of wider context. What I want 
to show is that (at this stage of his thinking) Ryle’s point is extremely understated: in practice, 
determining what some sentence is about is always a nuanced and contextual process. 
Consider the following example: 
Leo eavesdrops on his partner Shelly, as she talks on the telephone. From the other room he can 
hear her excitedly say certain thingsを╉Looking forward so much to tomorrow╊┸ ╉Can╆t wait┿╊┸ ╉I need time to prepare╊をwhen he interrupts her all of a sudden┻ ╉What are you talking about╂┿╊ 
Shocked, since she was only preparing Leo╆s birthday celebrations┸ Shelly replies┸ ╉A surprise party 
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for you tomorrow actually┸ which you╆ve ruined┻ What did you think I was talking about┼╂╊ 
Realising his error, Leo sheepishly answers┸ ╉I╆m sorry┻ What you were saying sounded┼ clandestine┼╊ 
Let us ask ourselves what Shelly was talking about in the snippets of overheard talk. Leo takes 
Shelly’s statements (that she is looking forward to tomorrow, cannot wait, and needs time to 
prepare) to be about some planned dishonest behaviour. Shelly, however, clarifies in her response 
that she was talking about his surprise party (a surprise no longer). Even though Leo is mistaken, 
both seem perfectly licit answers to the question of what Shelly was talking about. And notably, 
both answers are drawn from the circumstance the speakers find themselves in. But it might seem 
like we could take another approach. For Shelly said “[I] can’t wait!” which, now we reflect on it, 
indicates she was talking (elliptically) about her excitement—roughly equivalent to, say, “I’m so 
excited!”. And she is also “looking forward so much to tomorrow”; perhaps that is a statement 
about her anticipation then. Likewise, she “needs time to prepare”, so surely by that utterance she 
is talking about her needs or her future needs. It looks as though we could have it both ways (and 
be left none the wiser). 
But matters are not so simple. Observe what just happened: we changed our view of Shelly’s 
statements from being (generally) about the party to being (generally) about herself only by 
escaping from the ground-level circumstantial detail. Now at the abstract level, we examine Shelly’s 
statements independently of all circumstance. Is this legitimate; can we determine what her 
statements were about without considering that circumstance? Surely, the only way we can decide 
the matter is to clarify how “about” is used in norm-bound contexts. For that is where the concept 
we started out with has a home; that concept is the one we want to deploy in other philosophical 
questions, such as asking what the Mars question is about. Thus, we can only ensure that we are 
employing “about” intelligibly if we have in view its legitimate uses.  
So, back to examples. Suppose Leo’s fears were nearer to the truth (but a little off), and that 
Shelly’s hushed tones and excited claims occur in a scenario where she is planning to rob a bank. 
The reason she says she cannot wait is because she is excited about robbing a bank. Plausibly, her 
“I can’t wait” is just about her plans to rob a bank then; at least, if pushed as to what she is talking 
about, that is her honest answer. But if Leo is, say, perturbed by the fact that not only is Shelly 
planning to rob a bank, she is excited about it, then the situation may change. Perhaps he asks her 
why she would be excited about that, and not be worried or feel conflicted about the very idea; if 
she replies that she knows it is illegal and of dubious morality, but that she still cannot wait, then 
now it looks as though her repeated “Can’t wait!” is about her excitement.  
This is not a process Williamson wants to engage in. He is happy to bring in context only if we 




determined referents. Faced with these two different examples, then, Williamson would surely 
insist that Shelly’s orthographically similar statements are about exactly the same things, which are 
a function of the words used in the statements. But if the foregoing is correct, that is not what 
“about” amounts to; it is more sophisticated and harder to pin down than he assumes.  
Accordingly, Williamson would be making two mistakes in this test case: first, he insists on a 
use of “about” which is not the one necessarily being used in the examples, and second, he 
implicitly assumes that type sentences are already about things—purely in virtue of having words 
in them, linked together in a grammatical way. But all the facts of usage point in the other direction: 
it is only token uses of sentences (i.e., after a manner of speaking, statements) which are about 
anything, and token uses vary according to the nuance of circumstance; that is just how “about” 
functions in practice and gets its currency. Thus, the significance of any use of “about” is 
transparent only when we attend to circumstance, as we do, unthinkingly, all the time.  
We should now apply this understanding to the Mars question: what is “Was Mars always either 
dry or not dry?” about? The short answer is: nothing. It is about nothing insofar as it is treated as 
a type-sentence, the uses of which we are not to consider.94 The longer answer is that the sentence 
may be about any number of things in its token uses, but we should like to know the background 
and the relevant concerns of the contextual employment of such uses; that was why, in §2.2, we 
tried to put it into practice with the case of an astronaut, and reflected on norm-bound contextual 
employments of “dry”. 
But if the foregoing is correct, why would anyone be tempted to say that philosophical 
questions are about concepts? A reason is forthcoming: because, considered generally, 
philosophical questions are of a kind such that to address them we first have to clarify what the 
concepts they involve amount to: just as we have to do with “about” if we are to work out what the 
Mars question is about. 
 
§3 Williamson’s blind spot 
To present, we have critically explored Williamson’s general claim that we should not think 
language or concepts are central to philosophy, especially not in thinking that its characteristic 
questions are about language or concepts. We have uncovered at least two problems: first, 
according to many philosophers, conceptual investigation incorporates understanding the nature 
of phenomena, and second, that even to begin appraising the idea that philosophical questions are 
about language or concepts, we have to clarify the concept of (at least) “about”. Likewise, when 
                                                 




responding to the question “Was Mars always either dry or not dry?” we had to be sensitive to 
how “dry” is employed in a range of nuanced contexts—paying attention also to the overriding 
interests of those involved. We see, then, that only by concretising some type sentence—i.e., 
putting it to use in contexts—are we able to interpret what it says and how we ought to answer it, 
if we ought to do so. This already intimates why it is right to say that philosophy is a conceptual 
discipline: in the fields, at least, of metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology, and 
philosophy of mind, to resolve some philosophical problem is partly to examine the concepts 
expressed by characteristic statements of the problem. And to do so specifically by scrutinising the 
norms that govern concrete uses of expressions.  
So much, then, for Williamson’s attempt to undermine claims that philosophy is of a conceptual 
nature by appeal to what its questions are about. But Williamson’s attack on this claim is one part 
of his wider critique of philosophical exceptionalism, or linguistic/conceptual philosophy. We now 
face the remainder. 
 
§3.1 Analytic and synthetic senses of “true” 
Williamson’s main argument features two central claims: first, that conceptual truths are just 
analytic truths, and second, that no notion of analyticity can support a linguistic or conceptual turn 
in philosophy.  
the idea of analyticity . . . is still active in contemporary philosophy, often under the less 
provocative guise of “conceptual truth.” The terms “analytic” and “conceptual” will 
henceforth be used interchangeably. (Williamson 2007, 49) 
The overall upshot [of this critique] is that philosophical truths are analytic at most in 
senses too weak to be of much explanatory value or to justify conceiving contemporary 
philosophy in terms of a linguistic or conceptual turn. (Williamson 2007, 53) 
The first claim is not much argued for, and Williamson’s statement of it is quite striking. For 
example, he asserts that the common philosophical practice of seeking out conceptual truths, 
connections, analyses, and necessities reduces to one thing: “[many philosophers] present 
themselves as seeking far more general and less obvious analogues of ‘Vixens are female foxes.’ ” 
(2007, 48). This implicit equivalence claim seems rash, for one can readily imagine a philosopher 
who disagrees with it while maintaining that our paradigm philosophical questions, such as “Can 
we ever be certain that what we perceive is thus-and-so?” or “What does it take for something to 




problems they engender is a conceptual route, which involves, inter alia, articulating conceptual 
truths (and not analytic truths). 
But of course, whether or not analytic truth and conceptual truth amount to the same thing is 
a matter partly decided by what conception of analytic truth one has in mind; if one is to say that 
“analytic” means “conceptual”, then one ought to have in mind a specific conception. And in the 
first two chapters of this thesis, I argued that there are many non-equivalent conceptions of 
analyticity. For example, Kant held that a judgement is analytic when and only when its predicate-
concept is contained within its subject-concept. In Kant’s case, and contra the rationalists, while 
some analytic judgements are conceptual (“All bodies are extended”), many conceptual truths are 
not analytic. Indeed, Kant arranges his whole critical project around the synthetic a priori—a class 
including arithmetical judgements and those such as “Everything contingent has a cause”. By 
forming synthetic a priori judgements, he claims, we do not rely on experience, and yet we still 
increase our knowledge. As such, according to Kant, these judgements are uniquely positioned: 
they constitute the conditions for the possibility of experience; they are those without which we 
could not apply our concepts. 
However, unlike Kant, I am happy to merge his synthetic a priori class into my analytic class 
(without necessarily agreeing as to which propositions fall under which classes). For example, a 
proposition such as “Every event [everything contingent] has a cause”, which articulates a 
condition for the possibility of experience, plausibly is itself expressive of a norm, such as “If one 
applies the concept ‘event’, one should also conceive its cause.”95 Perhaps, then, Williamson’s 
equivalence claim is apt for my conception of analyticity, though not for all. For according to that 
conception, analytic truths are normative: they are not, as uttered, descriptions of how things are, 
but rather are preparatory to such descriptions, by being expressions of norms. The propositions 
(or judgements) which Kant would call synthetic a priori are, to my mind, normative, conceptual 
truths. Accordingly, I see no outright harm in equating conceptual truths with analytic truths, so 
long as one makes clear that to be an analytic truth is to be normative (which is not a criterion for 
Kant, or many others). At any rate, analytic truths are not factual—unlike truths about norms, 
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such as that there is a given norm at some particular time within some particular community, which 
G. H. van Wright called “norm-propositions” (1963, 106).96  
With the concession made that analytic truths (understood in the foregoing way) are conceptual 
truths, the time is ripe to examine Williamson’s arguments for the second claim identified above: 
that no notion of analyticity (as he sees it) can support a linguistic or conceptual turn in philosophy. 
Williamson attacks both the metaphysical and epistemological conception of analyticity. Against 
the former conception, and as mentioned earlier, Williamson offers the same argument as 
Boghossian (and Chisholm before him) to the effect that the truth of any given sentence can be 
explained by a statement first of what it means, and second that what it means actually obtains 
(Williamson 2007, 59). In this section, I focus on a separate (preceding) argument of Williamson’s 
which has in common with Boghossian’s argument the same assumption as that which undermines 
it. That is, like Boghossian, Williamson presumes that the descriptive garb worn by a declarative 
sentence ensures that it at least tries to describe something, such that it is either factually true or 
false. Accordingly, both philosophers are closed to the idea of a sentence which only appears to 
describe but which instead expresses a norm, without describing anything. 
Perhaps there is some clue to the difference between Williamson’s and my approach at the 
outset. What I am describing in normative terms—that a sentence-in-use which expresses a norm 
thereby does not describe—Williamson conceives as some putatively vacuous property that an 
analytic sentence, or truth, enjoys.97 He terms this vacuous property of analytic truths 
“insubstantial”, but he finds himself hesitant to do so. What defenders of analyticity tend to want, 
Williamson thinks, is a sense that analytic truths somehow require less for their truth than their 
synthetic counterparts; in his words, that analytic truths “impose no constraint on the world” 
(2007, 52). The metaphor is supposed to depict how sentences such as “All adults are grown-ups” 
are true independently of how the world is: they possess this insubstantial or vacuous property. 
The reason Williamson is hesitant to use this term “insubstantial”, even in describing his 
opponent’s position, is that he does not think it even possible for a truth to impose no such 
constraint, and so the contrast between “substantial” and “insubstantial” cannot, he argues, get 
off the ground (2007, 54). 
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97 Williamson is far more prone to talking about analytic sentences, propositions, and statements as truths 
than I am, and this may reflect his commitment (and my lack of such a commitment) to the thought that 
when talking about truth we are only talking about one sort of scenario, in which some fact about the 




Now, we must note that in the arguments Williamson puts forward to demonstrate his 
conviction that no truth could be insubstantial, he has in mind some conception of analyticity 
approximating mine. For example, he alleges that many logical positivists and Wittgensteinians 
hold that “true” can be disambiguated into analytic and synthetic senses and that “they have 
described [analytic truths] as stipulations, implicit definitions . . . , rules of grammar and the like” 
(2007, 54—emphases added). Against any such views, Williamson wants to “remind” us that 
“true” is in fact unequivocal between these senses. The argument he offers here, which I have in 
my sights in this section, runs as follows. 
To show that “true” is not equivocal, Williamson embeds analytic and synthetic propositions 
into disquotational truth-schemata, and then examines them:98 
岫T岻 ╉P╊ is true if and only if P┻ 
If “true” really is equivocal, then there must be analytic and synthetic variants of this principle, he 
claims. Further, in virtue of the “iff”, (T) can be read either left-to-right (“ ‘P’ only if P”) or right-
to left (“ ‘P’ if P”). So, for example, (T) can be disambiguated into separate principles, where “a” 
stands for analytic, “s” for synthetic, “lr” for left-to-right, and “rl” for the opposite: 
(Talr) ╉P╊ is analytically true only if P 
and 
岫Tslr岻 ╉P╊ is synthetically true only if P┻ 
However, while both these principles seem to hold, Williamson points out that (Talr) and (Tslr) 
are jointly equivalent to a schema for “simple truth”:  
岫Taslr岻 ╉P╊ is analytically true or synthetically true only if P. 
And this equivalence, he suggests, should make us suspect that there is really no ambiguity in 
“truth” to begin with—for (Taslr) apparently makes plain that whether P is analytic or synthetic, 
it is made true the same way. 
Williamson maintains there is a similar problem with the “iff” read in the other direction, which 
yields  
岫Tarl岻 ╉P╊ is analytically true if P┻ 
                                                 




Henceforth, for simplicity, I will only discuss the analytic variant of the truth schema as read in 
this right-to-left direction. If we fill in “P”, we get an instance such as 
岫S岻 ╉Adults are grown-ups╊ is analytically true if adults are grown-ups.99 
This is a claim to the effect that it suffices for the proposition “Adults are grown-ups” to be 
analytically true purely that adults are, indeed, grown-ups. That sufficiency claim should strike us 
as extremely odd. It is not the sort of thing which one would expect any contemporary defender 
of analyticity to believe (though a Leibnizian rationalist might, given the subject-in-predicate 
principle; see my Ch. 1, §1.1)—that it follows from adults being grown-ups that “Adults are grown-
ups” is analytic. If that were so, any given true fact could mandate a true analytic proposition. Of 
course, Williamson is trying to use this oddness to urge suspicion about analytic truth altogether. 
However, I think that reflecting on what is so fishy about this example reveals the same error with 
which we are by now somewhat familiar. To appreciate this point, we will need to observe its 
Kripkean origins. 
 
§3.2 The inherited error 
Recall §2.3 of the last chapter—Schroeder points out that the copula “is”, in the sentence “This 
stick is 1 metre long”, is ambiguous between “is as a matter of fact” and “is to be called” (Schroeder 
2006, 246). In his dialectic, it is Kripke who exploits this ambiguity, by supposing that Wittgenstein 
was mistaken in judging the standard metre in Paris to be neither one metre nor not one metre in 
length. Not coincidentally, Boghossian appeals to Kripke’s argument to support his distinction 
between “metaphysical” and “epistemological” conceptions of analyticity, and that is why we 
sought to examine the standard metre case in greater detail in the prior chapter. It is also no 
coincidence that Williamson regards Kripke as having really begun to knock analyticity off its 
perch, when he purportedly clarified the differences between apriority, necessity, and analyticity. 
According to Williamson, philosophers (whom he does not mention) previously took “analytic” 
to do both epistemological and metaphysical work; however, Kripke showed us that while 
“analytic” implies “a priori” and “necessary”, neither of these latter two imply “analytic”, and so 
that the work left to do for “analytic” was looking scarce (Williamson 2007, 51).100 There are two 
points to make about Williamson’s relationship to Kripke here. 
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First, it is very unclear just what philosophical tradition Williamson has in mind, with respect 
to the putative implications between statements of different kinds (necessary, analytic, and a 
priori). To take up our previous example again, one wonders how Kant fits into this picture, in 
Williamson’s eyes. For Kant ultimately saw “analytic” as a logical or semantic property of a 
judgement that distinguishes it from synthetic judgements, as discussed above. In particular, if a 
judgement is not only synthetic but a priori too, by Kant’s criteria, then it plays a number of roles. 
It plays a transcendental role by setting out a condition for the possibility of experience, an 
epistemological role by amplifying our knowledge, and a metaphysical role by being necessary. For 
Kant, then, a judgement’s being analytic would indeed imply its being a priori; yet he argued 
centuries earlier than Kripke that a judgement could be a priori without being analytic. Surely, the 
epistemological, metaphysical, and transcendental roles Kant envisioned for analytic judgements 
were greatly outshone by those he envisioned for synthetic (a priori) judgements. Presumably, 
then, Kant is not part of whichever tradition Williamson has in mind. 
Second, and most importantly, Kripke’s greatest influence on Williamson in this matter is 
intrinsically related to the error which Boghossian later commits. Of course, Williamson sees it 
otherwise. He positions himself as finishing off a job that Quine began (but failed to do properly), 
and that Kripke set on course (Williamson 2007, 50–52). Indeed, Kripke had argued for the 
existence of both necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths (Kripke 1972, 35–
38), and so had tried to loosen apparent links between necessity and apriority. But to my way of 
thinking, Kripke’s telling influence on Williamson is not that he motivated him to dismantle 
analyticity; rather, Kripke passed on the same error we discussed in the previous chapter and 
above. Williamson fails to appreciate that norms are not descriptions; that any given expression of 
a norm cannot simultaneously describe anything. And so, without this appreciation, of course 
analytic truth will look suspect when crammed into truth schemata which have impoverished 
expressive powers—impoverished in exactly this respect of distinguishing descriptions from 
prescriptions. 
But when one does appreciate the distinction between the normative and descriptive, then one 
reads (S) much more naturally as saying this: 
岫S旺岻 ╉Adults are grown-ups╊ is analytically true if adults are to be called ╉grown-ups╊┻  





(And we read “are to be” as expressing a normative connection.) Stated thus, (Sひ) is quite 
unremarkable. Moreover, it would not commit anyone who uttered it to a descriptive claim about 
how, in fact, adults are. 
The more expressive schema makes plain how Williamson has in effect written into his 
conception of truth that all true sentences are true of some worldly condition (and thus that all true 
sentences are descriptions), which is sufficient for their truth. And ultimately, this is a variation on 
Kripke’s theme, since Kripke conflates two senses of the copula, one descriptive and one 
normative. Accordingly, Williamson is here begging the question against, e.g., the 
“Wittgensteinians” who describe analytic truths as “disguised rules of grammar and the like” (2007, 
54). The circular nature of Williamson’s argument can be brought further into focus by looking 
again at (Sひ), an instance of the more expressive truth-schema. (Sひ) has no direct disquotational 
replacement for Williamson’s “P” as it occurs after the conditional in (Tarl). Instead, I have 
specified a norm about the correct use of the given terms, which is what would suffice for the 
truth of an analytic proposition.  
We can see, then, how a blindness to the separate logical functions of norms and descriptions 
leads Williamson to beg the question against some of those to whom he directs his argument. 
Right out the gate, Williamson denies any independent logical function to rules by squeezing them 
into schemata that are ill-equipped to handle them as the normative expressions that they are. But 
what of the assumption that Wittgensteinians see “true” as ambiguous between analytic and 
synthetic senses? Let us finish by looking at this assumption:  
The distinction between analytic truth and synthetic truth does not distinguish different 
senses of “true”: analytic and synthetic truths are true in the very same sense of “true.” 
That should be obvious. Nevertheless, it is hard to reconcile with what many logical 
positivists, Wittgensteinians and others have said about analytic truths. (Williamson 
2007, 54) 
One is left to connect the dots here, but Williamson assumes, at least, that Wittgensteinians deem 
analytic propositions to be true in a different sense to how synthetic propositions are true.101 Yet 
it need not follow from how I sought to expand Williamson’s truth-schema that I take “true” to 
be equivocal.  
For I have really advocated in this chapter so far that it matters what kind of sentence to which 
one attributes truth. For example, the claim that “Adults are grown-ups” is true cannot be 
                                                 





evaluated from a vantage point so abstract that the function of the sentence—as used in a particular 
context—is invisible. Once one knows that the sentence is being used, say, to express a norm, 
then one is aware, practically, what it amounts to when one says it is true. And so the sense or 
meaning of “true” need not be various, since the kinds of things to which one may ascribe truth 
are already various.  
This is somewhat similar to how “Jessica is intelligent” entails different things said of Jessica 
aged two and then five; we may take “intelligent” to have the same sense it always does, but what 
the claim amounts to will vary with the age of the person to whom intelligence is ascribed. Yet, of 
course, the tests of intelligence are not entirely disparate—something links them together. Two-
year-old Jessica is more likely to be an intelligent five-year-old than is, say, a lower-performing 
two-year-old. Further, a player with “footballing intelligence” may be terrible at mathematics, yet 
it is appropriate to ascribe a great mathematician and a renowned midfielder both with intelligence 
epithets. In the case of intelligence, it is not hard to see that what joins together different 
performances and tendencies to perform, in respect of intelligence, is to do with reaching certain 
standards, innovating, economising, and a whole host of performing abilities. (Ryle (1949, Ch. 2) 
has an interesting discussion of intelligent performances.) But what of “truth”—what do 
analytically and synthetically true sentences have in common? 
It is better to ask: What do we wish to portray, commonly, when we say that eligible sentences 
are true? The answer is best seen by attending to the practical role of “is true”. Now, as Baker and 
Hacker discuss, Wittgenstein pointed out that saying that p is true is to affirm that p, and one can 
just as much affirm a sentence expressing a norm as a sentence describing some empirical matter 
(Baker and Hacker 2009, 271). In both cases, one hopes to portray something affirmative, though 
the kind of sentence which one affirms will affect what this affirmation amounts to. If I affirm a 
normative sentence—explaining etiquette, I say it is true that “port is passed to the left”—I affirm 
a norm. If, however, I affirm a descriptive sentence—I judge it is true that “Bill passes the port to 
the right”—I portray some set of circumstances as really having occurred.102 
Perhaps, given these above considerations, the adverbial qualifications “factually” and 
“conceptually” true do not help matters, since they may predispose one to think that these phrases 
depict different kinds of truth, instead of indicating that what is claimed to be true is different in 
the two cases, even though something is common between their truth-ascriptions; namely, 
affirming. 
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§4 Justified by virtue of meaning 
The bulk of Williamson’s attack on conceptual or linguistic philosophy focuses on epistemological 
conceptions of analyticity. As discussed in more detail in my prior chapter, the supposed 
conception distinguishes itself from a so-called metaphysical, or metaphysically vacuous 
alternative. Defenders of the epistemological conception of analyticity, such as Boghossian, 
contend along with Williamson that analytic sentences are “made” true by the way that the world 
is; this is their argument against the vacuous conception of analyticity, which, as I have elsewhere 
pointed out, relies on the view, deep down, that analytic sentences are descriptive in function. 
However, the epistemological conception remains committed to another tenet: that while analytic 
sentences are not made true by meaning alone, they are justified by meaning alone. Accordingly, on 
this view, one is entitled to know,103 say, “Adults are grown-ups” on account of one’s awareness 
of what the individual words and the sentence as a whole mean.  
This conception of analyticity is another that Williamson thinks is ultimately unable to do the 
work that philosophers require of it, such as explaining philosophy’s “armchair” methodology 
(Williamson 2007, 73). Williamson targets those who hold an epistemological conception with 
respect to some vocabulary, be that ordinary, logical, scientific, or even moral. The figures he 
mentions include not only Boghossian, but Peacocke, Bealer, Gentzen, Prawitz, Dummett, Martin-
Löf, Brandom, Horwich, Grice and Strawson, and Jackson, among others. It is clear, then, that 
Williamson thinks the epistemological conception is pervasive.  
But it is notable that Wittgensteinians, even caricatures of them, are not generally in 
Williamson’s crosshairs here. In my view, this is likely because of the wider appeal of analyticity’s 
epistemological character than its vacuous, non-factual character, the latter of which is more 
commonly defended today by those of a Wittgensteinian or Carnapian persuasion. The market for 
the epistemological character is, so to speak, crowded out with lots of buyers; there are those who, 
like Severin Schroeder (2009), argue that trivial analytic truths, being norms of representation, 
cannot be understood without knowing that they are true; but there are also those such as 
Boghossian (1997) who reject that analytic truths are norms at all while still wanting to save an 
epistemologically special feature of analytic truths. By contrast, the market for the non-factual 
character is nowhere near as crowded, meaning that those who accept this feature of analyticity 
are easier to cordon off as, say, Wittgensteinians. The issue is, then, that many contemporary 
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philosophers, especially those working on analyticity, simply have not observed or fully registered 
the point that to prescribe is not at once to describe.  
Indeed, without acknowledging the exclusivity of description and prescription, those who 
nonetheless want to emphasise the epistemological character of analytic sentences unavoidably 
find themselves in trouble. For the central tenet of the epistemological conception—that we can 
know some sentence is true by knowing its meaning—is much harder to support when we have 
modelled all sentences on descriptions of facts (and not expressions of norms). And as we will see, 
Williamson exploits precisely this aspect of such accounts, when he commits himself to a particular 
notion of semantic or conceptual competence which tells against it. For if every true sentence is 
true on account not only of its meaning but also because it is true of a fact, then one is always in 
a position to understand the meaning and miss the fact; this, in my view, is the crucial mistake 
made by those who argue for an explicitly epistemological conception of analyticity. 
Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that recognising the exclusivity of descriptions and 
prescriptions, and (re-)acknowledging the normative character of analytic sentences, provides us 
with the key to resolving the problems which Williamson identifies with epistemological 
conceptions of analyticity. We turn now to these problems, before showing how to resolve them.  
 
§4.1 Understanding-assent links 
Williamson attacks the epistemological conception by showing the unviability of “understanding-
assent” links, which he proposes must lie at the root of such a conception (2007, 73–74). To 
explain what such a link is, take for example the analytic sentence “Every vixen is a female fox”. 
According to Williamson, epistemological conceptions of analyticity require that if one 
understands the sentence, one assents to it. Of course, such assent would not have to be overt, 
and is even conceived in dispositional terms. Prima facie, that does not seem an outlandish 
suggestion. For example, were I to dissent from this sentence, most competent English-speakers 
would, presumably, consider me to have betrayed my misunderstanding of the words involved. 
However, against the epistemological conception, Williamson denies that anyone who sincerely 
dissents from “Every vixen is a female fox”—or, more drastically, “Every vixen is a vixen”—
necessarily thereby manifests linguistic misunderstanding (2007, 85ff). 
Given the prima facie viability of understanding-assent links, then, what tells against them? 
That is, how might someone understand an analytic statement such as “A bachelor is an unmarried 
male”, yet still dissent from it? One is naturally inclined to think that understanding the sentence 
brings instantaneously a grasp of its truth. But Williamson (2007, 118) notes that native English 




though he is unmarried. Or, he suggests, some might reject that a mother who, after giving birth, 
undergoes sex-change surgery to become a man is really a female parent (to tell against, I presume, 
the putatively analytic sentence, “All mothers are female parents”). For simplicity, Williamson 
examines the following logical truth: 
(1) Every vixen is a vixen. 
Now, if (1) is analytic, then, according to the epistemological conception of analyticity as 
Williamson understands it, some understanding-assent link ought to hold. For example,  
(UA) Necessarily, whoever understands the sentence ╉Every vixen is a vixen╊ assents to it┻ 
(Williamson 2007, 86) 
But Williamson presents two deviant, native English-speakers who both (by hypothesis) 
understand (1) yet dissent from it. Let us focus on Williamson’s character from the first example, 
Peter, who thinks that (1) presupposes  
(2) There is at least one vixen.   
That is, “[Peter] takes universal generalisation to be existentially committing” (2007, 86—Peter 
can also resort to metalinguistic and theoretical statements of his reasons here, if needs be). 
Additionally, Peter believes that (2) is false, due to outlandish conspiracy theories about (the non-
existence of) foxes. Given the combination of his beliefs, Peter dissents from (1).  
How ought we to respond to Peter? Williamson first remarks that Peter is most likely wrong 
about this matter, not least since (1) is a logical truth. According to the epistemological conception 
of analyticity, he thinks, if (UA) holds, and Peter dissents from (1), then Peter does not understand 
it. Yet Williamson wonders what, in this case, conversation with Peter would be like; he thinks it 
would be clear to us that Peter had misunderstood a constituent term or a combination of terms 
(2007, 88). But against this, Williamson claims that Peter understands the words “vixen”, “female”, 
and “fox” just fine. Peter’s conspiracy theory, he says, involves no “semantic deviation”. For even 
though Peter thinks a sentence involving “every x” is only true if an x exists, most speakers, 
Williamson maintains, share in a similar belief. Accordingly, he suggests that Peter is competent 
with “every” in normal circumstances. Indeed, Williamson continues, Peter publishes articles in 
English, submitted to top, refereed journals; he just has odd views on a couple of matters. With 
Peter’s linguistic competence apparently not in dispute, then, Williamson thinks that his evident 
misunderstanding is not semantic but logical in nature (2007, 91). And as such Peter is taken to be 




A lone counterexample cannot hope to undermine epistemological conceptions of analyticity 
in one fell swoop. Yet Williamson concocts other examples for other understanding-assent links 
based on the same base recipe: in every case, he purports to show that it is always possible not to 
assent to a claim while understanding it nonetheless. 
 
§4.2 The inadequacy of understanding-assent links 
We are in a good position at this point to enquire further about the adequacy of so-called 
understanding-assent links. Remember, we are not in the business of defending an exclusively 
epistemological conception of analyticity—that simply will not do. But for all that, we are invested 
in showing that grasp of analytic sentences is significantly unlike grasp of synthetic sentences. 
Accordingly, it is worth our while investigating whether these understanding-assent links are really 
fit for purpose. To do so, let us take the tired and overworked bachelor example. 
(3) All bachelors are unmarried 
On Williamson’s model of what defenders of epistemic analyticity propose, if (3) is analytic, then 
the following understanding-assent link holds: 
(UA旺岻 Necessarily┸ whoever understands the sentence ╉All bachelors are unmarried╊ assents to it┻ 
As we have seen, Williamson’s strategy is to show that one could always consistently deny a 
sentence such as that embedded in (UAひ) without thereby manifesting a misunderstanding. Indeed, 
if many English speakers would, in fact, refuse to assent to the truth of the bachelor sentence 
because of (say) how long-term relationships and civil partnerships are understood, is Williamson 
not right about this? I suggest both that Williamson is right to reject understanding-assent links en 
masse but that he is wrong to suggest that such links are all that could lie at the heart of analyticity’s 
epistemology in the first instance. 
We are able to make both of these points by use of some lifelike examples. Suppose Elaine is 
an English-speaker who dissents from the claim that a specific unmarried man is a bachelor. We 
should want to pose her some questions, such as “What do you mean ‘isn’t a bachelor’? That man 
is unmarried.”104 She might reply as follows: 
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岫Elaine岻┺ Well┸ yes┸ I know that┸ but he╆s one half of a couple who are all but marriedをthey are in many respects just like a married couple┹ it doesn╆t feel right to call him a bachelor┹ he doesn╆t live the ╉bachelor╊ lifestyle.  
Elaine is here able to tell us a story about how she conceives of bachelors and unmarried men; 
how “unmarried” and “married” are to some extent elastic terms. Note that Elaine’s conception 
of bachelor is the kind which may be expected to be in play when discussing the marital status of 
bachelors, unlike, for example, the notion of a “bachelor of arts”, to use Schroeder’s example 
(2009, 86). Accordingly, what is evident in my example is exactly the sort of elasticity that might 
make a defender of analyticity wobble, and which, naturally, Williamson would like to exploit. (As 
such, it is much harder to maintain that Elaine’s rejection of (3) simply “betokens a divergent 
understanding” than it would be for the rejection in Schroeder’s example (2009, 86).) 
Now, to resume the example, we can imagine at this point an interlocutor (say) “Jerry” who 
could respond in agreement: 
岫Jerry岻┺ Oh┸ well if that╆s what you mean here by ╉bachelor╊┸ then I understand why you dissent 
from the claim.   
By contrast, next consider George, someone who also makes a prima facie strange claim about 
bachelors, and the same interlocutor:  
岫Jerry岻┺ Don╆t worry┸ being a bachelor isn╆t so bad┻ 岫George岻┺ I suppose┻ My dad╆s a bachelor┸ and he╆s happy┻ 
(Jerry): Really? I thought your dad re-married...? 
(George): Oh, he has. 岫Jerry岻┺ Then why do you say he╆s a bachelor╂  岫George岻┺ Yeah┸ ╆cos he╆s a bachelor┸ y╆know┸ since he╆s my father and he had that divorce┸ and┼ 
(Jerry): [exasperated] No... 
George’s response is prima facie confusing, especially given the apparent role of his “since”. We 
would want to converse some more with George to clear this up, and if he still cannot offer us an 
appropriate explanation, I maintain we should have to say he did not have a full understanding of 
what it is to be a bachelor.  
But let us pause here. I have suggested we would be satisfied by Elaine’s answers and yet 
probably be unsatisfied by George’s. I doubt that this prediction appears arbitrary to the reader, 
and for good reason: Elaine is able to explain her statement, and George is not—or not well 
enough. Because more than simply helping us understand why she said what she said, Elaine gives 
us particular reason to agree with her. For, as Williamson indeed points out, English-speakers do 
say such things. My claim, atop of Williamson’s, is that while it may be significant that speakers 




However, we might worry whether English-speakers really ought to adjust their usage so that 
not only unmarried men but uncommitted men too are to be called bachelors; that sounds radical, 
or at least strange. In fact, the point here is not that we (English-speakers) all ought to adjust our 
usage so. The point is rather that “Uncommitted men are bachelors” has some normative weight. 
Recall, in the last chapter, that I distinguished between an idealised kind of normativity and a more 
realistic, diffuse kind of normativity. The distinction is between, on the one hand, a rule whose 
authority reaches out over long stretches (perhaps all) of related discourse and, on the other, one 
whose authority fades somewhat and is itself susceptible to revision in light of the groundswell of 
other normative activity beneath it. It seems to me that the reality of language fits much better 
with this diffuse kind of normativity than the idealised version.  
For language, in its dynamic nature, incorporates neologisms and other creative uses; it very 
often reflects novel situations, new purposes. Accordingly, even once adamantine norms become 
over time much more brittle, and in their gradual deterioration branch open into other, so to speak, 
“nearly-norms”. Such nearly-norms may yet in time harden into overarching and fully-authoritative 
norms, or they may legislate over restricted areas of discourse, much as slang has a tendency to do 
(think of “wicked”, “bad”, “cool”, “hot”, “safe”, and so on). To my mind, given my ongoing 
training in and sensitivity to English as spoken in my culture, Elaine’s usage picks up on some real 
normativity. At the very least, “All bachelors are unmarried men” is no longer that rigid; our 
conceptions of singledom, masculinity, commitment, relationship structure, and even marriage 
have undergone much change in recent decades (cf. Hanfling 2000, 95, n. 1). This is change enough 
to limit the apparently pervasive reach of the original norm. But such change brings some 
uncertainty and in turn that can introduce more critical moments in conversation; challenges, 
confusions, disagreements, and so on will then find footing, because which norm is to govern what 
we say is not always transparent. (And neither, for that matter, is how to follow a norm.) 
Now, one worry, with this talk of diffuse and changing normativity, is that somehow “anything 
goes”; that correctness and incorrectness are at risk of slipping away. But that is not what I mean 
to suggest. Rather, what does “go” (i.e., is correct) varies according to the different pockets of 
discourse in question. For example, to return back to our example, George’s “since” cannot be 
trusted; it gestures at an explanation but fails to deliver on that promise. “My dad’s a bachelor, 
since as a father he divorced and remarried” is not good enough as an explanation because there 
is no convention which makes it intelligible. No norms or nearly-norms are in place to legitimate 
George’s claim, whereas Elaine plausibly does pick out something normative. This contrast 




sometimes breaks, its own constraints. But it has constraints to break; it is not totally free, or it 
would not be language. 
Indeed, the normativity of language is key to Wittgenstein’s closely related notion of a language 
game, which is partly so named because games are practices which are bound by rules (see Baker 
and Hacker 2005, 49–50). How much freedom do we have to break apart from the language’s 
inherent normative structure? Consider a remark sandwiched between §§35-36 of Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), in which Wittgenstein throws an odd question to the reader: “Can I say 
‘bububu’ and mean ‘If it doesn’t rain, I shall go for a walk’?” As is his way, Wittgenstein’s response 
is not obviously revealing: “It is only in a language that I can mean something by something”. A 
remark from his so-called Blue Book (material dictated to his Cambridge students in 1933-34) helps 
clarify the point: a sign or a sentence “gets its significance from the system of signs, from the 
language to which it belongs” (Wittgenstein 1958, 5). The conception of language as evinced here, 
then, is systematic (though not in the sense of being subject to axiomatisation). That is, “bububu” 
participates in a language if sentences containing it are systematically related to other sentences of 
the language, such that one could infer from a “bububu” sentence other sentences which follow 
from it or license it, and so forth. Thus, Wittgenstein’s response to the self-imposed “bububu” 
question is to say that it is not entirely up to him what significance the term is to have—we need 
to know that “bububu” participates in a language; that there are norms which guide its usage. 
Perhaps there could be, though these are yet to be spelled out and connected to the rest of 
language. 
Wittgenstein concludes his thought: “This shows clearly that the grammar of ‘to mean’ does 
not resemble that of the expression ‘to imagine’ and the like.” That is, a word’s having a meaning, 
and relatedly, our meaning something by a word, is unlike how we have an unrestrained creativity 
in what we imagine. For in the realm of imagination, rules (to the extent that they have any 
purchase at all) can bend so easily or disappear altogether, as is the habit of dreams; we can, 
plausibly, imagine that “bububu” has some determined meaning, but we do not ensure it via this 
imaginative moment. Consequently, one’s ability to introduce a term on a whim, expecting it to 
become part of the language, is somewhat attenuated, though not impossible. But what about a 
term with pre-existing normative connections, such as “bachelor”? In such a case, the normative 
connections of “bachelor” provide a rigidity to its usage with which we must cope and respond 
to, at least as a starting point. In accordance with the diffuseness of norms, the rigidity need not 
be everlasting, but it provides a necessary friction without which, as the conversation between 




Let us bring this all together. George’s claim that his father is a bachelor, by virtue of being his 
father, or having once been a father and divorcee, misfires as a legitimate explanation in much the 
same way that Wittgenstein’s interlocutor fails to establish that “bububu” means something about 
walking when the weather is fine simply by whimsical stipulation. Both claims do not participate 
in a language, where a language is understood as a systematic normative practice (or, more 
accurately, a whole set of changing normative and nearly-normative practices). Far from there 
being some idealised authoritative norm to undergird these claims, there is not yet even a pocket 
of practice which begins to carve out such proper usages. Elaine, by contrast with George, 
plausibly does pick out such a pocket. 
So where does this leave the notion of an understanding-assent link? As I foreshadowed, in 
practice normativity is a diffuse matter, and such links cannot hold independently of a given 
context: what holds in some region of discourse need not hold in another. Being a competent 
speaker of English does not require familiarity with all the intricate pockets of discourse and how 
they connect. Just as one may fail to be “down with the kids” by thinking that they mean “awful 
and cruel” by “wicked”, so one may be utterly perplexed by someone like Elaine, who thinks that 
an unmarried single man is not a bachelor on account of his committed relationship. And yet in 
spite of this distance in usage between speakers, all may still be generally competent; this is one 
reason why the phrase “semantically competent” is unhelpful, at least insofar as one hopes to 
explain away uses so divergent as to constitute what would normally be regarded as semantic 
misunderstandings (so I would contend).105 
And this is where these considerations come to a head. We can see that Williamson needs such 
a notion of semantic competence to support his attack on understanding-assent links; Peter is 
competent enough with the English language, we are told, and specifically, let us say, with “every” 
and “vixen”. But even if Peter’s general English competency is very good, obviously he can still 
make mistakes (as we all do). More to the point, he may be competent with “every” or “vixen” in 
some pockets of discourse but not others. What betokens a linguistic misunderstanding is not 
necessarily widespread error; likewise, we do not eliminate room for confusion simply by carefully 
handling various pockets of discourse with a term. Some mistakes are both small and significant. 
It is this appreciation of subtlety that puts my analysis of divergent usage on a surer footing than 
Williamson’s. For example, whereas I have drawn a distinction between Elaine and George, it does 
not seem that Williamson has the resources to distinguish in the same way. For on the assumption 
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of George’s more general linguistic competence, both he and Elaine are relevantly similar to the 
character Williamson exploits, Peter: a competent English-speaker who denies a putative 
understanding-assent link. Moreover, if Williamson cannot distinguish between the likes of George 
and Elaine, it is unclear how he can avoid a fatal scepticism about semantics: how is it determined 
that any speaker succeeds in meaning anything by what they say, if there is no norm enjoining what 
forms of language are intelligible? Likewise, how are we to understand Williamson? Surely, if he 
wants to be understood at all, Williamson presupposes background normativity. 
 
§4.3 A better picture: understanding and following a norm 
Williamson suggests that Peter’s mistake falls “well within the range of permissible variation for 
linguistically competent speakers” (2007, 118). He claims further that such speakers use the words 
“with their normal English meanings, despite their errors” (2007, 118). Thus, he concludes, that 
while those like Peter (and, presumably, George) “are ignorant of some facts about the normal 
English meanings of the words, such ignorance is quite compatible with linguistic competence” 
(2007, 119). And that, I take it, is the sense to be given to this phrase “permissible variation”—
Williamson is saying that we must allow room in our notion of linguistic competence for some 
semantic errors. 
To my mind, this analysis gets a trivial point right, but many serious points wrong. On the one 
hand, it is easy to agree with Williamson that English-speakers should be able to use their terms in 
subtly different ways and still be regarded as generally competent. Indeed, I have emphasised 
something similar in the sub-section above, with respect to Elaine’s apparent deviation. There are, 
I suggested, “pockets” of discourse which overlap and diverge, between which norms may not 
hold, or by the influence of one region upon another, norms may change, and so on.106 
Accordingly, I have suggested not only that speakers like Elaine are generally competent speakers 
(whatever quite that amounts to), but that they are also competent with respect to particular terms 
such as “bachelor”.  
On the other hand, Williamson is in no position to acknowledge the salient difference between 
Elaine’s competent semantic variation and the deviant uses to which George puts “bachelor”. For 
let us consider where Peter fits in with respect to Elaine and George. It is not altogether clear, 
since much depends on the further conversation we have with Peter. It may turn out that 
Williamson’s analysis is partly right—that Peter has a conspiratorial, wayward view of vixens, and 
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a commitment to the logical belief that universal generalisation commits one to existential 
generalisation. We could say even more about Peter, then: given that there are pockets of discourse 
in which “every” is taken to have such a commitment, his usage latches onto something part-way 
legitimate—something conventional, at any rate. In the final analysis, it may turn out that he and 
others are simply wrong on that matter. Maybe we argue this by extending a point Strawson made 
in his debate with Russell (Strawson 1950, 331–32). Strawson argued, contra Russell, that definite 
descriptions, such as “The King of France is bald”, do not yield disguised existential statements 
on logical analysis, such as “There is at least one King of France”. Rather, he held, it is simply a 
common presupposition that when one uses a definite description, there is a unique object to 
which it refers; one presupposes this and does not state it. In a like manner, perhaps, one makes 
no implicit existential statement in universal quantification, though one does presuppose it. If that 
is true, the nearly-norms that Peter latches onto are worth displacing. So be it, and it may turn out 
that we best express Peter’s commitment as misunderstanding “every”—much simply depends on 
what the normative status quo is, or should be.  
Thus, Peter can be relevantly like Elaine in my scenario, and nothing yet seems to have 
undermined Williamson’s position; or he can be more similar to George, and then it becomes clear 
that something about Williamson’s position is fishy. For what can Williamson say about George? 
I am sure of what “we would say”: in everyday dealings with George, when his mistaken belief 
surfaces—that all fathers, even married ones, are bachelors—competent speakers such as Jerry 
would most likely cast George’s error in terms of a misunderstanding about the concept 
“bachelor”. However, this tack is of course expressly denied by Williamson, because even though 
George does not assent to (UAひ), he is more generally linguistically competent. This is problematic. 
Because there is a real difference between the likes of George and Elaine, and no account of 
linguistic understanding is accurate without paying due respect to this kind of difference.  
Naturally, then, one wants to enquire about and probe into whatever account of linguistic 
understanding is really at play in Williamson’s view of things. Thankfully, he gives us some 
pointers. According to Williamson, his argument about the failure of understanding-assent links 
“exemplifies two interlocking themes” (2007, 91). First, that of epistemological holism, the view 
that “the epistemological status of a belief constitutively depends on its position in the believer’s 
whole system of beliefs” (2007, 91), and so in Quinean fashion allows unorthodoxy on one point 
to be compensated for by orthodoxy on many others. Second, that of semantic externalism, the 
view that “the content of a belief constitutively depends on the believer’s position in a society of 
believers” (2007, 91), and thus explains how, even with unorthodox usage of a term, a person may 




Williamson does not motivate these particular theses in any detail, which is just as well, since 
he does not take them individually or jointly to support his argument: 
neither epistemological holism nor semantic externalism figured as premises of the 
argument. Rather, the argument appealed to features of the relevant systems of belief 
that make epistemological holism plausible, and to features of our ascription of beliefs 
that make semantic externalism plausible. (Williamson 2007, 91) 
For my part, then, I do not need to examine, critically, the theses of epistemological holism or 
semantic externalism. Though it may bear fruit, that is unnecessary work. For if Williamson’s 
general structure of argument against the viability of understanding-assent links is problematic, 
then it is so much the worse for those other theses. Or maybe such theses can be motivated on 
other grounds; I need not challenge them in detail here.  
Accordingly, the matter we really must investigate is what could prevent one from seeing the 
difference between George and Elaine, and what the consequences of this omission are. As for 
the upshot—to my mind, one is left with a picture of language-use, understanding, and socio-
linguistic practice which is unbearably deprived of genuine features: there is an intricate web of 
normativity which is entirely missed out. When we take into account the fact that analytic sentences 
are norms, and moreover that norms often spread diffusely, harden, soften, change, and improve, 
then the puzzle over how it is that one could “grasp their truth at once” fades away. If, in some 
pocket of discourse, “All bachelors are unmarried men” correctly expresses a norm, then one’s 
assent to the claim is part and parcel of one’s recognition of it as normatively binding. 
Understanding and assent comfortably present themselves together, in such cases.  
Thus, what prevents one from noticing differences like that between George and Elaine is a 
tendency to model norms on descriptions, or simply to construe all declarative sentences as 
descriptions. When that tendency is present, one inclines to believe that analytic sentences must 
be “made” true by some worldly facts (as I have argued extensively against). At that point, there 
are two paths to take. If one still suspects that analytic sentences can play an important 
philosophical role—indeed, an epistemological one—then one must make intelligible an ability of 
speakers to know that some sentences are true (or be justified in regarding them as such) even 
without access to what in a sense “gives” them their truth (this is what Boghossian tries). The 
purported path of access is most plausibly thought to be the conceptual or linguistic competence 
which comes with being a member of linguistic society. Yet this is something wholly bizarre; 
something, indeed, supernatural. For it would seem to follow that one can intuit knowledge about 




is that I learn a language and then somehow I know facts about the world. It is no wonder that 
this picture is heavily criticised. 
The other path to take, when one thinks it impossible for analytic sentences to be true without 
being made true by the world, is to deny any useful or special significance to analytic sentences. 
And indeed, when it seems as though an unbridgeable chasm has opened up between facts about 
the world and our linguistic or conceptual understanding, one only has to exploit it to undermine 
the Boghossian-style picture described above. For example, by crafting these understanding-assent 
links and then knocking them down in turn, Williamson capitalises on the independence of 
meaning from fact, and in turn truth. For this divide helps ensure that when, in his example, Peter 
has strange beliefs about logic, or about fake vixens, he is not prevented from a full grasp of the 
meaning of sentences involving logical terms or vixen-related terms.  
But once one does away with the troublesome assumption uniting both critics and defenders 
of so-called epistemic analyticity—that norms are really descriptions—then analyticity no longer 
appears odd, or as suddenly hopeless in vindicating philosophy’s credentials as a specifically 
conceptual discipline. Because, as I urged in the first section of this chapter, philosophers do 
investigate the meaning of typically problematic terms; this is a non-controversial rendering of the 
claim Wiggins makes in his preamble, and which Hacker attributes to a whole range of 
conceptually-inclined philosophers. One cannot get an insight into, say, the mind without 
reflecting on mental concepts; the two tasks must be taken in concert. And analytic sentences—
norms, more generally—are apt contenders for what philosophy hopes to articulate by 
investigating the meaning of problematic terms and locutions. Finally, the epistemological and the 
non-factual character of these norms need not be something mysterious; it only seems it must be 
so when one fails to realise that a norm cannot describe a fact.  
And the consequences of adopting, wittingly or otherwise, the view that norms are descriptions 
are incredibly damaging. For example, it leads Williamson to oppose understanding-assent links 
across the board, which in turn makes it unclear how speakers can understand each other: their 
usage patterns are permitted to vary considerably, such that what before looked like definitions 
which all should agree upon, are now claims which all are entitled to dissent from, without loss of 
understanding. He labours, briefly, over this issue: “What binds together uses of a word by 
different agents or at different times into a common practice of using that word with a given 
meaning?” (2007, 123). And his answer, save the appeal to causation, is strangely reminiscent of 
Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” passage (Wittgenstein 1953, §65): 
what makes a unity out of diversity? Rarely is the answer to such questions the mutual 




constituents and somehow prior to the complex whole itself – an indivisible soul or 
bare particular. Rather, it is the complex interrelations of the constituents, above all, 
their causal interrelations. (Williamson 2007, 123) 
Williamson applies this broad sensibility to language more specifically. So applied, it leads him to 
conclude that we need not share a stock of platitudes to share an understanding of a word. The 
alternative, Williamson claims, “depends on the assumption that uses of a word by different agents 
or at different times can be bound together into a common practice of using that word with a 
given meaning only by an invariant core of beliefs” (2007, 123). 
Now, aspects of this very brief sketch might appeal to us. As should be clear by now, I agree 
that no single sentence can be assented to across all contexts. For one thing, what token utterances 
of a sentence end up saying is partly determined by salient and background features of a context. 
For another, norms are subject to revision, to deterioration, to limited and changing jurisdictions—
the different “pockets” of discourse. And so sentences expressing norms do not fit the billing of 
an “invariant core of beliefs” either. Yet the big difference here is that nonetheless there are still 
matters of right and wrong. Learning a language is, inter alia, a matter of being trained in normative 
structures, where one learns that, e.g., if the respective propositions are normative, then an 
unmarried man may be called a bachelor and an adult may be called a grown-up. As one grows, 
and as language grows too, one encounters changes to such norms, or finds that they had less 
reach than in the past. But normativity remains, and misunderstanding still occurs precisely when 
one violates an active norm.  
Moreover, I have barely broached how within one small pocket of discourse we may require 
different normative standards—compare teaching a child the use of “bachelor” on Monday, and 
having conversations about bachelors with fellow teachers the day after. On Monday, failure to 
assent to the bachelor sentence may legitimately constitute misunderstanding, and yet by Tuesday 
the same dissent need not be taken so, for the fellow teachers can tell a story which is normatively 
rich enough to explain their own possible dissent, in the way in which Elaine did. This 
demonstrates not that classic analytic propositions are not normative, or that failure to assent to 
them does not constitute misunderstanding: it simply shows us how we must broaden our picture 
of the role, authority, and diversity that norms play in our linguistic practices to make sense of 
understanding between speakers. This norm-sensitivity is absent in Williamson’s discussion; he 
neglects to treat meaning-understanding as a matter directly related to the contextual employment 
of norm-bound terms. In the process, Williamson loses the right even to describe his characters 





The transcendental role of analytic truth 
In the first three chapters, we investigated and scrutinised conceptions of analyticity as they appear 
in different places. First, we compared historical conceptions of analytic truth, and found 
analyticity to be both diverse and pivotal to a number of philosophical projects. In the second 
chapter, we criticised contemporary attempts to divorce the non-factual character of analytic truth 
from its purported epistemological upshot—our ability to know these truths a priori, 
independently of knowledge about empirical matters. We found that arguments to separate apart 
these non-factual and epistemological features fail to take seriously the normative quality of 
analytic sentences. That is, Chisholm, Boghossian, and others presuppose that an analytic truth 
(such as “Adults are grown-ups”) is a description and not a rule; or, if they do recognise its 
normative import, they maintain it is still nonetheless true by virtue of describing the world. 
However, we presented a series of arguments and imagined normative practices to show that no 
expression of a rule or norm can ever function descriptively in the way some have imagined. 
The value of this point became most salient in Chapter 3, when we analysed Williamson’s 
criticisms of analyticity. It is apparent that he, too, fails to appreciate the normative character of 
analytic or conceptual truth. With a full appreciation, we were able to see how Williamson’s attacks 
on Boghossian’s non-factual and epistemological conceptions of analyticity are as misconceived as 
Boghossian’s distinction in the first place. For Williamson is ultimately unable to explain how it is 
that speakers betray misunderstandings of specific concepts, or how they can extend concept-
usage and develop new lanes for concepts to travel in. And this is because any picture of conceptual 
truth which does not pay diligence to the normative grounding of concept-use will struggle to 
make intelligible how speakers of a language both understand and misunderstand the content of 
each other’s concepts.  
Further, we found problems with what both Boghossian and Williamson agree upon. For 
example, both hold that all true sentences are true “of” the world, which is something I have 
forcefully denied. My denial is founded on the simple point that some sentences express the rules 
that govern our concepts, even though (as I have also insisted) rules bend, fade, and change. As 
such, those sentences are not “true of” the world (insofar as this way of speaking is apposite); 
rather, they are expressions of conceptual norms. The resulting positive idea about truth, here, is 
that not only is the agreement between descriptions and what they describe but also that between 
normative propositions and the norms they express (latent as they are in practices) aptly termed 




we affirm will vary according at least to the kind of sentence in question. And so construed, the 
analytic-synthetic distinction then distinguishes between truths which are normative and 
descriptive respectively (and need not indicate two different senses of “is true”, should that be 
problematic).  
Thus, the last two chapters have provided a defence of the notion of analyticity, or conceptual 
truth, in part by insisting on its normative character. But we ought now to wonder where all this 
leaves us. In this chapter, we move on to thinkers from a different strain of philosophy than I have 
discussed so far, represented by Wilfrid Sellars, Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, and John 
McDowell. What instigates this change of course is still the analytic-synthetic distinction, however, 
and what has been said about it as covered before—indeed, it pays to consider why my approach 
is one not especially accepted by those we have reviewed from the contemporary discussion of 
analyticity. 
The key to unlocking this puzzle is to change vantage point. I have thus far only looked at 
contemporary and historic conceptions of analyticity. It transpires that to understand fully just why 
analyticity is contested in the way it is today, we have to look at the other side; the side, that is, of 
syntheticity or empirical description. In §1, we do just this, and find that latent within Quine’s 
original rejection of analyticity was an untenable conception of the relationship between meaning 
or language on the one hand, and “the facts” or “the world” on the other. The way this relationship 
is conceived, moreover, is just as influential as Quine’s explicit arguments against analyticity.  
This faulty picture of the synthetic is so damaging that, seduced by it, we find ourselves unable 
to articulate how it is that sentences are ever true of the world, and so how what we say is ever 
vulnerable to the world for a verdict on its correctness. Viewed through this lens, normativity is 
lost once again, this time as manifest in the way we are, epistemologically, at the mercy of the 
world before us. In §1, we rehearse arguments from Donald Davidson, who most forcefully argues 
against Quine that his dualistic way of conceiving mind and world is problematic. But it so happens 
that Davidson’s solution is itself insufficient to restore the normative connection between what 
we say and that which we say it about. To restore that essential link, we must revisit Kant through 
the eyes of John McDowell in §2.  
The most significant finding of §2 is that McDowell’s (dis)solution of Davidson’s problem 
makes indispensable use of “rational relations” between our concepts; and the expression of these, 
it occurs to me, are grammatical, analytic propositions. Thus, we come to a transcendental finding: 
without analytic truth, synthetic truth—any true description of the world—becomes impossible. 
This is a positive finding somewhat distinct from (though related to) the negative arguments 




normativity of analytic truth is required for us to make sense of how other truths are synthetic, or 
empirical.  
It is not easy to rest content at this point, however, since an unresolved tension between the 
various views I have advocated is still present, and this is what I explore in §§3 and 4. The problem 
is this. First, much of what I have said about the relationship between rational, normative 
propositions (the analytic ones) and the content of the concepts they involve, resembles, from one 
point of view, the so-called inferentialism of Robert Brandom. Second, however, Brandom’s 
theory falls foul of exactly the same error as Davidson’s by unwittingly severing off the ties 
between the world of which we speak and our speaking of it. Thus, it seems as though central 
claims which I advocate about the constitution of concepts threaten to undermine my ability to 
maintain what we must anyway have: an ability to describe the world truly. What has to give, among 
this inconsistent set of views, is ultimately Brandom’s semantic theory of inferentialism, but it has 
to be dropped in such a way that still does justice to the relationship between norms and meaning 
I advocate. By implementing McDowell’s critique of Brandom, in §4 we finally reach a perspective 
from which the link between analytic truth and meaning is transparent, and crucially (unlike 
Brandom) fully world-involving.  
 
§1 The third dogma of empiricism 
As we saw in chapter one, Quine famously attacked the analytic-synthetic distinction, 
characterising it as empiricist dogma. He thought the idea of some sentences made true by virtue 
of meaning alone, as opposed to being made true by meaning and facts about the world was 
untenable because it incorporated a problematic notion of meaning, which was ultimately circular. 
Moreover, it was undermined, he held, by the falsity of another dogmatic tenet—that sentences 
face the “tribunal of experience” one by one, in an apparently reductionist fashion. The reality, 
Quine argued, is not that isolated sentences face this tribunal but rather that the whole of language 
or (properly) science as a body of theory does (1951, 42). For Quine, then, no sentence in isolation 
is made true; a fortiori, no solitary sentence is made true by meaning alone; rather, every sentence 
is in principle revisable. 
The conception of analyticity which Quine attacked—according to which analytic sentences 
are true “come what may”, independent of extra-linguistic reality—is of course part-Carnapian, 
especially insofar as it incorporates the idea that the truth of analytic (well, “L-true”) sentences can 
be established alone on the basis of the semantical rules of a language (see Carnap 1947, §2), 
leaving considerations of fact out of the picture. In my Chapters 2 and 3, I defended the idea that 




analytic ones, have a grammatical, normative purpose; the argument I made was that sentences 
expressing norms are not descriptions of the world. In so doing, I avoided the Quinean confusion 
over how some sentences are not true by virtue of the world. (I am not much attached to this “by 
virtue of” locution and recognise its misleading nature, but it is easy and inconsequential enough 
to recycle for now.) 
However, there is a deeper problem with Quine’s attack on analyticity. Quine’s way of framing 
the relationship between, on the one hand, language, theory, or science, and on the other, the 
world or facts has the unintended consequence of making the world epistemically inaccessible. All 
this needs unpacking, which I do presently, but one thought to highlight and hold on to throughout 
this chapter is that we must appreciate the normative dimension of analytic truths to find a route 
out of the dilemma engendered by Quine’s foundational picture.  
 
§1.1 Davidson on the scheme-content dualism 
Donald Davidson attacked Quine’s underlying view of how language and the world must be related 
(Davidson 1973, 1983); this is a view which he thinks is encouraged (though not entailed) by 
rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction (1973, 9). Davidson himself also finds the analytic-
synthetic distinction is useless, as “Quine’s faithful student” on the matter (1983, 144), yet he 
thinks Quine ought to have gone further. For when Quine rejected the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, according to Davidson he did so in a way which left intact the idea that language is 
made true by the world, where the world is necessarily not conceived in a conceptual manner but 
is, as it were, set over against language.  
Indeed, Quine had written “[i]t is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and 
extralinguistic fact” (1951, 36), and he did so as a concession to the framing of analytic truth as an 
exception to the rule, where the “factual component” of truth is simply null. When Quine rejected 
the possibility of this null factual contribution, effectively he endorsed the view that, keeping facts 
about meaning the same, the truth of language thereby depends on extralinguistic fact. Falling back 
on this view was always going to be a risk when giving up the conception of analyticity as Quine 
had framed it: 
If we give up the dualism [of the analytic and synthetic], we abandon the conception of 
meaning that goes with it, but we do not have to abandon the idea of empirical content: 
we can hold, if we want, that all sentences have empirical content. Empirical content is 
in turn explained by reference to the facts, the world, experience, sensation, the totality 




Of course, what is not in view for Davidson here, but which I think should be, is that it is only 
giving up a certain conception of analyticity which tempts us into keeping the idea that sentences 
“have empirical content” in the problematic sense (explored shortly). For if we set off, 
alternatively, by recognising that analytic sentences play a normative role, then we are less likely to 
make the wrong step of thinking that all declarative sentences are made true by the world.   
Still, one may consistently appreciate that analytic truths are normative and yet also think that 
legitimate descriptions of empirical happenings are, by contrast, made true by what they describe 
(conceived as “the world”).107 So what is wrong with this view?  
Davidson describes this way of conceiving the relationship between the language and the world 
as a dualism of “conceptual scheme” and “empirical content”. The sense of “content” here is 
illuminated by Davidson’s referral to it also as “uninterpreted” (Davidson 1973, 9); that is, a bit of 
the world which has no conceptual structure—thus not a description of the world but the world 
itself. Indeed, Davidson points out that “content” here is a placeholder for typical expressions of 
reality, as in “the universe, the world, nature”, or alternatively, experience: “the passing show, 
surface irritations, sensory promptings, sense data, the given” (1973, 14). Content in this sense is 
something yet to be organised or else “matched” by a conceptual scheme; it is, so to speak, 
“neutral”. The problem with this dualism, according to Davidson, is that such apparently neutral 
empirical content cannot fulfil the role required of it: it is necessarily not the sort of thing which a 
conceptual scheme could organise or be made to fit, in a way that secures the truth of our empirical 
beliefs.  
Davidson places these concerns within a particular dialectic in his “On the very idea of a 
conceptual scheme” (1973), the target of which is a kind of conceptual relativist, represented by 
Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and indeed Quine. (Relativism in this sense maintains that there 
could be several incompatible—incommensurable—conceptual schemes.) This is not a dialectic I 
wish to rehearse, since it is not fully relevant to the chapter. Suffice it to say, however, that 
Davidson argues against this relativism by using a series of arguments which purport to show this: 
something could not be a language if it were not in principle translatable into a familiar idiom or 
language (1973, 7–8). Within this story, then, Davidson’s way of fleshing out the problem with the 
scheme-content dualism is to say that any translation of a person’s beliefs from one language to 
another will require that we individuate what those beliefs are about (events, experiences, 
sensations, the world) according to “familiar”—i.e., idiomatic—principles (1973, 14–15).  
                                                 





The upshot in Davidson’s terms is thus that nothing (“no thing”) on the side of uninterpreted 
content can “make” sentences or theories (on the side of conceptual scheme) true; however, “[t]hat 
experience takes a certain course . . . if we like to talk that way, make[s] sentences and theories 
true” (1973, 16). Davidson’s explanatory use of the “that-clause” here receives fuller explanation 
elsewhere, and so we now turn to this material, which is most useful for the purpose of seeing 
what is wrong with Quine’s picture of the relationship between language and world. 
 
§1.2 Reasons for belief 
In his later “A coherence theory of truth and knowledge” (1983), Davidson points out that 
“nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” (1983, 141). This moves 
the former claim about beliefs (concerning how they are individuated) from the ontological realm 
to the epistemic and rational realm (concerning now what supports our beliefs). But the claims 
have a common root: a subject’s beliefs are connected directly not to the unconceptualised 
world—the “uninterpreted reality” (1973, 20)—but only ever to conceptual articulations of that 
reality. A useful example in the later article clarifies this claim: 
Suppose we say that sensations themselves, verbalized or not, justify certain beliefs that 
go beyond what is given in sensation. So, under certain conditions, having the sensation 
of seeing a green light flashing may justify the belief that a green light is flashing. The 
problem is to see how the sensation justifies the belief. Of course if someone has the 
sensation of seeing a green light flashing, it is likely, under certain circumstances, that a 
green light is flashing. We can say this, since we know of his sensation, but he can’t say 
it, since we are supposing he is justified without having to depend on believing he has 
the sensation. Suppose he believed he didn’t have the sensation. Would the sensation 
still justify him in the belief in an objective flashing green light? (Davidson 1983, 142) 
This passage nicely brings out the tension implicit in the idea that our beliefs are connected directly 
to, and are epistemically supported by, nonconceptual contents—sensations, bits of the world, or 
unarticulated streams of experience. Davidson’s character (call him “Mike”) cannot cite any such 
things as his reasons for believing that there is a green light flashing before him. Any attempt to do 
so will see Mike impose a grammatical structure onto supposedly neutral content, thereby bringing 
it over to the side of language (“…because I have a flashing green sense-datum”). And if, as 
Davidson invites us to ponder on, Mike claims not to have a sensation of a green light before him, 




is mystifying if not contradictory.108 Mike is normatively committed, we should think, precisely to 
disavowing such a belief in the absence of believing in such a sensation, even if the sensation is 
actually present. This highlights the rational redundancy of the sensation itself in the example, in 
stark contrast to Mike’s beliefs, which we feel must have rational credentials. 
It is thus that Davidson rejects the idea of any epistemic intermediary—empirical content—
between beliefs and what they are about (1983, 144). Whatever they are about, if beliefs are to 
provide rational support, they must be expressed in normative, rational terms; that is a requirement 
which sensations, e.g., fail to meet: “The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, 
since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes” (1983, 143). Yet the idea of a causal 
intermediary, Davidson argues, shows us a way out of this problem, for beliefs are in general, he 
claims, caused by the world, by the deliverances of the senses, and so on. Therefore, Davidson 
concludes that via this causal mechanism beliefs do have a basis, albeit not an epistemic one. By 
this argumentative move, supplemented with some others we cannot explore here, Davidson 
thinks he has found a reason for thinking our beliefs are largely true (the causal mechanism) which 
is not evidence (as is putatively provided by, say, sense data) for this truth (1983, 146). 
However, as will become clear in the following section, Davidson’s move to the causal 
dimension does not allay the creeping doubt engendered by his argument against the dualism 
between conceptual scheme and empirical content. On the contrary, it ought to leave us 
bewildered. As McDowell makes plain, there is something right all along (albeit untenable in the 
way it is typically expressed) in the empiricist thought that our beliefs are not just caused by the 
world but are rationally supported by it. The trouble is just how to reconcile that with Davidson’s 
sound (Sellarsian) argument that beliefs are not so supported by a nonconceptual world. 
To conclude this section, it is apposite to summarise how we got to this juncture. Quine rejects 
the analytic-synthetic distinction, and Davidson thinks this was the correct move to make; he 
opines that erasing that distinction “saved philosophy of language as a serious subject” (1983, 145). 
Crucially, though, he thinks Quine stopped short of rejecting another fatal distinction—that 
between scheme and content. He argues that thinking of language or meaning as somehow 
reducing back to unconceptualised content ultimately opens the door to scepticism and relativism 
about our conceptual scheme(s), and loses objective truth in the bargain. Moreover, Davidson 
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argues it is the way of setting up the analytic-synthetic distinction which brings about this whole 
mess.  
Here, I am in complete agreement with Davidson, with one essential caveat: Quine’s way of 
cashing out the idea of true sentences which are not true on account of describing the world is not 
the only way, and is indeed fundamentally defective. By contrast, if one sees the distinction 
between the analytic and synthetic as between sentences playing now normative and now 
descriptive roles, then a solution to the epistemic tangle presents itself—one which allows us to 
incorporate the intuitive empiricist feeling that our thoughts really are supported by the world in 
some sense (a sense which has to be cashed out very carefully). 
It is in McDowell that we find the resources to make this case, albeit not cast in terms of 
analyticity. The larger significance of the foregoing and following arguments for this thesis is thus 
that not only are there negative arguments to support the view that analyticity is essentially 
normative; there is a positive, transcendental argument too: if analytic sentences did not express 
linguistic practical norms, then intentionality—the aboutness of our thought—would not be 
possible.  
 
§2 McDowell on mind and world 
§2.1 The myth of the Given 
In this section, we find that McDowell responds directly to themes in Sellars, especially as brought 
out by Sellars’s attack on the “Myth of the Given” (Sellars 1956). Very broadly speaking, Sellars 
identified the Given109 in a functional way: anything which purports to play its role—and it is 
alleged many philosophical items through the ages have tried to play it—is thereby an instance of 
the Given: “sense contents, material objects, universals, propositions, real connections, [and] first 
principles” (Sellars 1956, §1). Clearly, having such a range of suspects, Sellars wanted to undermine 
not just any species of givenness, but what he called the whole “framework of givenness”.  
According to Sellars, the role any species of the Given plays is explicitly epistemological: it 
purports to provide justification for a chain of beliefs, to which the chain must ultimately be 
connected at base, while floating free itself of the epistemic obligation to lean on some further 
support. One species on which Sellars focuses as an initial way to explore the framework more 
                                                 
109 I follow McDowell’s practice of capitalising the problematic Given, to allow room for the fact that it is 
possible—indeed, necessary—for experience to be given in a more innocent sense: conceptualised 
experience sets a constraint on what we can correctly say about the world. This will become clearer in due 




generally is the sense-data of traditional empiricist accounts of perception. In essence, then, the 
Given is the epistemological foundationalist’s item of faith, and it is in other terms that which 
Davidson calls “content” or “empirical content”. (Indeed, Davidson (2001, xvi) later 
acknowledged that his argument should have credited Sellars, given its origin.) 
McDowell (1994) portrays philosophy’s relationship with the Given as something which 
seemingly it can live neither with nor without, at least insofar as we appreciate the concern which 
give rises to postulating the Given. (If we do not recognise this concern, we may be what 
McDowell (1994, 67) terms “bald naturalists”, who opt out of this region of philosophy.) And as 
we saw with Davidson, this concern arises when we reflect on how our empirical claims, such as 
“The leaves are green”, stand related to their subject matter: are they supported by what they 
depict, conceived as unarticulated contents? 
In this respect, a standard overview of epistemology always includes two contrasting positions: 
foundationalism, according to which our empirical claims are indeed grounded at some base of 
certainty, and coherentism (of which Davidson is a former advocate), according to which beliefs 
connected together in a network provide each other with mutual support, though none is ever 
epistemically grounded on something exterior to the network. Although McDowell targets both 
these ways of understanding the relationship between our empirical claims and the world, he does 
recognise in each position an insight worth preserving. Problematically, however, it is these very 
insights taken together which generate the concern which bothers him. Nevertheless, his method 
of resolving this apparent dilemma is to find a way to absorb and recognise both insights.  
Foundationalists invoke the Given in response to the felt urgent need to ground our knowledge 
on something not further epistemically suspect, such as a non-conceptual impact of the world—a 
“bare presence”. For example, one might postulate as a form of the Given a red sense-datum, 
appearing in consciousness, as supporting a basic empirical claim such as “I see red”. This is not 
unlike, e.g., Carnap’s Aufbau constructional project—with caveats—which we looked at in Chapter 
1; it is also the third dogma of empiricism as characterised by Davidson, which we discussed in 
the prior section. The insight which partly motivates those who postulate the Given is that 
somehow judgements must be responsible to the world; that, in order for my claim “I see red” or 
“there is red before me” to be reasonable, it must be said in response to a reason provided by my 
experience, or by what I am experiencing. This is a thought, explored more below, which 
McDowell wants to preserve, in some shape. 
 Those who reject the myth of the Given, however, such as Davidson, do not give weight to 
that thought, because an insight of their own seems to tell against it. This insight concerns the 




(McDowell (1994, 67) sees “bald naturalism” as characterised also by its denial of precisely this 
thought.) We already encountered this insight in Davidson, who articulates it as the claim that 
“nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief”. Thus, he “rejects as 
unintelligible the request for a ground or source of justification of another ilk” (Davidson 1983, 
141). Anything which appeals to experience to provide that justifying role, must, for Davidson, be 
succumbing to a form of the mythical Given (McDowell 1994, 14)—we saw, indeed, that 
Davidson lists “experience” among his problematic categories of reality which putatively explain 
empirical content. Yet as above, McDowell wants to preserve this Sellarsian thought in some form; 
he wants to maintain that the world itself, as Given, does not enter into rational relations. And 
seemingly this is in tension with the empiricist insight above. 
According to McDowell, the plausibility of the insights of both foundationalists who postulate 
the Given and coherentists of a Davidsonian stripe lead philosophy to sway between two positions 
in an “interminable oscillation” (1994, 9). At one end, McDowell finds Davidson trying 
nevertheless to provide a stopping point for our beliefs. Granted, Davidson says, experience 
cannot provide a reason for belief; nevertheless, our beliefs are generally veridical, and are caused 
somehow by our experience, at which point, being beliefs, they can then enter into rational 
relations. McDowell explains, however, that the problem with Davidson’s anchor—as an 
alternative to the Given—is that the rocks in which it lands not only fail to justify our judgements, 
they exculpate us from responsibility for them. That is, if we relinquish the Given as Davidson does, 
it seems we must also relinquish our empirical beliefs’ answerability to the world, having thus 
swung to the other end of the oscillating arc. And so, according to McDowell, philosophy 
continues oscillating between accepting and rejecting the Given. 
 
§2.2 Concessions to empiricism 
This problem and its resolution, on McDowell’s account, are essentially Kantian in nature. Recall 
the very first lines of the (second version) Critique, which open with a concession to empiricism: 
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should 
our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses 
partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our 
understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, 
work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects 
which is entitled experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge 





Kant’s opening words convey, inter alia, that our experience of the world must involve a passive 
component. This passivity should be uncontroversial. For example, whether or not the wind blows 
is out of our control, and so long as we stand outside, we are receptive to the elements; we do not 
choose to feel the wind. There is of course an amount of our own contribution to this perception: 
we are standing outside; we are of a certain physical (nervous) constitution that allows us to sense 
the moving air. But no matter how much of ourselves that we contribute to this experience, that 
we perceive the flow of the wind cannot entirely be “up to us”. 
The Critique’s opening lines above are perfectly compatible with the thought that experience 
causes beliefs, and so that our knowledge does begin with experience, even if our judgements 
about the world are not rationally supported by it. Likely, anyone investigating perceptual 
knowledge would accommodate this basic thought. Indeed, Kant’s concession is clearly agreed 
upon by both Davidson and any subscribers to the mythical Given. But those who do postulate 
the Given want to build upon the causal, temporal impact of experience, in a way that Davidson 
cannot—they want for experience to play an epistemically intermediate function, in Davidson’s 
terms. McDowell calls this requirement a “minimal” empiricism—minimal because he thinks we 
must assent to it, even if we do not become full-fledged empiricists. Think of it as a second 
concession to empiricism:   
That is what I mean by “a minimal empiricism”: the idea that experience must constitute 
a tribunal, mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as it must 
be if we are to make sense of it as thinking at all. (McDowell 1994, xii)110 
In McDowell’s story, then, Kant shows us the first movement in a relationship between judgement 
and experience, but in order for knowledge actually to sprout from experience, our judgements 
need to be more than just caused by it. It becomes clear, to a minimal empiricism,111 that the 
judgements we make of the world need somehow to be responsible to it: a subject’s utterance of 
“There is a red ball before me” attains a degree of justification because it is answerable to 
something in her experience. 
The notion specifically of being answerable here is important, and it is not happily substituted 
by “accurate”. That is, we do not satisfy a minimal empiricism simply by saying that a person 
knows that the ball is red in virtue of uttering “the ball is red” when and only when the ball is in 
                                                 
110 From the introduction, added in 1996. 
111 To be clear, this is not a position offered in response or opposition to Kant; on the contrary it is a Kantian 
point, in McDowell’s exposition, as expressed in his dictum that “thoughts without content are empty” (in 




fact red. That may well be important, as a precondition for environmental knowledge, but it does 
not show that her judgement meets a rational tribunal in what she encounters in the world. We 
need instead for the subject herself to perceive that the ball is red, and thereby for her to be 
rationally entitled to the belief. Thus the problem, as McDowell sometimes puts it, is that subjects 
need to be responsive to reasons as such; that subjects need to be able to recognise and grasp the 
reasons for their beliefs, even if only when taken back from the experience, temporarily, to reflect 
on their reasons and whether they provide sufficiently for a belief or action (McDowell 2009, 128). 
Only this possibility can make it intelligible that the subject responds rationally to her 
environment—that her judgement is vulnerable to the world for its correctness. 
The problem we face in trying to meet this minimally empiricist requirement is that Davidson 
is quite right to insist that only a belief—or what has a conceptual structure common to beliefs 
and judgements—can be a reason for another belief. Sellars illuminates this point. Our beliefs and 
claims, he noted, work within a sui generis normative sphere: they are the sorts of things for which 
we are responsible; we ground them with good reasons or bad reasons; we ought to infer one belief on 
the basis of another, or a set of beliefs; and so on. In Sellars’s visual metaphor, our beliefs operate 
within the “logical space of reasons” (1956, §36), not the “space of nature”. The problem is just 
how to reconcile this insight about reasons with the first: that the world or our experience of it 
must provide us, who articulate it, with good or bad reasons for what we say about it. 
For given the rational relationships which only beliefs and judgements bear towards each other, 
how is it possible for something extra-doxastic to provide normative support? That would seem 
to require that “the world” enters into, or is already a part of, the space of reasons. Prima facie, it 
is hard to conceive how this is even possible. The carnage of a storm, say, is neither reasonable 
nor unreasonable—it just is. One could intelligibly remark that it is unreasonable, but only in some 
derivative sense of the term; it would be a metaphorical stretch to describe a storm as unreasonable, 
and it would not imply that the storm acted with bad reasons (only, perhaps, that God did), or 
without a reason where it had available reasons. Accordingly, that storms and other worldly forces 
impinge on our senses is not to be sincerely described in normative or rational language, and 
therefore it remains totally unclear how anything like the Given—a putative non-conceptual item 
of experience—could play a normative role.  
But pace the sceptic, given a minimal empiricism, our empirical beliefs are rationally grounded. 
And this fact, combined with the insights we have expressed so far, provides us with a 






§2.3 Alleviating the transcendental anxiety  
McDowell first expresses this anxiety by working initially with a Sellarsian interpretation of Kant. 
He expands Sellars’s metaphor (McDowell 1994, 5) by imagining now a space of concepts, 
constituted by our network of thoughts. In metaphor, the claim that the Given (once postulated) 
could not rationally support our empirical beliefs just is the claim that the space of concepts 
exhausts the space of reasons; that outside the bounds of the rational is outside the bounds of the 
conceptual; and, for the coherentist, that experience itself is outside those very bounds. This is the 
insight McDowell attributes to Davidson.  
By contrast, since the Given is defined as non-conceptual intake, those who accept the Given 
into their epistemic picture—foundationalists—would draw the boundary of the space of reasons 
wider than the space of concepts. Having done so, however, they too would have absolved 
themselves of responsibility over their empirical beliefs, because, so long as we accept that the 
logical space of reasons is sui generis, any apparent worldly or experiential “reasons”, being non-
conceptual, are not eligible for entry into that space. (Think again of §1: the sensation of the 
flashing light before Mike, or even the flashing light itself, is rationally redundant in an explanation 
of what makes him justified.) The anxiety thus forms because it seems as though neither 
epistemological picture can allow for what must anyhow be the case: that our experience of the 
world rationally constrains what we have to say about it. In light of the anxiety, there is an air of 
mystery to this essential constraint. 
In Kantian language, McDowell poses this problem as that of how receptivity (belonging to the 
faculty of sensibility) and spontaneity (belonging to the faculty of the understanding) jointly 
contribute to experience. Receptivity covers the passive intake of sensory consciousness, while 
spontaneity, he says, represents the active, free-thinking nature of reason; “[i]n a slogan,” 
McDowell says, “the space of reasons is the space of freedom” (1994, 5). On this way of viewing 
the problem, the myth of the Given is a response to the seemingly unbounded liberty of our 
thinking. Those who subscribe to a form of the Given hold that we are not simply free to say what 
we like about the empirical world, because items of our experience (as Given), to which we are 
epistemically responsible (they hope), lay waiting at the bottom of our judgements. And those who 
reject the Given try to interpret causal relations as rationally restricting what we are free to claim 
about the world. (It is not only Davidson who tries this route, but Brandom too (1995, 253–54), 
whom we discuss in this connection in §4.) So the challenge seen in this light is how to weigh 
down our free thinking with our experiential intake. 
McDowell’s dissolution is best explored by another colourful example. Imagine that a subject, 




relatively uncontroversial to say that the abilities Rose exercises when she actively makes such a 
judgement are conceptual in nature, because here she is operating with the concept of green. 
Moreover, she can collect instances (shades) under a general notion (“green”); she is aware that 
green is a colour, of different shades; she would not assent to the claim that green is not a colour, 
or that the wall is green and red all over, given how it looks in optimal viewing conditions. These 
are the capacities one would expect Rose to draw on when making active judgements. But stopping 
to ask Rose about these things by getting her to engage those capacities takes her back from the 
scene, at a reflective distance; that is the sort of distance that Rose does not have when the world 
simply impinges on her senses in the everyday flow of experience. It might seem surprising, then, 
that McDowell’s way out of the problem presented is to argue that even in her passive perceptual 
experience, conceptual capacities are operative: “One’s conceptual capacities have already been 
brought into play, in the content’s being available to one, before one has any choice in the matter” 
(1994, 10).  
To my mind, McDowell takes the only route out of a troubling philosophical situation, so long 
as one has already acknowledged the insights laid out above. However, I do think McDowell’s 
perspective is intuitively more plausible when we ward off an unstated objection right at the start. 
Clearly, it cannot always be the case that perceptual experience is conceptual in this way. 
Concepts—conceptual abilities—are learned over time (pace Kant’s a priori categories), and so 
there must be a stage in a human’s life during which she cannot discriminate the items of her 
experience, or at least can barely so discriminate. This early stage is summarised by William James’s 
depiction of a new-born’s stream of experience: 
The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great 
blooming, buzzing confusion; and to the very end of life, our location of all things in 
one space is due to the fact that the original extents or bignesses of all the sensations 
which came to our notice at once, coalesced together into one and the same space. 
(James 1890, 462)  
McDowell’s argument, taking account of this objection, should be that as mature human creatures 
we have a rich, conceptualised experience that goes far beyond the relatively indiscriminate 
“blooming, buzzing confusion” which is so characteristic of the immature experience. The 
argument is thus best understood not as claiming that conceptual capacities are activated “from 
the off”, so to speak; there has to be a role in place for learning and improving those capacities. 
(In the view of Wilson (2006), this is an extreme understatement; we accommodate much of his 




Let us retrace some steps now in order to refine our understanding of McDowell’s resolution. 
We noted, first, that the logical space of concepts exhausts the logical space of reasons; second, 
we then saw that those who yield to the myth want for the Given to be located (impossibly) both 
inside the space of reasons and outside the space of concepts. McDowell is fighting against this 
myth by urging the thought that experience itself sits within this space of concepts; that all 
experience is conceptual.112 And one reason why he urges this is because of the epistemological 
gain: if experience is correctly so placed, it is thus within the space of reasons, and therefore we 
can demystify how it is that we justify our empirical judgements and beliefs about the world by 
reference to it—by reference now to what is “given” in a non-problematic sense. 
 
§2.4 The conceptual content of experience 
In order to terminate effectively the uneasy oscillation between accepting and rejecting the Given, 
McDowell must make intelligible the idea that what experience delivers is already conceptual in 
nature. In service of this task, one might attempt to construe the dichotomy between spontaneity 
(our freedom of thought) and receptivity (the passive constraint on our thought) in a new fashion: 
while all experience is conceptual, spontaneity does not stretch so far as to cover the intake of 
experience. But, as McDowell notes (1994, 11), this position is not defensible. It retains the 
spontaneity-receptivity dichotomy, and simply sneaks it into the space of concepts, a space 
supposedly characterised in the first place by spontaneity. So this is (albeit instructively) mistaken, 
because in keeping hold of the dichotomy, we completely lose sight of the desired epistemological 
upshot—it is precisely the spontaneous character of our thinking which we must somehow limit 
and ground, according to a minimal empiricism. What is required, then, to understand how our 
passive intake can nonetheless be conceptual, as McDowell spells out, is to dissolve the dichotomy 
between ourselves as active, spontaneous thinkers and passive, receptive observers. 
This is the crucial thought: receptivity and spontaneity work in concert; the former is not even 
“notionally separable” from the latter (1994, 41). This claim should not be unpacked as the thought 
that all passive experience involves active conceptualising;113 it is not that in order to experience 
the wall as green, Rose must be thinking about the rational relations between judgements 
employing the concepts of green, colours, shades, looks, walls, spaces, and so forth. Rather, as 
                                                 
112 With respect to my “baby” caveat, we should take this to mean all mature experience, where the requisite 
level of maturity is for now left unexplored. 
113 Effectively, this is the criticism which Dreyfus (2013) alleges of McDowell—if not with passive 
experience then with unreflective activity; McDowell (2013) in his response, however, is at great pains to 




McDowell explains, the ability to engage in such active thought is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of (mature) human experience: 
[E]ven if we consider only judgements that register experience itself . . . we must 
acknowledge that the capacity to use concepts in those judgements is not self-standing; 
it cannot be in place independently of a capacity to use the same concepts outside that 
context. . . . Quite generally, the capacities that are drawn on in experience are 
recognizable as conceptual only against the background of the fact that someone who 
has them is responsive to rational relations, which link the contents of judgements of 
experience with other judgeable contents. (McDowell 1994, 11–12)  
Discourse involving “green” is intelligible only against a backdrop of colour-related discourse, 
which again is intelligible only against a backdrop of discourse about how things seem and look, 
about the sorts of things which are coloured, about optimal viewing conditions, and about 
perception as revealing the way things are (1994, 12). It is in these discourses, or networks of 
thought, that spontaneity is exercised; it is thus where Rose can demonstrate that she comprehends 
what it is for the wall to be green-coloured.  
Accordingly, McDowell is arguing that concepts themselves are partly constituted by the 
rational relations into which they enter (1994, 13). Moreover, the active spontaneity plays a role in 
further refining and changing possible intakes of experience. That is, the network of rational 
linkages in which concepts find their place and distinction is not “sacrosanct”: we are responsible 
for reflecting on that network and adjusting it as needs be (1994, 12–13). McDowell is keen to 
point out that in principle this flexibility still applies to observational concepts, even though in 
practice it is hard to see how we might need or be able to revise them.114 
Indeed, it is somewhat surprising at first that these insights apply even to “close” observational 
concepts like those of colour. For our colour intake appears most susceptible to being treated (in 
the manner of the Given) as comprised of self-standing, intelligible items of experience which 
determine the empirical content of the (colour) concepts sitting closest to them in experience. But, 
as we see above, one could not engage a capacity to perceive colours as they are, in passive 
receptivity, without being able to navigate along the rational pathways between concepts of colour 
and ones associated to them in active thought. So even the more passive abilities, which might be 
thought to play into the hands of a foundationalist, must be conceptual in at least this sense.  
                                                 
114 Perhaps Nelson Goodman’s puzzles about the putative colour “grue” (Goodman 1954, 59–83) can help 
us imagine ways that we might revise our colour concepts, were circumstances importantly different. In the 
following chapter, we discuss Wilson’s blend of inventive and historical examples which suggest that some 
form of “linguistic engineering” is possible (to use Wilson’s (2006) language), even with empirically “close” 




Rose’s ability to judge that the wall is green draws on the concept of green found in the realm 
of spontaneous thought. That is a realm in which other propositions about green, colours, things, 
perceptions, and so forth are rationally related to each other. For example, “Green is a colour”, 
“Surfaces which look green in such-and-such conditions are green”, etc. Rose is obliged to 
acknowledge and show a grasp of these rational relations, in order for it to be fully plain that she 
really does wield the concept of green. And, ultimately, this competence is a sine qua non for being 
able to take in that the wall is green, rather than whatever is manifest in simply parroting a verbal 
response, “green”, to certain walls. 
 
§2.5 Analyticity as a precondition for syntheticity 
Before proceeding with the next section, it is worth pausing to reflect on what McDowell’s train 
of thought achieves here. We began with a philosophical anxiety, part-inherited from Davidson 
and before him Sellars, about how perceptual knowledge is possible, especially given two 
apparently contradictory but plausible insights. This was a problem which on its face was 
epistemological in character. But in the course of reconciling these insights by paying attention to 
how experience must be structured, McDowell brings us to thoughts about the nature and content 
of concepts.  
The first thought I want to preserve is that even empirical concepts, such as colour concepts, 
are at least partly constituted by the inferential relations into which they enter. The second is that 
in order for a subject to demonstrate competence with these concepts, to count as having them, 
she must be responsive to these inferential relations by exercising the concepts in the sui generis 
logical space of reasons. To articulate those inferential relations is, at least, to express the norms 
which partly constitute concepts. It is, as I have urged in the last chapter, to express analytic or 
conceptual truths, which are essentially normative. Thus, though McDowell does not discuss his 
rational relations explicitly in terms of analytic truths, the way is very much open to conceiving 
them as such. With that terminological amendment in place, we come to a conclusion that may be 
prima facie striking: our ability to describe the world truly (or falsely) is predicated on the idea that 
some other sentences are not “made true” by the world.  
Yet this of course needs illumination, and seen in the right light, it is a rather quotidian point. 
Namely, before we are able to describe how things are, we must learn how to use concepts 
concerning them; moreover, we must master practices even more general than specific concept-
application, such as the practice of describing what we see (or hear; or did see; or might see; or 
would like to see; and so on!), or aspects of what we see. All such normative practices in a sense 




are only intelligible against the background of normative practices enjoining what is to count as a 
correct or incorrect descriptive move. Such a background, in my view, endows us with an ability 
to wield concepts, competently, by teaching us normative, grammatical propositions—in short, 
analytic truths. Thus, put this way, analytic truth is a precondition of synthetic truth.  
The germ of this idea is undoubtedly present in McDowell’s Mind and World. In his afterword, 
McDowell discusses how Davidson’s rejection of the third dogma ought to bring into question 
more of the Quinean commitments, including both meaning-scepticism and holism about 
verification. Accordingly, Quine’s argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction need not go 
through. Yet, McDowell maintains, there is a Sellarsian way of reading Quine which sees his 
argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction as targeting another form of the Given—this 
time, an “endogenous” one, local to language or meaning, as opposed to an “exogenous” form 
local to the external world (such as sense-data or experience conceived non-conceptually, in the 
manner of Davidson and Quine).115 That is, one could see Quine as arguing against a linguistic 
form of the Given (which Sellars discusses too, in less detail); such a species of givenness would 
be something that purported to supply us with certainty having emanated entirely from within the 
understanding. One could thus label as a form of the Given exactly the idea that some sentences 
are made true purely by virtue of meaning alone (see McDowell 1994, 136–37, 157–58). 
McDowell thinks the Sellarsian Quine could then find himself in pursuit of a conclusion we 
want to come to: if some sentences are true purely by virtue of meaning alone, this might suggest 
a hard, dividing line again between mind (or language) and world, or conceptual scheme and 
empirical content. Disowning that model of analyticity is then a way of combining receptivity and 
spontaneity in McDowell’s terms. We could say that disowning that idea of analyticity is one way 
of showing that the output of the understanding is world-involving, much as how discarding the 
exogenous Given shows that the input of the world is conceptual. Ultimately, McDowell finds 
Quine lacking here; he is unable to make this move, precisely because he fails to notice the myth 
of the Given seen from the exogenous side (1994, 136). Accordingly, and as Davidson argued, 
Quine works with a picture of intentionality which sees language and the world as two disparate 
entities—the third dogma again. 
But what if Quine had noticed and explicitly targeted the analytic as an endogenous form of 
the Given? 
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[I]f I am right that Quine’s insight is really a glimpse of the unacceptability of the 
dualism [between mind and world], perhaps we can rehabilitate the idea of statements 
that are true by virtue of their meaning, without flouting the real insight. (McDowell 
1994, 157) 
Effectively, then, McDowell concedes that nothing need be wrong, at the outset, with the very 
notion of analyticity, so long as it does not involve picturing the space of concepts or reasons and 
the space of nature on separate sides split by a chasm, which would indeed be “flouting the real 
insight”.  
“If,” McDowell continues, “the notion of a conceptual scheme need not belong to the dualism, 
meaning can constitute the stuff of schemes in an innocent sense” (1994, 157–58). And here 
McDowell arrives only inches away from the conclusion I argue for in this chapter:  
The idea of a structure that must be found in any intelligible conceptual scheme need 
not involve picturing the scheme as one side of a scheme-world dualism. And analytic 
truths (in an interesting sense, not just definitionally guaranteed truisms such as “A 
vixen is a female fox”) might be just those that delineate such a necessary structure. 
(McDowell 1994, 158) 
A necessary structure of our conceptual scheme is exactly what I have painted, in prior chapters, 
analytic truths as providing: not just industry-standard bachelor-sentences, but ones such as “Red 
is closer to orange than it is to yellow”, “The chess king moves one square at a time”, “The green 
light means ‘go’ ”, and “No square is round”. Moreover, it is my view that such sentences are 
expressive of exactly the kind of rational relation that McDowell has in mind in the first instance, 
when he explains the idea of conceptual capacities being actualised in the realm of spontaneity.  
Taking all this into account, then, we can see that how one conceptualises the analytic-synthetic 
distinction reveals much about how one thinks intentionality is to work. In the fatal case, thinking 
of sentences as divided into those true by virtue of meaning and true by virtue of the world can 
make two basic phenomena unintelligible. In the first instance, we may misconstrue the 
normativity of the analytic—i.e., we may fail to realise that some propositions are grammatical, not 
descriptive, and thereby prescribe the correct context-bound applications of concepts. In the 
second instance, we may distort the normative connection between synthetic, descriptive 
sentences and what they describe—we may, that is, fail to account for our ability to represent, see, 







§3 Brandom’s inferentialism 
I have already foreshadowed that central issues remain to be worked out. First, my endorsement 
of certain claims about concept constitution—that analytic truths partly constitute the content of 
relevant concepts—sounds very similar to the inferentialist thesis of Brandom. Second, and 
problematically, McDowell has shown Brandom’s inferentialism to be fundamentally defective, 
precisely because it allows room for the transcendental anxiety discussed last section, and does 
nothing to allay it. This second point we will overview in greater detail in §4. The current section 
will instead focus on summarising Brandom’s theoretical machinery and assessing how much 
overlap there really is with the set of views I have thus far advocated.  
 
§3.1 Inferentialism and analytic truth 
We can approach Brandom’s inferentialism by considering a notion pivotal to his project—that of 
a “material inference”. Sellars coins the term, and introduces it by contrasting it with formal 
inference. Formal rules of inference prescribe (and proscribe) the transitions one may make from 
propositions of one form to another. Take the transition from “The ball is red and round” to “The 
ball is red”. First-year undergraduates are routinely introduced to such transitions when learning 
the rules of natural deduction systems; e.g., they learn the elementary valid argument form of 
simplification which holds that the conjuncts of a conjunction may be asserted separately. That 
rule is thus specifiable purely in terms of form. A material rule of inference, however, licenses 
transitions which are specifiable in terms of the “matter”, the content, of the terms involved: 
(a) The ball is red. 
(b) Therefore, the ball is coloured. 
As Sellars notes, one way to respond to these kinds of inferences is to regard them as 
enthymemes—arguments in which a premise is implicit or missing (1953, 313). Once the missing 
premise is explicitly supplied (“If the ball is red, then the ball is coloured”), no longer does it seem 
as if there is another rule of inference in play, only a standard modus ponens inference, which 
secures the argument’s validity on purely formal grounds. 
To say that there are material rules of inference is to say that the above inference is already 
valid, without the additional premise. Since validity is standardly defined by reference to inference 
form, this claim would rely, it seems, on some other notion of validity, which perhaps amounts to 
an inference which is warranted by a material as opposed to a formal rule of inference (cf. 1953, 
313). Sellars considers arguments which might show material rules to be of limited or no 




and thought) as formal rules” (1953, 317). In the following quote, Sellars presents the kind of 
thought which motivates Brandom, who maintains that material proprieties of inference, by 
licensing the practical moves we can make between claims, fully explain the notion of semantic 
content: 
[T]here is an important difference between logical, modal and normative predicates, on 
the one hand, and such predicates as “red” on the other. In the case of the former, it is 
obvious that their conceptual meaning is entirely constituted by their “logical grammar”, 
that is, by the fact that they are used in accordance with certain syntactical rules. In the 
case of the latter, this is not obvious—though, as we are about to argue, it is equally 
true. (Sellars 1953, 334)  
The rhetoric here misleads somewhat, for Sellars is arguing that there is no truly important 
difference between, say, logical and empirical predicates in respect of how their meaning is 
constituted—it is only that the meaning of the former is more “obviously” constituted by their 
logical grammar.  
The view that, specifically, the meaning of logical or modal predicates is constituted by the rules 
legislating correct inferences involving them is a species of what today can be called “local 
inferentialism” (Murzi and Steinberger 2016): i.e., a semantic thesis about the content of some 
smaller part of the whole of language, according to which the content of a concept within that 
domain is constituted by the inferential rules for its correct use. Formal logical vocabulary is 
sometimes thought to provide the best locality for this thesis, for its purported rules are fairly 
definite, mostly non-controversial, and easy to discover. Consider the rules held by some to 
constitute the content of “and”: the aforementioned simplification rule which allows one to assert 
only a conjunct from a conjunction and the rule of conjunction which allows one to conjoin two 
separately asserted propositions. Given these two rules, someone who agreed, first, that it is raining 
today, and second, that Donald Trump is not fit to be a US President, is further obliged to agree 
to the proposition “It is raining today and Donald Trump is not fit to be a US President”, on pain 
of being seen as insincere or confused. Specifically, logical inferentialists claim that, if sincere, such 
a person would be taken to misunderstand “and”.  
Indeed, post-Boghossian (1997), this is the point of emphasis for many inferentialists, who take 
themselves to be committed only to epistemic and not metaphysical analyticity. But this is a 
distinction we scrutinised in the last two chapters. Briefly, it is thought that no sentence can be 
true purely in virtue of what its constituent words mean (i.e., no sentence is “metaphysically” 
analytic), but that some sentences are known to be true purely in virtue of knowing the meaning of 




involve the industry standard (the bachelor sentence), this claim might be thought somewhat 
plausible, for at least there is a purported subject matter for those sentences to be about (bachelors, 
or marital statuses); to be true of. But the logical inferentialist has different go-to sentences, which 
are far less obviously “about” anything, since the words, or symbols for, “and”, “or”, “if”, and so 
on do not on the face of it stand for anything.116 At any rate, logical inferentialists do take the 
supposed implicit definition of a logical constant to be epistemically analytic. That is a purported 
fact they take to explain how it is possible to grasp logical truths. 
Contemporary literature is much concerned over whether logical inferentialism is plausible. 
Scepticism comes from, e.g., Williamson (2007, 2012), who, as we have already seen, denies 
epistemic analyticity tout court. That is, Williamson argues, if semantic competence cannot ever 
engender knowledge of a sentence’s truth, then logical sentences (such as implicit definitions) 
cannot be known to be true purely by knowing the meaning of their constituent terms. 
Accordingly, so Williamson contends, it is always in principle possible not to assent to a sentence—
logical or otherwise—without failing to understand that sentence. (In addition to my Chapter 3, 
also see Williamson 2007, chap.4.)  
In light of this ongoing debate, it may seem surprising that anyone is a global inferentialist, by 
taking up the second position which Sellars describes above. A global inferentialist, such as 
Brandom, has to maintain that the content not just of logical concepts but also, for example, of 
colour predicates is constituted by the rules for their correct use. Some philosophers worry that a 
conception of the content of any given concept as involving implicit rules requires substantial, or 
worryingly, exact agreement in order for communication and understanding to be possible (see 
Fodor and Lepore 2001).  
My first concern at present, however, is to draw attention to how what Brandom has said tallies 
with what Baker and Hacker had to say, in my Ch. 2, §3, about grammatical propositions. Their 
analysis of necessary propositions revealed them to be normative,117 and not, unless used in a 
different way (qua different tokens), descriptive. This was a point which I examined both in the 
particular case (the “metre proposition”) and more generally. Moreover, they held that this 
normativity makes necessary propositions “concept-forming” and “partly constitutive of the 
meanings of their constituent terms” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 259). Given that, as I argued, 
analytic truths may too be regarded as normative, since they also provide “inference tickets” (a 
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117 With the exception of logical propositions, which they hold to be “essentially related to norms of 




feature of grammatical propositions), the combination of these claims comes to this: analytic truths 
are partly constitutive of the meanings of their constituent terms. That is a thought about concept-
constitution, but of course there is a related thought: that to understand the meaning of a term is 
partly to articulate the normative truths which show what one may and may not do with that term.  
Brandom makes claims about material rules of inference which are very similar to those just 
rehearsed about necessary propositions (or analytic truths): “The picture being developed is one 
according to which materially good inferences correspond to the conceptual content of nonlogical 
expressions” (1994, 102). Here, Brandom signals his commitment to a claim about (nonlogical) 
concept-constitution. He derives, again, much of the support for it from Sellars, who holds that 
material rules of inference—or rather, what they express—are indispensable for both scientific 
and everyday vocabularies (Brandom 1994, 103).  
Brandom’s own argument for the importance of material principles is explanatory and 
pragmatist. Consider the inference from “Today is Wednesday” to “Tomorrow is Thursday”. 
Rather than being enthymematic (and thus, at base, formally valid), he holds this inference to be 
materially valid. Its validity is, for Brandom, a matter of its being implicit in practical proprieties 
of inference: in the “moves” that language-speakers license and prohibit by the normative attitudes 
they take towards the “players” who make those moves (cf. 1994, chap.1). (One can, of course, 
give expression to the material rule by the use of logical vocabulary, e.g., “If today is Wednesday, 
then tomorrow is Thursday”, even though the norm itself remains implicit.) And so he holds that 
the correctness of these inferential moves at the practical level is what gives the terms their content. 
He can then appeal to conceptual content as what underwrites inferences which are materially 
valid albeit formally invalid. So, in the above example, he argues that the contents of the concepts 
“Today”, “Tomorrow”, “Wednesday”, and “Thursday” are what make the inference correct (1994, 
98). Furthermore, he relates the concept-constitution claim to a corresponding epistemological 
one: “Endorsing these [material] inferences is part of grasping or mastering those concepts” (1994, 
98).  
So much rounds off some of the salient similarities between Brandom’s picture and what I have 
so far advocated regarding analytic truths. Brandom’s inferentialism, however, is considerably 
more finely-grained and systematic than the perspectives which I have so far endorsed. 
 
§3.2 Inferentialism: a different game? 
Brandom locates a specific area of practice as crucial for conceptual content: the game of giving 
and asking for reasons. I will detail the structure of this game and its terminology in brief, before 




Brandom conceives the Sellarsian “game” of giving and asking for reasons in terms of the 
practical deontic statuses which “players” possess, and which are instituted by means of the 
normative attitudes they take towards each other. The two core statuses themselves, he says, are 
“commitment” and “entitlement” to claims or actions, where actions may too be perceived as the 
premises or conclusions of practical inferences. Within this game, we confer commitments on 
ourselves with respect to the assertions we make, through what we say or do; we confer 
entitlements likewise on ourselves in light of our other commitments, and these entitlements are, 
effectively, assertions appropriate for us to make. Accordingly, Brandom’s “basic” form of 
“discursive commitment” is the assertion (1994, 157). And finally, assertion, Brandom maintains, 
is essentially related to inference; i.e., to understand the notion of assertion, one must understand 
the notion of inference (1994, 158).  
That is a very brief overview of Brandom’s core model for understanding conceptual content 
on the basis of inference. It is abstract and broad strokes, so let us consider an example to fill in 
the details: 
(c) Buttons is a cat. 
(d) Buttons is a mammal. 
By Brandom’s lights, in virtue of the material norm, which we may make explicit as the rule “If x 
is a cat, x is a mammal”, any speaker who asserts (c) is committed to asserting (d); anyone who is 
entitled to assert (c) is likewise entitled to assert (d); a speaker who asserted (d) without having 
asserted (c) would not, on the basis of (d) alone, be committed to (c), though other assertions she 
makes may commit her to it. In light of the material principle, anyone who asserted (c) but refused 
to assert (d) would have failed to commit herself to a claim that she was instituted as being 
committed to, by virtue of the assessments of the interpersonal linguistic community of which she 
is a part. Everything incompatible with the propositional content of (d) is incompatible with the 
propositional content of (c), and so, in Brandom’s terminology, (c) “incompatibility-entails” (d). 
And with the notion of incompatibility relations finally in place, Brandom can define the 
“contents” of any given commitment as “the set of commitments that are incompatible with it” 
(1994, 160). Thus, the content of a commitment to (c) is an indefinitely long set such as {“Buttons 
is a dog”, “Buttons is not an animal”, “Buttons is not a mammal”, “Buttons is an invertebrate”, . 








§3.3 Anticipating a methodological debate 
The further details of the model described in the sub-section above involve many more intricate 
distinctions of which we will have no particular use in this discussion. However, I wish to draw 
attention here to a structural feature of Brandom’s system. Brandom is very careful that his 
vocabularies do not intertwine; for example, incompatibility-entailment makes no mention of 
formal negation (which it easily could) so that the practice it is used to explain—the game of giving 
and asking for reasons or the “deontic scorekeeping model of discursive practice”—does not 
presuppose any formal relations. His description of that practice does not presuppose semantic 
notions either, such as, crucially, reference. This careful construction allows Brandom 
systematically to build up a semantic picture about conceptual and propositional content from 
primitives involving only pragmatic notions such as “material inference”, “normative status”, 
“commitment”, “entitlement”, and “incompatibility”:  
The institution of [correct and incorrect moves in a game] by practical assessments on 
the part of the practitioners is the ultimate source of the meanings of the noises and 
marks they make, and of the other things they do. (Brandom 1994, 159)  
This direction of explanation reflects a general reductivist tendency in Brandom. It is not an issue 
of which he is unaware (or, as such, an issue for him); rather, it explicitly shapes how he frames his 
task. But it is a bone of contention between McDowell and himself. Exploring some of this 
disagreement is instructive for coming to an understanding of, first, what conceptual content 
consists in, and, second, the nature of what is conceptually true: grammatical propositions, analytic 
truths, and material inferences. 
Although Brandom is often characterised as coming from the same school of thought as 
McDowell, and both as together with Sellars,118 he and McDowell have had several disagreements 
in print over core features of the other’s philosophy. For example, while Brandom has expressed 
the thought that his own work not only chimes with McDowell’s, but in substantive ways continues 
and repairs it, or expands on its consequences (Brandom 1995, 248), McDowell explicitly denies 
this characterisation (McDowell 1995, 1998, 2005): 
I reject the suggestion that my short book [i.e., (McDowell 1994)] issues promissory 
notes redeemed in Brandom’s long one [i.e., (Brandom 1994)]. In crediting me with a 
                                                 




sketchy version of the sort of philosophical activity he engages in, Brandom ignores the 
dialectical organization of my book. (McDowell 1998, 403)  
§4 Bringing the world into the picture  
The main reason McDowell rejects the apparent affinity between himself and Brandom is that he 
fails to afford the representational dimension of experience any significant role. We have already 
seen that McDowell argues that this representational dimension is necessary for empirical 
conceptual content (that is, for the content of concepts familiarly used to depict phenomena 
encountered in experience, such as “red” and “tree”); it is necessary, he argues, for us to make 
sense of our taking a stand on how things are in the world. In this section, I show that this is 
something which Brandom cannot accommodate by using the notion of inference (and the game 
of giving and asking for reasons) as an unexplained explainer. Largely, that is, Brandom cannot 
make room for the role of representation in his semantics precisely because he is committed to 
privileging inference at the expense of representation. Whatever stance we take, then, on how 
concepts are constituted, it cannot reduce purely to some specified set of inferences, conceived 
independently of representation. 
 
§4.1 Brandom’s reductivism  
An important disagreement between Brandom and McDowell centres on what Brandom calls “the 
semantic order of explanation”. For Brandom, the link between pragmatics and semantics is 
intricate. Roughly, semantics concerns contents, especially intentional contents—the contents of 
beliefs, desires, and so forth; pragmatics concerns the significance of those contents, as borne by 
intentional states, attitudes, and performances (1994, 68) and as gleaned by a study of practices 
involving them. Moreover, practice, as something done, holds out the hope of grounding meaning 
or content (1994, 91), since practice can be described, according to Brandom, without the use of 
semantic terms such as “true” or “represents”.  
When we have in mind, then, how Brandom construes the relation between semantics and 
pragmatics, it is easier to see what he means by the “semantic order of explanation” as a dimension 
along which his inferentialism can be articulated. The inferentialist order of explanation requires, 
first, that he home in on what the practical significances of our beliefs and such really are, to reveal 
their contents, and, second, that he explain how other semantic features of language can be 
explained in terms of those (inferentially articulated) contents.  
Brandom’s contrast to the inferentialist order of explanation is the so-called 




representation as its primitive or “master” concept (1994, 6), which means that the contents of 
concepts and propositions are articulated representationally—by a specification of what is 
represented by those concepts and propositions. For singular terms, that could be the objects in 
the world designated by them; for predicates, that could be properties of objects; for propositions, 
that could be truth-values or sets of possible worlds. The details do not matter, here, insofar as the 
picture is clear: according to the representationalist order of explanation (as Brandom conceives 
it119), concepts acquire their contents through their representative function, while other semantic 
notions—such as inference—are explained in terms of those representational contents.  
In view, then, are two apparent “traditions” which order semantic explanation in opposite 
directions.120 Brandom understands the representationalist tradition as being Cartesian in origin, 
and often designational in method (that is, representation is cashed out in terms of designation 
relations). Brandom argues against this order of explanation, but praises the inverted, inferentialist 
order which by contrast takes the notion of inference to be primitive. He claims that the 
inferentialist tradition responsible for inverting the order arises in pre-Kantian rationalism, grows 
in Kant’s own philosophy, matures in Hegel, lies implicit in Frege, and finally makes itself explicit 
in Sellars. The details and accuracy of Brandom’s rational reconstructions are certainly 
questionable. (For example, McDowell (2005, 130–33) charges that portraying Frege as having 
inferentialist credentials is a severe misinterpretation.121) Still, Brandom’s inferentialism stands or 
falls on its own merit; in particular, on its commitment to a reductive order of semantic 
explanation.  
However, as foregrounded in §3.3, it is precisely this defining feature of Brandom’s 
inferentialism which McDowell contests: that one must take either representation or inference as 
primitive and explain the other in terms of it. Brandom holds that either primitive must be taken 
as antecedently intelligible (e.g., 1994, 94)—that is, as making sense independently of and prior to 
other notions. But at first glance the matter is slightly obscured, because, as we have seen, Brandom 
sets up the divide between pragmatics and semantics in a very particular way: in the first chapter 
of Making It Explicit, Brandom settles on a “normative pragmatics”, whereby content is conferred 
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Indeed, McDowell deems it near-fatal that this tradition may not exist, since without it—and its mistakes—
not much else recommends its mirrored inversion. 
120 To anticipate the next chapter, it strikes me that both of Brandom’s supposed traditions adhere to the 
“classical view of concepts,” as defined by Wilson (2006); both, it seems, buy into some notion of “semantic 
finality”. See my Ch. 5, §2 for an explanation of these terms. 




on concepts and propositions by the normative attitudes and exchanges of individuals in a 
community. So it does not seem right to say that Brandom conceives the notion of inferential 
correctness as intelligible antecedently of anything—as Brandom accuses the representationalist 
tradition of so taking representational correctness (1994, 6f)—but actually as intelligible in light of 
something expounded on in depth. 
And so one might say that the semantic order of explanation which Brandom urges us to adopt 
is not exactly reductive, because it bottoms out not in semantics but in practice; and, one might 
reasonably conjecture, concepts could not receive their content except through practice. (Wilson 
(2006) would strongly object to this claim, as we see in Chapter 5.) That is, if it is reductivist to 
claim that conceptual content is derived from practice, we might wonder if that is simply a 
reduction worth making.  
I think that this is, in rough outline, the shape of Brandom’s way of thinking here. Indeed, a 
central remark of his manifests it: “Semantics must answer to pragmatics” (1994, 83).122 But I also 
think it would be rash to see this claim as essentially reductivist or inferentialist—in the sense of 
Brandom’s inferentialism. This is because the claim that concepts could not receive their contents 
except through practice is vague and platitudinous; it can be unpacked differently to suit the needs 
of many incompatible philosophies. For even a direct reference theorist will conceive practice in 
some way so as to complement and fill in the gaps of a semantic story; Kripke’s emphasis on 
baptisms and causal-historical chains of use spring to mind (Kripke 1972, chap.3). Yet the 
platitudinous claim itself does not get Brandom off the hook (if, indeed, being a reductivist is a 
bad thing), since his unpacking of the claim is nevertheless reductivist, as we will see presently.  
Recall from §3 that Brandom’s conception of discursive practice relies on the normative 
material principles which underwrite the inferential transitions speakers make. This relation itself 
is reductively conceived: “material proprieties of inference have been treated as primitives, playing 
the role of unexplained explainers” (1994, 133). Now, according to Brandom these primitives are 
instituted by players in the game of giving and asking for reasons, or the “deontic scorekeeping 
model of discursive practice”, where the basic move (or discursive commitment) is making an 
assertion, and where assertions are understood in turn by the more basic notions of (assertional) 
commitment and entitlement. And, finally, these notions are spelled out in terms of incompatibility 
relations between propositions. (For example, again, “Buttons is a cat”, in Brandom’s terminology, 
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identifies as possible, “weak inferentialism” (1997, 160); see Making It Explicit for the weak/strong/hyper 




incompatibility-entails “Buttons is a mammal”.) Brandom claims that the players in this game are 
able to keep track of each other’s commitments and entitlements because of their awareness of 
the proprieties governing which transitions are allowed and disallowed; thereby, they “keep score” 
of the discursive field of play. Accordingly, Brandom uses this set of key terms to exhaust the 
game of giving and asking for reasons, which he takes to model, in principle, real-life social 
discursive practice (cf. 1994, 158). And this is the problem: discursive practice as we know it could 
not be conceived in such a set of basic terms. 
One huge issue is that it is hard to see how the notion of assertion, which is pivotal to 
Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping practice, is recognisable as assertion, given he is only to describe 
the game in the terms discussed above. McDowell has forcefully argued this point (2005, 126–29):  
To my ear, we have locutions that are explicitly representational as soon as we have 
“that” clauses, as soon as we have the idea of propositional content. If someone is said 
to assert that things are thus and so, she is thereby said to represent things as being thus 
and so. (McDowell 2005, 126)  
To understand the force of this point, remember that Brandom by design postpones an account 
of objective purport, so that representational locutions123 are prohibited from appearing on stage 
until the later scenes. Accordingly, by Brandom’s lights, objective purport cannot be conceived 
until we have the main cast onstage at the beginning, to play out the first act. That cast of 
characters—assertion, inference, commitment, entitlement, and incompatibility—and the story 
they together perform—playing the game of giving and asking for reasons—are to be intelligible 
before the narrative of the later scenes, involving descendent characters. To break the analogy, 
perhaps, the actions of later characters are not to throw new light on those with which the audience 
are already familiar.  
In the context of this structural design, Brandom cannot help himself to a practical 
phenomenon that seems essential to what assertion is: that we articulate (or try to articulate) how 
things are. I think we can profitably illuminate this point by reflecting on how assertions are 
actually individuated. We should not individuate assertions to be whatever have the grammatical 
form of a declarative sentence or a sentence in the indicative mood. As we saw in the last two 
chapters, not every apparent description is a description, even falsely, “of the facts”. For instance, 
analytic propositions, in particular, are normative, and normative propositions are not intelligibly 
conceived as true or false of the facts; they prescribe and do not describe. “The chess king moves 
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one square at a time”, when used as a rule, does not (indeed, could not) describe a fact. But real 
assertions—i.e., sentences actually used to describe (in a number of different ways), in spite of 
grammatical form—are distinctive precisely because they are attempts to articulate how things are 
(or could be, or were, and so on). And that is, in practice, how we individuate them from other 
linguistic manoeuvres. 
If, as I believe it to be, the foregoing thought is cogent, then Brandom is not even entitled to 
the notion of assertion in his Act One list of characters. For Brandom construes that notion to 
have no direct relation to the practice of describing how things are. This point is damning, because, 
as McDowell shows, it has two devastating consequences. First, Brandom himself is committed to 
the mutual dependence of inference and assertion: “Asserting cannot be understood apart from 
inferring. [And] . . . [i]nferring cannot be understood apart from asserting” (Brandom 1994, 158). 
Brandom’s rationale for these claims is likely quite right. For example, to take each other as making 
genuine claims, we must presume each other to be able to show an understanding of those claims 
by telling us both their consequences and the circumstances which entitle us to them. But that is 
not all that the meaningfulness of assertions is bound up with; it is also the case that assertions 
describe how things are. So, granted that it is true that neither assertion nor inference can be 
understood independently of the other, when Brandom is not entitled to the notion of assertion, 
he is likewise not entitled to the notion of inference. Rather, as McDowell puts it, what was 
formerly called an assertion is simply a “move”, and what was formerly presumed to be an 
inference is simply a “transition”, in the deontic scorekeeping model (McDowell 2005, 128). Such 
is the risk of analysing one set of a vocabulary in terms of another: they may be inextricably related. 
The other devastating consequence leads us nicely into the next subsection. If Brandom is not 
entitled to the concept of assertion, because the basic kind of move it is in the deontic scorekeeping 
model is not one which articulates how things are, then the model—the game of giving and asking 
for reasons—has no essential bearing to reality. This is not to say that people could not, really, 
play the game; it is only to say that prospective players would be making moves and transitions in 
a way that is self-contained. It is true that Brandom allows noninferential circumstances of 
application (perceptual in nature) and practical consequences (actions) to be legitimate transitions. 
But given how the notion of assertion, because representational, is actually inapplicable to the 
game, this does not change much: “nothing in the description of the deontic structure ensures that 
these pointers outside the game have anything to do with the sort of meaningfulness that would 
reveal the practice as linguistic” (McDowell 2005, 127).  
Let us expand on McDowell’s point with an example. Suppose a red ball crosses my line of 




nearby scorekeeper wants to check I really understand it. So she asks me what else the ball must 
be, given that it is red. I respond, satisfactorily, with the claim “The ball is coloured”. (For 
simplicity’s sake, let us not consider also the exit from language conceived in terms of practical 
consequence.) According to the discursive scorekeeping model, this is a successful discursive 
interaction. It is the manifestation of conceptual capacities, which are exploited in inferential terms, 
even though the circumstance due to which I applied the concept was noninferential. McDowell 
is saying that this game completely fails to show that I actually was rationally entitled to the claim 
that the ball is red. Because, as Brandom sets this practice up, the circumstance of application has 
no meaningful relation to my utterance. After all, the move I make is not to be construed as one 
which is an articulation of how things are. So what ensures that I actually was entitled to this claim 
in the first place, and that it was indeed about the world around me? 
 
§4.2 Observation reports 
According to Brandom, even empirical conceptual content, the kind possessed by the concept 
“red”, is articulated by the game of giving and asking for reasons. This is what we saw in the 
example above. For Brandom, although our responses to environmental stimuli—such as “That’s 
red”—are in the paradigmatic case noninferentially prompted, he does not think that by being 
reliably so prompted they are thereby conceptually contentful claims. Instead, Brandom seeks to 
amend a reliabilist take on justification by specifying that observers reliably making reports are also 
participants in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Reliabilism in epistemology refers to the 
way in which the justification condition of traditional tripartite accounts of knowledge (where 
knowledge is equal to a justified true belief) is conceived, by affecting the way a true belief is 
formed: namely, by a reliable process. Brandom is unsatisfied with this, however, since what he 
calls “reliable differential responsive dispositions” do not suffice for knowledge (1994, 212). 
Rather, an utterance produced by such a disposition could only be a claim to know such-and-such 
if it were, first, a claim at all. And as we saw in the last subsection, an assertion is, for Brandom, 
inextricably bound up with inferential commitments. Accordingly, Brandom argues that an 
utterance such as “That’s red”, brought about by a reliable differential responsive disposition, is 
only contentful by dint of its possibly figuring here as premises and now as conclusions, in 




practices. Meeting both criteria, however, “That’s red” is a bit of knowledge. Or so Brandom 
contends.124 
As a model of perceptual knowledge, this fails to be intelligible. It is undermined by Brandom’s 
reductivist commitment, and also therefore by what that entails about his notion of an assertion. 
Brandom introduces the inferentialist requirement on knowledge—that observers must be 
participants in a social deontic scorekeeping practice—in order to separate parrots and 
thermometers from humans as discursive beings (1994, 214). The problem here is that he has not 
managed to account for this discursive nature; McDowell’s criticisms run deep. We could put the 
point like so: for Brandom, it is as if humans qua discursive are game-playing parrots. But that fails 
to take adequate account of the dimension of practice which includes responding to reasons given 
by the environment.125 The subject who exclaims “That’s red” is not recognisably making a rational 
move until we can understand that she encounters the fact that it (say, a ball) is red. Another way 
of saying that the subject must respond to reasons as such in her experience (as discussed in §2), 
is to say that the subject must encounter the fact, as the reason it is, in experience. In these terms, 
let us pose Brandom a question: Who is ever able to encounter such a fact in experience?  
This is something of a trick question, given that Brandom does not have an account of 
experience according to which it represents how things are. After all, he does not deem the notion 
of experience as integral to the social deontic scorekeeping practice which he takes to exhaust the 
nature of discursive practice. (So at best the role of experience can be an afterthought.) Indeed, 
Brandom regards McDowell’s emphasis on experiential content, in particular, as unmotivated, 
given that the rational constraint to our free thinking so sought after in Mind and World can, he 
argues, be played by (Brandom’s version of) reliabilism.126 Nevertheless, Brandom signals 
agreement with McDowell on an important point: that perceptual experiences must possess 
rational credentials (Brandom 1995, 248). And that is a requirement Brandom thinks he can meet: 
                                                 
124 Brandom’s account of observational reports is derived, he maintains, from Sellars (1956). See Brandom 
(1994, 214–17, 2002). This is another source of deep disagreement with McDowell, who reads this 
interpretation as “perverse” (McDowell 2010, 130). McDowell’s own account is based partly on how he 
thinks Sellars ought to be read. 
125 I do think it is important to conceive rational responses to the environment as within the practical 
dimension; perhaps this is just another way of saying, in McDowell’s terms, that conceptual capacities are 
operative in experience (after a certain training). Nevertheless, putting it this way coheres with the platitude 
that semantics must answer to pragmatics. The thought here is simply that Brandom’s conception of 
practice is both too reductive and too inflexible to show how, in fact, semantics and pragmatics are 
interdependent. 




taking it that the fact that the reporter is noninferentially disposed (in the right sort of 
circumstances) to acquire a belief with a given content provides a good reason for 
acquiring a belief with that content oneself (a reason the attributor of reliability could cite 
in justifying his own belief, even if the one whose belief it is could not). That reliability 
(in specified circumstances) as a reporter is likelihood of truth (in those circumstances) 
of reports ensures that the connection envisaged by reliabilists between reported facts 
and reports of them is not merely causal, but also rational. (Brandom 1995, 251–52)  
We can bring Rose back to help explain this passage. Brandom’s thinking here is that even though 
Rose, as a reporter, may not be aware that she is reliable when she says “That’s red”, a scorekeeper 
(an attributor) can be in a position to so tell. If the attributor can tell that Rose is reliable, it turns 
out, he thinks, that she does have a good reason (she is reliable at spotting red things). Further, 
her belief thus acquired (“That’s red”) has a content, which though it is noninferentially obtained, 
only counts as a belief in virtue of its ability to feature as a premise and a conclusion of inferences. 
The picture that builds up from this sketch, then, is one according to which Brandom allows 
perceptual experiences rationally to constrain beliefs, which are only beliefs in virtue of the 
inferentially articulated content they express. And, further, Brandom can then say that conceiving 
Rose’s experience itself as that which provides the rational entitlement to her belief is unnecessary, 
since an external process, socially observed, already so entitles her. 
However, there is a glaring hole in Brandom’s account of observational knowledge. The 
reporter, Rose, still does not encounter the fact that an item is red, or the reason as such for her 
belief that an item is red, provided by her experience. It is, so to speak, completely foreign to her. 
The best she can do is come to realise that she is a reliable responder, but she need not do so to 
acquire her belief rationally (on Brandom’s account). So the above-cited agreement between 
Brandom and McDowell is illusory: “My point about perceptual experiences is that they must 
provide rational credentials, not that they must have them” (McDowell 1998, 406). That is, it will 
not do simply to frame experiences as events which, in virtue of their reliably occurring, simply 
are warrants for belief. For one thing, conceiving rationality like this will not soothe the 
transcendental anxiety which first brought about the concern to find a way to reconcile receptivity 
and spontaneity, since the passive component of experience on Brandom’s conception fails to 
show to a subject that things are thus and so. The fact cannot be in view as a fact for her. 
Worse, for Brandom, is that the attributor in his story needs also to be an observer. The 
attributor, qua observer, must observe both that Rose judges that such-and-such, and indeed that 
such-and-such obtains. In light of this, it is completely unclear how the attributor can attribute, 




Brandom thinks that by describing interactions among a multiplicity of individuals, 
who, considered individually, are not intelligibly responsive to anything as reasons for 
their responses, and hence do not intelligibly have anything in view, we can somehow 
make sense of their having in view, after all, one another’s performances, and objective 
items that somehow come into view for them as subject matter for those performances 
and for counterpart performances of their own. I think this smacks of magic. 
(McDowell 1998, 408)  
So we have to come back, eventually, to a subject’s encountering the facts. But by doing so, we 
have to give up the thought that empirical conceptual content can be specified in purely inferential 
terms.  
That is, we acknowledge ultimately that the practice of rationally responding to the environment 
is partly constitutive of the content of such empirical concepts as “red”. It remains true, of course, 
that one should not take a subject to be making a genuine claim about her environment unless she 
can participate in reason-explanation. But there is no fundamental form such explanation must 
take. It is sufficient for a subject to justify taking in that the ball is red because the ball is red. It is 
a very good reason. The reason must not be supposed to be available independent of the ability to 
make relevant inferences with the concept of red, but this is just to insist on McDowell’s original 
view in Mind and World that receptivity (passive experience) and spontaneity (active thought) work 
in concert.  
 
§4.3 Conceptual content 
We arrive at a place, then, where we must notice that empirical conceptual content is not purely 
representationally articulated, as might be suggested by a subscriber to the Given; not purely 
inferentially articulated as is suggested by Brandom; but, at least, both inferentially and 
representationally articulated. It seems to me that we should say that conceptual content is rationally 
articulated, because norms of rationality clearly govern the representational dimension of our 
discursive practice, which if the foregoing is correct cannot be displaced by purely inferential 
norms. If one’s experience shows things to be thus and so, given a certain training, one ought to 
take it that things are thus and so. Brandom eschews such a view because of a commitment to an 
untenable reductivism—one which renders the practices of assertion and inference unrecognisable 
as discursive, and which maintains an implausible semantic thesis. 
There are, presumably, indefinitely many norms which govern what we ought to say, given a 
discursive training. They are indefinite because there is not a settled number of ways to continue 




our awareness, as we see very soon in the last chapter.) They are not only inferential, but they are 
all rational, since to use language is to deploy concepts which take on a distinctive logical shape 
through the way that they are used. Sometimes, normative propositions express the meaning of a 
term; a bachelor is an unmarried man. Other times, they will express proprieties of inference; if 
today is Tuesday, tomorrow is Wednesday. Still other times, they will express the rational 
entitlements which experience of the world provides us with; if the ball is red, “the ball is red” (is 
true). None of these tokens are descriptive, because they are expressions of normative, conceptual, 
analytic truths.  
The conclusion I want to draw from the epistemological discussion, then, is that once we 
acknowledge that experience itself provides a subject with noninferential reasons for belief, then 
we can find a suitable way of reading this remark: Conceptual content is rationally articulated. This 
simply means that to explain what a concept is, we must detail its rational import. A good deal of 
that will involve the inferences into which it enters, but some of it must reflect what it concerns, 
in the world, if it does.  
For example, the concept “red” is not illuminated for all purposes by listing the familiar 
inferential norms, “If something is red, then it isn’t green”, “Red is a colour”, and so on. It is also 
illuminated by pointing to that colour, in a series of samples. Ostensive explanations such as these 
therefore play a grammatical role in our practices. (Perhaps this is unsurprising from a certain view; 
Wittgenstein (1953, §50) already regarded samples themselves as instruments of the language.) And 
that is precisely because such performances are contentful; the person who is learning colours is 
learning that that colour is to be called red. As before, we should always be wary of the reductivist 
impulse. In such circumstances, we should not abstract the practice of ostensive explanations 
above the practices with which it is related, and then construe it as antecedently intelligible of any 
such practices. Instead, when the philosophical worry calls for it, we must recognise the 
background knowledge one must have in order even to recognise pointing gestures, for example. 
Moreover, we must see that an inferential role for “red” is also but not only in view.  
There is, then, only a superficial similarity between the views of Brandom on conceptual 
content and myself. The threat was that by construing grammatical propositions—analytic 
truths—as normative and thereby as partly concept-forming, I might have implied that inferential 
relations constitute conceptual content in a reductive fashion. This is what Brandom does by 
arguing that material proprieties of inference are unexplained explainers in his order of semantic 
explanation. We have seen what is wrong with that reductive way of elaborating conceptual content 
by overviewing McDowell’s critique of Brandom: it leaves out the representational dimension of 




temptation to conceive of empirical content in some uninterpreted way—in the manner of 
content-bearing sense-data, say. Instead, we must, as it were, interpret content; we have to turn 
the Given into the given. That requires us to acknowledge how our mature experience of the world 
is necessarily conceptualised, in the sense that without a background normative training, 
expressible as analytic truth, we cannot experience the world as conceptually graspable, or 






Analyticity and conceptual change 
§1 Norms under question 
The picture I have so far insisted on gives pride of place to normativity as it manifests in practice. 
That is, the norms that partly constitute meaning, or conceptual content, are often implicit practical 
principles which language users develop and adhere to over time. Their usage morphs into slightly 
new forms, of course, and sometimes more novel uses take hold and become normative, or nearly-
normative. Norms are more explicitly brought into discussion when parties need to clarify their 
understanding. Thus, an ability to operate according to a norm is a good first place for estimating 
a speaker’s conceptual grasp in a particular pocket of discourse, in which specific purposes are 
pertinent. Indeed, sometimes we require other speakers—especially in educational contexts—to 
demonstrate openly the degree and nuance of their understanding. As such, norms may perform 
a kind of epistemological role: one cites a norm to support one’s using a word in a particular way. 
Significantly, and with respect mostly to the last chapter, the norms which we cite are not only 
inferential in nature; at times simply pointing to a sample is sufficient to show the requisite level 
of understanding, rather than making inferences.  
As should be clear by this summary, I have found it necessary to relax any insistence that norms 
could “fully” articulate conceptual content. Might this be deemed a weakness in my account; could 
something else supply concepts with the content that expresses them? Well, another option—and 
it is certainly a popular one—is to bring in the causal dimension. One might suggest, in the manner 
of Kripke (1972), that concepts derive their content from links of usage causally related via long 
chains back to grounding baptisms. However, the discussion of the last chapter should make us 
immediately doubtful of the normative contribution that could be made by any causal process in 
this manner described. 
I have said that norms perform a justificatory or epistemological role by being cited in support 
of one’s concept-employment, including ostensive explanations and definitions. It is a broader but 
equally relevant point that only what is conceptual can perform this role. Recall, we saw that for a 
subject to be rationally entitled to her ostensive judgement “This wall is green” she must actually 
encounter that the wall is green in her experience (she must see the wall as green). A speaker seeming 
to make this judgement, without having had relevant training in using representational and colour 
concepts, is not in a position to so encounter the wall as green (by contrast, she can encounter the 




neither can this greenness, of its own, make her speech pattern “This wall is green” rationally 
responsive to her environment. For the only kind of thing which can provide rational credentials 
for a judgement will be, like judgements themselves, conceptual in structure; anything not so 
structured is brute, external to reason, like the stormy wind that topples over a tree. To believe 
otherwise is to subscribe to a form of the ever-mythical Given. 
With a fear of the Given in mind, then, it is prima facie not possible for some causal chain of 
usage to articulate conceptual content—even for empirical concepts which seem to apply directly 
to the world, such as “green”. For there is no mechanism of justificatory support available here; 
one cannot cite distant and questionable baptisms to justify one’s present usage of a term: what 
makes this employment of “bachelor” the correct one, in this pocket of discourse, is (say) the norm 
that a bachelor is an uncommitted male.127 None of this is to downplay causality: doubtless, the 
spread of a term is something that could be charted causally, if one had access to all the 
conversations made and writings ever produced. (Perhaps, in a looser sense of “cause”, 
lexicography just as much traces normative usage as it does the causal links between those usages, 
in etymological and historical terms.128) 
But should we not still worry that my account of conceptual content thus far allows no role for 
causal processes, and, perhaps relatedly, no available way to chart the progress of concepts? More 
generally, what seems to be missing from the account so far is any idea of how “the world” can 
contribute to conceptual content (if not by some crude causal chains). I have indeed been at pains 
to point out that language is intentional—that we do as a matter of course represent the world—
and so even though the world and its contents cannot directly give our words meaning, in the 
manner of the Given, it must play a significant role. A concern is emerging, then, that the pockets 
of discourse I have discussed nonetheless float free of the world—not in the way that Brandom’s 
game does, but simply because the only norms I have welcomed into the fold which concern the 
world are ostensive, grammatical devices, within the “space of concepts”. Even if, as I contend, 
conceptual content is not given by natural elements, do not such elements still contribute to how 
that content arranges itself in the first place? 
Mark Wilson (2006) offers a set of views about language and the world which both conflicts 
and intersects with my own account as just sketched out. His magnum opus is sprawling, wide-
ranging, and ambitious—it cannot be adequately summarised. But for my purposes, a key lesson 
                                                 
127 Causal theories of meaning tend to have trouble with linguistic forms that are not names, in any case, 
such as predicates like “is a bachelor”. 
128 Incidentally, the etymology for “bachelor” remains uncertain, though its usage history is fairly well 




Wilson hopes to impart, and which I need to scrutinise, is that our ability to understand concepts 
is far poorer than most philosophers estimate: “We need to frame, I think, a far more mitigated 
appraisal of our capacities to anticipate our linguistic futures” (Wilson 2006, 11). Wilson is no 
Wittgensteinian, though one may recognise certain affinities (see Wilson’s (2006, xx, 279, 566) own 
account of similarities and differences.) The mantra “Back to the rough ground!” (Wittgenstein 
1953, §107; cf. Wilson 2006, 17) surely applies, as an injunction to focus on the use of terms—
though, in Wilson’s case, the rough ground tends to be applied mathematics and the physics of 
macroscopic phenomena. Indeed, an emphasis on normative use as such is missing; rather, Wilson 
focuses on descriptive practice and the strategies employed by various technicians to overcome 
practical problems (2006, 10), often when existent norms break down.  
Accordingly, two of Wilson’s claims need assessment: that our grasp of concepts is much worse 
than we think it is; and that the norms governing usage do not ultimately have much of a 
constitutive role, unlike how I have advertised, especially for predicates which “wander” away 
from original domains of usage. For an example of this second claim, Wilson examines the concept 
of hardness, and finds that what pushes usage one way rather than another has little to do with 
normativity: 
Whatever “rules” our linguistic peers might have originally taught us in regard to 
“hardness” prove quite beside the point, soon overcome by the impertinent 
particularities of metal, ceramic and plastic. (Wilson 2006, 344) 
The fourth section of this chapter takes up the challenge of responding to this second claim. 
To get a handle on the strategic development of some predicate usage, Wilson employs a largely 
novel vocabulary and imagery, only some of which I will relay here. Typically, the usage of a 
classifying predicate such as “is hard” is mapped onto overlapping “patches”; the predicate may 
sit, in his metaphor, atop these patches, which themselves straddle above the world of properties 
or attributes. Wilson points out that these many patches of “is hard” usage find themselves 
arranged in a messy manner, overlapping at their boundaries in some cases and not others, and in 
fact likely not attaching to the same properties in each employment—without, for all that, being 
especially vague or difficult to apply. Wilson describes this structural image of descriptive practice 
as an “atlas” or “façade”,129 arranged in “patchwork” style. The story Wilson tells of how these 
patchwork structures accrue new patches and are navigated between is rather compelling. Further, 
it is not too dissimilar to what I have gestured at, in much less detail, with my “pockets of 
                                                 




discourse” talk. But, as foregrounded, a prima facie difference is that Wilson finds a much less 
prominent role for normativity in his narrative (Wilson 2006, 343–44). 
Why does Wilson downplay the importance of normativity in discussing conceptual content, 
employment, and behaviour? If Wilson is right to so reduce its significance, then my own picture—
somewhat similar in its contours—is in dire need of reform. Further, I shall have to characterise 
philosophy itself in a quite different manner if conceptual content is not usefully articulated by 
norms but by something else. Fortunately, I believe Wilson’s reasons for limiting the contribution 
of norms to conceptual content derive from a fear of too rigid normativity, from which my own 
picture does not suffer. (There is a structural similarity in this respect, although their projects differ 
greatly, between Wilson and Williamson.) Nonetheless, Wilson’s framework for examining 
concepts gleans insights that I wish to elaborate on for the purposes of this thesis. And so 
overviewing this work presently will be instructive. 
 
§2 Semantic finality and the patchwork structure  
Wilson makes use of so many examples—from disciplines as wide-ranging as applied mathematics, 
mechanics, geography, atlas-making, various industries, folklore, musicology, applied physics, and 
biology—it is hard to settle on just two or three to demonstrate the rough picture. We can best 
bring about what is important by first outlining the commitments of those to whom he objects. 
 Wilson groups together a number of theses under the heading “the classical view [or picture] 
of concepts” (2006, xiii-xiv; 7).130 He takes Russell to be the most “perfect representative” of this 
view (2006, 5), though insists it finds expression in a list of thinkers as diverse as Frege, Carnap, 
Kripke, Nelson Goodman, neo-Kantians, and communitarian kinds of Wittgensteinian, 
sometimes in “neo-classical” form (e.g., see Wilson (2006, 83–84)). Further, the body of views has 
changed in some ways over time, so that not all its theses would be accepted by a good Russellian, 
though the changes seem like natural extensions (2006, 5). Wilson finds this group of views to 
stem from everyday thinking, unhappily titled “ur-philosophy”—vaguely philosophical 
perspectives which do not encounter much pressure in normal environments, but which still 
dictate patterns of thought in headier or more practical matters, where they place in us an undue 
confidence in our conceptual abilities (2006, 17).  
One way in which this overconfidence manifests in philosophical thinking, according to 
Wilson, is in the views of the “ordinary language movement”, which maintains that we 
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learn complex, implicit rules from our linguistic tutors that restrict “concept” and 
“attribute” to finer circuits of proper application. If we would only attend to these rules, 
it is argued, we should be able to prevent language “from going on holiday”131 in the 
manner that leads to errant philosophizing. . . . [S]uch projects rest upon an untenable 
view of language insofar as they demand a foundation in the notion that “our linguistic 
training tells us how to use notions like ‘concept’ properly.” (Wilson 2006, 18–19) 
Notably, Wilson does single out J. L. Austin as a philosopher with whom he shares methodological 
objectives and sympathies. However, it strikes me that perhaps more than any of those sometimes 
portrayed as “ordinary language” philosophers (which is not, to my mind, a healthy portrayal), 
Gilbert Ryle is the one whose methodological tenets most resemble some of Wilson’s key 
approaches. This is something I shall detail further in §4 below. At present, we should note that 
Wilson is here denying that mastery of a concept is something determined by learning rules early 
on in learning a language. Rather, his view is that concepts have an open-ended and surprising 
range of application, which often we discover not by reflecting on the norms governing early 
concept-usage, but rather after implicitly and explicitly adapting our usage to a stubborn, 
unforeseen world. Moreover, it is not just concepts of everyday phenomena which come under 
Wilson’s scrutiny, but also terms of “conceptual evaluation” themselves: “concept”, “grasp”, 
“notion”, “property”, and so on.132 Thus Wilson is arguing that linguistic training fails to instil 
within us failsafe rules for applying evaluative terms too—for knowing what it often amounts to 
in saying, e.g., “Tommy doesn’t quite grasp the concept of motion”. On Wilson’s account, our 
inadequate training thereby skews not only our ability to determine the “right” way to employ a 
given concept, but also the way to get a measure of correctness concerns themselves. 
This idea that we attain a full grasp of conceptual contents generally when young, as part of 
learning the language, Wilson dubs “semantic finality” (2006, 19). As a core element of the classical 
picture of concepts, he ascribes it not only to ordinary language philosophers, but to other thinkers 
who help themselves to this picture. What leads us to assume semantic finality, he claims, is a 
desire to underwrite basic features of language such as communication and understanding; we 
hope fixed contents can ensure that we relay what we intend, and that our audience can interpret 
us correctly. He finds another motivation in the felt need to explain the creativity of language, our 
ability to state and understand limitless new propositions, in terms of a finite compositional 
structure (Wilson cites Ray Jackendoff convincingly to this effect—2006, 19–20). 
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Although broad strokes, the thesis of semantic finality does strike me as accurately describing 
semantic views shared throughout different periods. One can certainly recognise, for example, the 
motivation to find units that cross a chasm between speakers, allowing us to understand each 
other, in the writings of Locke (Locke 1689, bk.III, ii, §1).133 More exactly, one finds expression of 
something very similar in Russell’s descriptivist treatment of proper names (B. Russell 1956, 243), 
and a common way of reading the senses attached to proper names in Frege (1892). Moreover, 
according to semantic finality as set out by Wilson, while conceptual content may be slightly 
tinkered with, ultimately any new learnings are not absorbed into the content proper, and rather 
remain external to core conceptual content. This certainly resembles how the analytic-synthetic 
divide is often described, where core content (“All bachelors are unmarried”) is analytic and 
externally learnt matters (“Some bachelors are miserable”) are synthetic. As we saw in the first 
chapter, the notion of analyticity is itself pertinent to many branches of historical and some 
contemporary philosophy; as such, semantic finality may be a fair generalisation of a theme that 
has run throughout analytic philosophy in recent times at least.  
Indeed, that semantic finality and common interpretations of analyticity are similar should 
prompt us to anticipate how the picture of normativity defended in my thesis will not fall prey to 
concerns about semantic finality. What is so wrong about semantic finality, anyway, according to 
Wilson? Simply put, he contends it is an inaccurate account of conceptual content: 
As we continue to work with our words past our hypothetical date of finalized capacity, 
virtually every term of macroscopic evaluation becomes subject to subsequent shaping 
pressures for which our training has left us unprepared. In compensation, subtle 
correctives and barriers creep into our language, often quite unnoticed, with the net 
effect of turning our classificatory concepts in quite different directions than we 
originally pictured. (Wilson 2006, 20–21) 
That is, according to Wilson, concepts used to classify items of experience—say, in respect of their 
hardness or colour—are “shaped” in the course of their usage by pressures that we may not even 
recognise. And so, to insist that conceptual content is, so to speak, settled in advance is to sell 
short the capacity of our terms to evolve. Worse, he thinks, is how obstructive to learning more 
about the world this view can be. For he claims that some significant advances in, inter alia, applied 
mathematics, gear-wheel mechanics, and classical physics would not be possible were thinkers to 
cleave too strongly to the content of concepts as they had been taught them. 
                                                 




An example will serve to make clear exactly why semantic finality, according to Wilson, cannot 
hold for all our concepts. Fairy tales often feature rainbows which display the qualities of some 
physical arch, as though they were scalable and locatable. As Wilson notes, we might even consider 
it criterial for the notion “rainbow” that a young child be able to understand arch-like employments 
of “rainbow” (2006, 21). Growing up, however, we find this picture false and the stuff of fantasy; 
instead, we learn that the rainbow is a product of raindrops irradiated in a certain manner, and 
usage which portrays rainbows as continuing to exhibit the form of material arches we will classify 
as errant. 
There are two points to make about this example. The first is that whatever linguistic 
competence was instilled within us when young with respect to the concept of a rainbow, plainly 
it did not inform how the predicate’s application should change, perhaps like a seedling to a tree. 
The predicate’s changes rather become necessary when we “accommodate” to “real world 
contours” (2006, 23). The basic message here is that semantic finality does not hold for the 
apparently pedestrian concept, “rainbow”. And Wilson urges us to imagine the consequences of 
misconstruing the contents of other, more important concepts, such as “force” and “hardness”, 
because of a foolhardy commitment to semantic finality: “our buildings fall down and our knife 
blades dull at inopportune moments if we augur their conceptual contents wrongly” (2006, 22). 
The second point, though later picked up somewhat via the metaphor of “latent DNA” (2006, 
459), is something which Wilson could emphasise more (I discuss this thought in greater detail in 
§3.2). Namely, we do not scrap the sorts of test we put before the child; within certain 
circumstances the concept remains properly employed in “arch”-like manner.134 On Wilson’s part, 
he highlights here the purpose of concept-evaluative vocabulary such as “concept” and “attribute”: 
by means of them we can “monitor and correct our usage”, and so our notion of conceptual grasp 
itself “must display considerable sensitivity to the maturational level of the speakers we attempt to 
evaluate” (Wilson 2006, 23). That is, we need not conclude that a 7-year-old misunderstands the 
concept of a rainbow just because she responds to a rainbow’s apparent arch-like features.  
What Wilson hopes to come through in this example is how our normative classificatory 
practices ultimately play second fiddle to Nature with a big “N”. Indeed, Wilson exhibits a trend 
to describe predicates and concepts by use of metaphors depicting action without human 
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Nonetheless, I think it is an important one. Wilson’s metaphor is intended to capture how old 
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Wilson could, if so inclined, make this point without recognising the enduring propriety of those old 
directivities, much as one could recognise the influence of some Roman law on contemporary common 




intention: they get “pulled” onto different patches of usage (2006, 257), and thus “drag” properties 
(2006, 175); they are “shaped” by external pressures (2006, 135); they evolve (2006, 8), have careers 
(2006, 23), and so forth. The picture Wilson slowly paints is one in which predicate usage conforms 
to the obstacles which “Nature” stubbornly presents; we conform to its ways, often adeptly and 
unawares. Sometimes he does speak of our cooperation with Nature (2006, 235–36), but this is 
not by means of conforming to the rules which we think govern the use of the concept. Indeed, 
he argues we simply cannot be confident that some stock of conceptual content remains firm and 
directs or prescribes future usage, for there always remain “untested domains of application” 
(2006, 22). 
Take “rainbow” again. Even knowing that a rainbow is formed from irradiated raindrops, one 
might have thought it impossible or nonsensical for a rainbow to “lie on its side” (2006, 22). Yet, 
as we find out, this becomes a well-known phenomenon in certain conditions (2006, 434–35), 
which thus cannot be ruled out in advance by some invariant conceptual content. Wilson offers a 
more striking example of untested application domains: the colour of rubies on Pluto. Being cold 
and poorly lit, it is plausible, he contends, that conditions on Pluto alter the crystal array of rubies. 
And since rubies’ hues “depend sensitively on scattered color impurities in their matrix”, Wilson 
thinks it possible that a Plutonian ruby could possess a quite green hue—as revealed in a time 
exposure photograph (so that humans could view it despite Pluto’s low light levels) (2006, 231–
32). 
Were this “green ruby” scenario to obtain in conditions such as Pluto’s, it is unknown how we 
would adapt. Wilson points to existent prima facie inconsistencies: that we allow a heated 
corundum135 to classify no longer as a ruby by virtue of a wrong temperature change, yet we also 
allow that a ruby is red even at night with the lights off. Seemingly, then, the “directivities” (2006, 
15) or guiding normative standards that we follow change as we skip over into different patches. 
(Wilson’s (2006, 95) term “directivity” is used “as a non-technical means for capturing the loose 
bundle of considerations that we might reasonably cite, at various moments in a predicate’s career, 
in deciding how the term should be rightly applied.”) Accordingly, from Wilson’s perspective, we 
cannot even ensure that our linguistic training for “red” or “ruby” equips us with a core conceptual 
content, able to classify any item it meets. Rather, “we will have merely assembled preparation 
adequate only to a narrow, local slice of the universe” (2006, 232). To assume otherwise is to betray 
“tropospheric complacence” (2006, 55): to believe that conditions of application remain relevantly 
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similar come what may, such that we will always have an easy understanding of what something’s 
being red or icy will amount to in any environment. (Incidentally, Charles Travis (2008a, 14) says 
that criticism of such a view is “a basic point of Wittgenstein’s methodology”.) 
 So much is what Wilson hopes to have shown from the above thus far: that the classical picture 
of concepts, sprung as it is from everyday thinking, inclines us toward some complacency; we 
assume that the circumstances in which we employ concepts remain the same as we go on, and we 
assume that the normative standards to which we adhere in so employing concepts remain 
perfectly adequate. Yet he points out that both of these assumptions turn out to be ill-founded 
when we look at actual cases, and so the classical view, at least in respect of its semantic finality 
thesis, needs to be overturned. However, he does not recommend inverting it totally; indeed, he 
thinks postmodernism emerged as a too extreme repudiation of certain classical themes (2006, 3), 
and thinks softer though still misguided rebellions are at the heart of Quine’s holism and aspects 
of Wittgenstein136 (for instance, the emphasis on rules and practices as they pertain to meaning). 
In that respect, then, Wilson regards classical thinking about concepts as on the right track, albeit 
too stiffly: 
Forced to choose between exaggerated mistrust and blind acceptance of every passing 
claim of conceptual authority (even those issuing from transparent charlatans), we 
should plainly select gullibility as the wiser course, for the naïve explorer who trusts her 
somewhat inadequate map generally fares better than the doubter who accepts nothing. 
(Wilson 2006, 3) 
I sympathise with Wilson’s outlook here. He is unwilling to withhold trust, completely, in 
conceptual “authority”—i.e., authority over the proper, normative application of concepts. And 
this resembles my own response to Williamson. Recall §4.2 of Chapter 3, in which I held that one 
cannot say, on a whim, as per Wittgenstein’s example, “bububu” and simply mean “If it’s not 
raining outside, I shall go for a walk”, because language is not totally free; although its norms 
spread diffusely, grow branches, and change, it remains a normative system. (One might say that 
the freedom characteristic of language is a freedom conditioned by limitations, in this case 
normative ones; in which case, “total freedom” of language is no freedom at all.) Similarly, in 
Wilson’s narrative, by submitting wholly to mistrust when it comes to matters of conceptual 
authority, we would be depriving language of something essential to it: we “would render daily life 
patently unworkable” (2006, 3). Indeed, a central point I make against Williamson in Chapter 3 is, 
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in Wilson’s terms, that he provides no tools with which speakers could evaluate for 
misunderstanding of concepts, and yet we plainly do have such tools and implement them well 
enough. 
Set against this backdrop, then, it is difficult to locate precisely the point of disagreement 
between Wilson’s picture and my own. He wants both to commend our ability to resolve matters 
of conceptual misunderstanding and to resist overstating that competence. So much I can agree 
with. Yet a consequence he wants to extract here, among others, is that governing linguistic rules 
and such do not primarily contribute to conceptual content. Moreover, on his view, we do well to 
ignore these rules to bring about successful descriptive practice. That is, on Wilson’s view, rules 
we learn for the application of concepts in key cases must be overturned; we must forge ahead, 
norms be damned, in order to describe correctly the objective world. 
I think Wilson is simply wrong on these latter points: language is, on my picture, irreducibly 
normative, and the methods used for conceptual evaluation in our linguistic practices by and large 
indicate that norms do underwrite conceptual content. The challenge, then, is to reinstall 
normativity’s seat at the linguistic table, yet to do so in a way which respects the ability of 
technicians to change the way they apply key concepts in their investigations, in response to 
worldly prompts. Wilson’s reaction to one of his favoured examples is especially useful for taking 
on this challenge. 
 
§3 Weighty concerns 
Consider predicates such as “weighs x pounds”, “is weightless”, and so on. On Earth, students 
learn to distinguish the notion of weight from mass, since they pick out different properties: mass 
is a measurement of matter comprising an object, whereas weight is the impression that mass 
makes as it is pulled by a gravitational force.137 Accordingly, students learn that to apply “weighs x 
pounds” to a person or object, the measurement is relative to the exerted gravitational force upon 
that person’s or object’s mass: what Alfred weighs on Earth (180 pounds, say) is not what he 
weighs on the moon (30 pounds, say), given the moon’s much weaker gravitational field. 
Moreover, Alfred’s lightness on the moon is reflected in the other salient directivities or norms 
which speakers implicitly follow. For example, we learn that if something is heavy it is harder to 
lift (or carry) than something lighter; that it will hurt more if dropped on one’s toe; and so on. 
                                                 
137 This is how Wilson presents the discussion (2006, 328), although it seems to be incomplete. According 
to Einstein, mass is the aggregation of energy (potential, kinetic, thermal, etc.), not matter. See Markus 
Pössel (2010) for more on Einstein’s view of mass and energy, and Einstein (1916) for an accessible 




Likewise, when Alfred is on the moon, he is easier to lift than on the Earth, and he would register 
30lbs on a suitable scale. Finally, when we see astronauts in space stations, slowly floating around, 
we judge them to be weightless; they can easily carry heavy machinery which on Earth weighs 
several times their earthly weight, and they would register 0lbs on a scale. 
Accordingly, we have norms by which to ascertain something’s being heavy or light and what 
follows from such judgements; further, we learn the norm that to apply the concept of weight 
properly, we must distinguish it from an object’s mass and calculate weight according to the 
gravitational field in which the object resides. So far, seemingly so consistent. The problem Wilson 
poses crops up, he says, when we think about Alfred’s different weight assignments collectively 
and sequentially over points in a larger expanse of space. We can tabulate Alfred’s weights onto a 
single chart, jotting down his weight at separate locations: as he rockets out of Earth, past its 
atmosphere, through space, towards the moon, and finally lands on the moon. Say he weighs 30lbs 
on the moon; working backwards, at some point, just where the gravitational pull of the moon 
and the Earth cancel each other out (one of the so-called Lagrangian points), the exerted force 
upon his mass will mean his weight is 0lbs. But as he continues to travel back towards the Earth, 
he starts to pick up in weight, relative to the increased force exerted upon him. At some point, 
about 250 miles from the Earth’s surface, Alfred will bump into his space station colleagues. There, 
we have previously been willing to accept he and others are weightless, but in so doing, we have 
not stayed firm to an earlier principle: that an object’s weight is a function of the gravitational force 
exerted on its mass. 
For, in the orbiting space station, the gravitational force exerted on Alfred is 88.8 percent of 
what it is on the Earth (NASA 2015). Accordingly, he should weigh around 160lbs. Here, we 
encounter something Wilson calls “multi-valuedness” (2006, 329). Inspired by the way applied 
mathematicians describe the behaviour of analytic functions (2006, 316–17), Wilson applies the 
term to a wide range of non-mathematical predicates.138 Crudely, the idea is that, in following 
distinct standards for applying some predicate, we end up jointly endorsing—and seemingly 
without error—competing, contrary values or claims: in our case, that Alfred weighs both 0lbs and 
160lbs when at the orbiting space station. Wilson’s explanation for this multi-valued phenomenon 
is that we have tacitly allowed ourselves to be directed by different salient features of the scenarios 
we describe, such that we actually end up aligning the predicate “weighs x pounds” with different 
properties: 
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In the face of so much apparent classificatory reward and so little discouragement, we 
remain well satisfied with our “weighs zero pounds” judgments. Thus the powerful 
inferential and classificatory directivities of our folk physics reasoning standards silently 
shape our space station employment of “weight” in a parochially adjusted manner, 
despite the fact that the predicate is thereby dragged away [. . .] from its erstwhile 
attachment to [the property] impressed gravitational force. (Wilson 2006, 330)139 
That is, the normative standards we incline to stay true to, in coming to the “zero pounds” 
judgement, are those which we apply in terrestrial contexts, or “patches” covering a terrestrial 
domain, in Wilson’s terms. And in jumping between most patches for “weight”, Wilson suggests, 
we have no problem remaining consistent with the principle for deriving an object’s weight, which 
connects “weight” to the property impressed gravitational force. Yet on one kind of jump between 
patches of usage, we are somehow tricked into applying “weighs x pounds” to a different property: 
“work required to move x relative to local frame” (2006, 330). 
Now, Wilson’s account of what happens here is not as crude as it might seem. He is not saying, 
for example, that the weight predicate is simply applied wrongly whenever we describe astronauts 
on the station as weightless. Rather, he argues that we do have rules for extending the application 
from the territorial patch of usage covering the Earth to the patch covering the station. By Wilson’s 
lights, such “prolongation rules” are successful and do not create problems considered on their 
own. Likewise, we have equally useful rules for prolonging the predicate’s usage across the domain 
of space stretching from the Earth to the moon. According to Wilson, however, we simply lack a 
prolongation rule connecting the patch covering the whole stretch of Earth-moon space with the 
patch covering the orbiting space station (2006, 330–31).  
Thus, Wilson represents the structure of usage as a series of patches connected by boundary 
rules to help us switch between patches. Sometimes these patchwork structures or atlases just 
exhibit, he thinks, multi-valuedness, and it is folly to try and “flatten” them out into more uniform 
usage—Wilson maintains that the best we can do, and indeed tend to do, is pay attention to the 
boundaries of these patches and work out where there are rules to prolong the usage, and where 
such moves are blocked. The weight example, however, is one for which he contends there is a 
plausible technique to so “flatten” out these different usages—and it is this I find most 
contentious: “we simply need to stick ‘apparent’ in front of ‘weightless’ every time we employ the 
phrase within a space station context” (2006, 382). To my mind, this is not as effective a trick as it 
would need to be to create some uniform application for the predicate; examining just why 
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demonstrates that Wilson stops short of the more radical consequences of his thesis, which he 
ought nonetheless to endorse. Moreover, as I show, there is good reason to do so. 
Preceding my argument to show that we cannot reasonably hope to “flatten” the predicate 
usage of “weight”, it is noteworthy that there is a technical explanation why one should sometimes 
refrain from calling space shuttle astronauts “weightless”—at least given a Newtonian picture of 
physics, and specifically gravity. The International Space Station (ISS) is actually travelling at 
approximately 17,500mph in its orbit around the Earth (NASA 2015). We can describe the ISS as 
maintaining this orbital speed in order to balance the gravitational pull against the centrifugal force 
thus generated by its horizontal motion. In doing so, the station is, so to speak, “falling around the 
Earth”—it is in gravitational free fall, much as one would be if airborne in a fast elevator moving 
downward from a great height, or (allowing for air resistance) on certain similar fairground rides. 
When in free fall, one has the sensation of weightlessness—of what would be experienced at a 
Lagrangian point between the Earth’s and the Moon’s respective gravitational fields, say, where 
Alfred’s weight is zero pounds. We can see, then, why it is tempting (on a Newtonian picture) to 
say that Alfred is only seemingly weightless when orbiting the Earth. But this fails to do justice to 
two other normative considerations: our application of “weight” given, first, Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity, and, second, other everyday normative standards which contribute to the 
content of “weightless” (and, indeed, to that of “seemingly” or “apparent”).  
 
§3.1 Einstein 
Let us consider the first point. Wilson’s discussion of the weight scenario clearly takes Newtonian 
cues; he does not spell out how “weight” might change in application once we take Einstein’s work 
on relativity fully into account. Einstein’s reading of the 
example, in lay terms, may be along the following lines. 
We must reorient our conception of gravity, first and 
foremost. To see how, consider Einstein’s notion of 
spacetime—he imagined that space and time, conjointly the 
“fabric” of the universe, are not dimensions which we can 
dissect apart. Having made this move, he then showed that 
what we incline to see as the gravitational pull of bodies 
could actually be the straight paths bodies take along the 
“curvature” of spacetime. Finally, given the curvature of spacetime and the paths of gravitating 
bodies along it, he was able to propose that gravity is not really a force at all, but simply a feature 
of spacetime geometry. Let us unpack these details. 




It will help to look, by comparison, at a Newtonian way of representing gravitational orbits. 
Look at Fig. 1; it shows the orbit of the Moon around the Earth on a 2D spacetime diagram: 
keeping the Earth’s position fixed, as time passes, the 
Moon’s position (simplified to one spatial dimension for 
ease of presentation), curls around that of the Earth. 
According to Newton, if the Earth were not present, then 
the Moon would carry on in an inertial (i.e., uniform) path 
as in Fig. 2, or else be at rest. Newton thus conceives a 
force—gravity—as what makes the Moon orbit 
around the Earth when in its proximity, thereby 
pulling it back from its inertial path.  
But while this is an accurate model for most orbits, ultimately it proved weaker in predictive 
power than the model Einstein proposed. Einstein managed to confirm, instead, that spacetime is 
itself curved. This means that the orbiting path in Fig. 1 is already inertial, travelling in a uniform, 
straight manner; it somewhat resembles the line drawn in Fig. 2, then, because it takes this (nearly) 
straight path. The straightest possible line, or shortest possible path, is what is known as a 
“geodesic”, which is analogous to an exactly straight line in 2D plane geometry, i.e., the shortest 
distance between two points. But as applied to 3D geometry—e.g., as on the surface of a sphere—
the straightest line between two points will fall along a curve (just as it is on Earth); it will be the 
“shortest curve” between two points. However, in 4D or spacetime geometry, the shortest curve 
between two points is one that curves along both space and time. Unsurprisingly, we cannot easily 
conceive what this looks like except by relying, somewhat illegitimately, on the spherical model 
and bracketing the curving of time. But suffice it to say, most significantly, that any free-falling 
particles or bodies—i.e., those acted on by no forces except for gravity (which is not quite a force 
anyhow)—are properly described as taking spacetime geodesics (the shortest curves along 
spacetime). 
Taking this into account, an early worry presents itself for Wilson’s attempt to flatten out the 
“weight” predicate onto a patch covering just the property impressed gravitational force. For according 
to Einstein, gravity is not a force to begin with! In my example, the Earth’s mass is intimately co-
operating with the local fabric of the universe—i.e., reciprocally and simultaneously, the Earth’s 
mass curves the surrounding spacetime and the spacetime “moulds” the mass. And so Alfred on 
the ISS, free-falling around the Earth, is travelling as straight as possible along the spacetime 
curved by the Earth’s mass. This means that Alfred is not, as per Newton, only following the 
spherical curvature of the Earth by horizontally travelling fast enough to offset its gravitational 




pull. Rather, he is simply following the spacetime geodesic which matches the curvature around 
the Earth. Therefore, Alfred is not forced away from the straight path he would have travelled in 
the absence of the Earth; he is exactly carrying on in the straightest possible line given the Earth’s 
gravitational distortions. 
One way to express what happens here is to say that although Alfred is accelerating around the 
Earth, he may as well be at rest in outer space. This is a rough statement of Einstein’s equivalence 
principle, which has a direct consequence for how we think of weight. First, we have to understand 
so-called frames of reference. By Einstein’s theory of special relativity, an astronaut in a space 
shuttle, with measuring instruments and a clock, freely floating in space (far from any significant 
bodies), is in an “inertial” frame of reference.140 To qualify as being in such a frame of reference, 
the observer—an inertial observer—must be moving at a constant velocity (speed in a direction) 
or be completely at rest. Two such observers may see each other go past their spaceships; without 
anything else in the frame, both will see the other as moving past herself. But the moment one 
observer accelerates, she stops being in an inertial frame of reference. Instead, she becomes an 
accelerated or non-inertial observer. When he offered his special theory, Einstein held these two 
kinds of frame distinct. However, when he tried to adapt special relativity to account for 
gravitational forces, he was forced to conclude something strange. Namely, he postulated that an 
accelerated frame of reference is in effect no different than an inertial frame of reference so long 
as the acceleration matches the apparent force of gravity on the inertial frame. 
Let us get a picture of this point via an example, by means of which we can see the relevance 
to the notion of weight. The pull of gravity is measured in Gs; the Earth’s pull of bodies towards 
its surface is stipulated to count as 1G (~9.8m/s2). If an astronaut in a windowless box is 
accelerating through open space at a rate of 1G, in any direction, her feet will be planted to the 
floor of the box, and she will experience the same feeling of “weight” in her limbs as she does on 
the surface of the Earth. Likewise, objects will fall to the ground at their usual speed when thrown 
(mutatis mutandis for a lack of terrestrial air resistance). Thus, Einstein asserted an equivalence 
between the rate of acceleration and the “force” of gravity, which may as well be regarded as 
acceleration. This is Einstein’s famous equivalence principle, in layman’s, non-mathematical terms. 
(Interestingly, as DiSalle notes (2016, §2.6), the principle was in part anticipated by Newton 
himself.) 
There is here a slight complication with this equivalence: bodies do not take parallel trajectories 
(relative to each other) falling through space toward a body’s mass (neither do they on the surface 
                                                 




of the Earth, but the effect is so minute we could not detect it). Rather, the bodies are falling in a 
non-uniform manner; further, the bottom of a body (relative to the Earth) is also falling at a very 
slightly faster rate than the relative top of the body. Such differences are accounted for under the 
description “tidal forces”. So the equivalence principle implies that an accelerating frame of 
reference in outer space, with an acceleration rate of 1G, is qualitatively the same as the inertial 
frame of reference on the surface of the Earth, excluding tidal effects.  
What does this all mean for weight and weightlessness? Recall that on the Newtonian 
conception of gravity, Alfred on the ISS is still under the force of 88.8% of the Earth’s gravity, 
and so in spite of his seeming weightlessness, he actually weighs 88.8% of his weight on Earth 
(160lbs). That is because, for Newton, the horizontal motion of the aircraft is fighting against the 
Earth’s strong gravitational pull. But on the Einsteinian conception as articulated in his general 
theory of relativity, there is no such gravitational force. Rather, the Earth, which in Einstein’s 
theory is bending the fabric of the universe, is understood to instruct, as it were, the orbiting body 
to take a uniform line along the curvature of spacetime. Given the equivalence principle, Alfred’s 
accelerating frame of reference (his perpetual free fall around the Earth) is qualitatively the same 
as any non-accelerating, inertial frame of reference in outer space, where even Newton would 
concede he is weightless. (The only remaining question here is whether to count the small tidal 
forces as in effect making Alfred have a little weight, in this scenario.) 
So, if Einstein is right (and decades of physics agree with him), Wilson’s worry about “multi-
valued” applications of “weight” may be unnecessary. Perhaps a Newtonian picture tethers 
“weight” to impressed gravitational force, but Einstein argues against seeing gravity as a force at all to 
begin with. Rather, “weight” will tether to a property such as acceleration relative to frame, and it will 
always be such, whether at a Lagrangian point, the moon, the Earth, or the ISS. In my view, in 
fact, given Einstein’s discovery, we do well to think of Alfred in outer space, accelerating inside a 
shuttle at 1G (in any consistent direction), as having weight. Only in the context of Newtonian 
classical mechanics can refusing to describe Alfred as being weighty be worthwhile. Indeed, there 
are ordinary concerns about what it is to have weight which we should adduce in favour of saying 
that Alfred has weight here, and that is the point in the sequel. 
 
§3.2 Everyday directivities 
What the Einstein discussion shows, I think, is the importance of what we earlier remarked upon: 
“latent DNA”. Before, during, and after the Newtonian conception of gravity and physics more 
generally, persons needed ways to refer to objects as taking more effort to lift, move, and carry. 




dealings. Insofar as the concept becomes distinct from others, of course it acquires its own 
inferential directivities: criteria on the basis of which one can and cannot make certain inferences. 
It so happens that in the case of “weight”, those directivities pulled us in a different direction than 
Newtonian physics deems proper. Or at least, Newtonian physics taken strictly. What Wilson 
usefully proposes is a way to understand the concept of weight as taking on groups of divergent 
directivities. According to Wilson, then, it matters on which patch of usage we stand when we 
pronounce whether Alfred is weightless or not. 
That is well and good, but let us not forget that at other times Wilson is keen to show that the 
undulating structures of usage he terms “patchwork” can sometimes be “flattened out”. In the 
case of weight, he contends that we can do so by appending “apparently” to “weightless” to 
account for those patches involving gravitational free fall as in orbit. In this subsection, I offer 
more reasons why this solution is insufficient. In brief, it fails to account for the inferences 
legitimately warranted by the everyday directivities. 
Recall that one learns to make certain inferences to and from a judgement that something is 
heavy (to speak, temporarily, in a Brandomian tone). In a terrestrial context, e.g., if the rocket 
attachment weighs a tonne, Alfred cannot lift it. What happens to these implicit norms when we 
move to new, extra-terrestrial domains? The issue is complicated. If, outside the space shuttle, 
Alfred refuses to lift the rocket attachment and pass to his colleague on the grounds that it “weighs 
a tonne” (or 88.8% of a tonne), we should have good reason to presume he is either joking, sulking, 
or has misunderstood.141 That is, in this domain of application, the impressed gravitational force 
(given a Newtonian picture) on the rocket attachment is not a salient feature of its being weightless: 
rather, the purposes of this task require that astronauts pay attention to other aspects of 
something’s being weightless. In this case, that the object can be lifted and carried with ease. 
Furthermore, the effect of weightlessness produces notable changes to the human body: 
During evolution on Earth, all physiological systems have been optimized for life in 
gravity.142 This particularly is obvious for the vestibular system but also is true for the 
cardiovascular system, the sensorimotor system (which is responsible for movement 
coordination and control), and the system of bones and muscles. In fact, there is almost 
no physiological system in humans that has not been shaped by the specific gravity 
conditions on Earth. As a consequence, lacking this force in space induces several 
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physiological changes that call for complex adaptive processes in the human organism. 
(Kanas and Manzey 2008, 16) 
Accordingly, tests of astronaut health on space stations make a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the effects of weightlessness on the human organism, and to the future health 
of astronauts on space missions. With overriding interests in such effects, one wants to test in 
actual conditions of weightlessness, as best one can, and not apparent weightlessness (much as a 
good baker wants a scale that gives the actual, not the apparent, weight of his ingredients). And so 
it is far from clear that, in this context, the “apparent” is apt or even intelligible, without calling to 
mind directive norms from other contexts of application which are not here salient. Moreover, 
given the Einsteinian interlude, it may be that the everyday directivities of “weight” are not as 
errant even in spacestation contexts as may seem: the equivalence principle sees Alfred on the 
orbiting ISS and Alfred at the Lagrangian point as equally weightless.  
At any rate, Wilson elsewhere sounds liberal enough on these matters. For instance, he is 
perfectly willing to accept that there are other patchwork structures, such as that provided for the 
usage of “hardness”, which inevitably exhibit multi-valuedness and yet could never usefully be 
flattened out in the way hoped for “weightlessness” (indeed, there have been failed attempts to do 
so for “hardness”, as he discusses). Wilson later speaks of predicates that only appear to be 
“purpose independent” (2006, 455), but which actually are dependent, such as “hardness”, “red”, 
and (surprisingly) “sounds a low C tone”. Purpose-dependence is a useful notion, somewhat 
already covered by talk on my end about context-dependence (recall my Chapter 3 discussion of 
the astronomer testing Mars’s material for wetness; that it very much depends on his purposes as 
to what is correct to say). Likewise, in Wilson’s terms, my point is twofold: (a) the content of 
“weighs x pounds” is purpose- and context-dependent (should those prove to be different 
qualities), and, (b), the content of most, if not all, terms is likewise sensitive to purpose and context. 
The above discussion presses the case for (a): there are distinct Einsteinian, Newtonian, and 
everyday norms which license different applications of the “weight” predicate. The next claim, 
however, is prima facie radical, and it is not one which Wilson endorses. Thus, my argument for 
(b) in the next section will fully bring out the locus of disagreement between Wilson and me, 









§4 Word/world alignment 
In his opening chapter, Wilson flags up a difference between the sorts of predicates he is interested 
in and those entertained by “comparable literature of recent vintage”, such as “dog” and 
“doorknob” (2006, 12). He has in mind a philosopher such as Fodor:  
I’m interested in such questions as: “What is the structure of the concept DOG?” . . . 
And my answer will be that, on the evidence available, it’s reasonable to suppose that 
such mental representations have no structure; it’s reasonable to suppose that they are 
atoms. (Fodor 1998, 22) 
Views such as this are commonly paired with a thesis about content—say, the significance of the 
concept “dog” is exhausted by the attribute to which it refers (dogs), such that any satellite claims 
about dogs are external to the core conceptual content of “dog” (e.g., Wilson 2006, 60–61). What 
Wilson opposes here is not this view of conceptual content simpliciter, just its generalisation to every 
predicate. And so by focusing on predicates of this apparently simple variety, other literature, he 
claims, tacitly assumes that all concepts behave in the same way. Wilson will have no truck with 
that assumption: for him, predicative employments of “dog” and “hard” are importantly different. 
Any attempt to construe “hard”, “red”, or “rainbow” on the model of “dog” will likely have 
bought into the idea of semantic finality as earlier discussed.  
Nonetheless, Wilson suggests that many concepts work in the way that he thinks “dog” does, 
where “predicate” simply aligns with worldly attribute (or “P”/ for short). This is a point I cannot 
endorse. In the last section, we saw how it was not possible to flatten out the usage of “weighs x 
pounds” so that, across different patches of usage, it always aligns neatly with the same property. 
The problem was that there were simply too many normative concerns to separate out. In my 
view, such normative complexities—relative to purpose and context—are thoroughly pervasive, 
and they affect even the apparently simpler kind of predicate, such as “is a dog”.  
Now, to be clear, Wilson does not embrace the view of concepts he would find in Fodor—
quite to the contrary, he insists it cannot adequately capture a number of more interesting concepts 
which experience “seasonal shifts” in their directivities (2006, 26); for those concepts, correct 
usage on different patches is guided by “the press of salient circumstance” local to those patches 
(2006, 43), not held firm by some invariant referential content (as he thinks “dog” probably is). 
The vocabulary subject to such seasonal variation is, in Wilson’s view, normally that upon which 
we place great evaluative demands in some venture. For example, various industries apply “is hard” 
according to different standards, because they are tasked with producing a range of hard materials 




place greater evaluative demands on “dog”, such that its content would best be articulated not by 
a single attribute in the world to which it refers but by describing a patchwork of context- and 
purpose-sensitive usage. His main point here is simply that, in fact, we place relatively few demands 
on the large majority of descriptive or classificatory terms, such that appeal to “P”/ alignment 
adequately articulates their conceptual content. As such, Wilson is recommending a softer kind of 
classicism about concepts; for him, semantic finality is true, up to a point, but it cannot be the 
whole story: 
my own position is quite clear: circumstances where a group of predicates sit in simple 
‘‘is a dog’’/being a dog relationships to the world are rather common, a fact that generally, 
but not always, represents a desirable semantic situation (almost certainly the predicate 
‘‘is a dog’’ itself falls within this happy state). (Wilson 2006, 382) 
Against this backdrop, I want to show that the application of deceptively simple concepts proves 
equally to be subject to the seasonal variation Wilson flags up for more demanding concepts. In 
other words, even the content of simple classificatory concepts is not exhausted by referential 
relationships with worldly attributes, and is more similar to concepts such as “hardness” than 
Wilson notices. We turn now to the work of Gilbert Ryle to make this case. 
 
§4.1 Ryle’s systematic ambiguity 
Ryle distinguishes the ambiguity of so-called pun-words (such as “bank”) from a more 
“systematic” variety (Ryle 1945, 215–17). He points out that we can easily resolve confusion 
stemming from pun-words by paraphrase or translation, and that the different significances of, 
say, “bank” qua financial institution and “bank” qua riverside land are normally made plain by the 
context of utterance.143 On the other hand, systematic ambiguity, according to Ryle, is more 
pervasive and less visible than pun-word ambiguity:  
there is another sort of elasticity of signification which characterizes the use not of a 
few but of most or of all expressions and which is such that the paraphrases and 
translations of an expression with a certain elasticity of significance will normally have 
a precisely similar elasticity. (Ryle 1945, 215) 
When Ryle says that paraphrases and translations of expressions carry with them the same 
elasticities as those with which the expressions begun, he is pointing to the internal character of 
                                                 





those abstracted expressions.144 In other words, propositions and concepts are at least partly 
individuated by the common elasticities of significance they exhibit. In Ryle’s terms, that is due to 
their “logical powers”: 
[Any proposition] follows from some [others] as a consequence and it implies others. 
It is incompatible with some and merely compatible with others. It is evidence 
strengthening or weakening the probability of ulterior hypotheses. Further, for any 
logical powers possessed by a given proposition it is always possible to find or invent 
an indefinite range of other propositions which can be classed with it as having 
analogous logical powers or, as it is commonly put, as being of the same logical form. 
(Ryle 1945, 207) 
To get a handle on Ryle’s talk of logical powers, note its resemblance here to how Brandom 
discusses the inferential articulations of conceptual content.145 Both philosophers would agree, for 
example, that a proposition such as “Amy is recuperating” presupposes “Amy has been ill”; 
further, both would take it that such a relation is underwritten by conceptual content. In 
Brandom’s case, he will state that the content of the concept “illness”, say, warrants this transition, 
and in turn that its content is supported at base by implicit “material” proprieties in practice. I am 
unsure whether Ryle would offer quite such a reductive account. In any case, Ryle is still happy to 
identify concepts with the families of propositions involving them, indefinitely many in number, 
employed in daily linguistic transactions (1945, 209). 
Now, Ryle claims that all or most of our expressions undergo systematic ambiguity;146 further, 
as discussed, expressions are systematically ambiguous because they exhibit unique sets of logical 
powers. These logical powers interrelate with those of other expressions, and carry over to 
paraphrases and translations of those expressions. Another way in which expressions exhibit this 
systematic kind of ambiguity, according to Ryle, is that they are employed in sentences with subtly 
different but related connotations: “The various ideas expressed by an expression in its different 
uses are intimately connected with each other” (1945, 215). To use Ryle’s example, we say distinct 
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outputs contents; in these terms, “I” has a non-fixed content: its content varies with the context of 
utterance. See Kaplan (1979, 83) for more details. 
145 Perhaps this is not surprising: Brandom’s most salient inspiration is Sellars, in whose work approving 
references to Ryle are not uncommon. 
146 Kremer (2016) remarks that Ryle’s term, borrowed from Susan Stebbing and possibly Russell, is 
unfortunate. He opts for “polysemy” as opposed to the pun-word “homonymy”. I do think “ambiguity” is 
misleading insofar as it implies different senses, which seem far too coarse to indicate the much subtler 




but related things when we describe a man on a particular occasion as punctual compared to 
describing his arrival itself as punctual, or a whole class of people as such—the different 
employments of “punctual” within these several propositions “are in one way or another different 
inflections of the same root” (1945, 216–17).  
Admittedly, this example is not especially revealing, but luckily in Chapter 3 we surveyed Ryle’s 
early discussion of the different uses of “about”, which demonstrates well the same kind of 
systematic ambiguity (Ryle 1933). In response to Williamson’s attempt to discern what 
“aboutness” might amount to, we canvassed different ways to apply “about”: for example, to the 
nominative subject of a sentence, to the object of a sentence, or to some topic in a conversation. 
But beyond these general pointers from Ryle, I showed how in conversation what sentences are 
about is heavily influenced by the salient concerns and purposes embedded in a context. In 
consequence, there are subtly different but connected uses of “about”, but they do not carve out 
definitively different senses of “about”, if the notion of a sense here might imply quite separate uses. 
Rather, as Ryle would later come to describe such linguistic phenomena, these different 
employments of “about” are inflections of the same root; they are systematically ambiguous. 
In effect, then, Ryle’s conception of systematic ambiguity invites us to reflect on the contextual 
application of expressions and, thereby, to notice the nuanced though systematic differences they 
enjoy. This is fully characteristic of how Ryle sought to analyse mental-conduct expressions such 
as “believes”, “perceives”, “thinks”, “knows how”, and “knows that” (see, e.g., Ryle 1949; on 
knowledge specifically, see Kremer 2016, 6). Additionally, his explicit examples include “exists” 
and the aforementioned “punctual”. Julia Tanney has argued that “red” undergoes the same sort 
of elasticity, along with “reason”, “intention”, “understanding”, and specific forms of expression 
such as “acting for a reason” (2013, 340ff).147 Further, my own treatment of “bachelor” and 
“metre-stick” in previous chapters exhibits similar elasticities of significance. If right, Ryle and 
Tanney are pointing to a pervasive normativity which seeps through our language: the content of 
a concept is sensitive to what is counted as falling under that concept in the given circumstances—
where circumstances, in turn, are strongly shaped by salient purposes. 
 
§4.2 Two complaints 
As such, the Rylean picture of conceptual content bears many affinities to Wilson’s patchwork 
structure. However, despite some technical nuances, the glaring difference is in the absence of 
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normativity in Wilson’s picture, in two respects. First, his purpose- and context-sensitive treatment 
of conceptual content does not extend to all or most concepts; it is more common, he maintains, 
for concepts to function in an unproblematic “P”/ alignment manner (2006, 381–382; see also 
60–61 on the “capacity-independence” of ‘dog’). Second, even for those wandering concepts 
which Wilson treats as being supported by a patchwork structure, the role that norms play in 
contributing toward their content is considerably muted. For instance, as quoted much earlier, 
Wilson argues that whatever norms we learn as part of learning “is hard”, physical obstacles 
encountered in working with materials are what actually push us far beyond linguistic rules.  
With respect to the first complaint, I think we have reason enough to regard the content of 
such concepts as “dog” as still elastic. For scenarios are forthcoming in which “dog” is not properly 
applicable to the “attribute” with which it supposedly aligns even in the presence of, say, a member 
of the Canis familiaris species. That is, the predicate “is a dog” will not contribute to the content of 
all propositions in a uniform manner; it, too, is systematically ambiguous in Ryle’s sense. For 
example, imagine that Superintendent Sharon, who controls the dog unit in the police station, has 
a pet poodle named Poppy. For whatever reason, Sharon must bring Poppy to work on one busy 
day. On that day, Sharon has had to send out all the dogs in her unit for cases before noon. 
Constable Bob, at noon, urgently needs a dog to accompany him on his own case. Bob impatiently 
says to Sharon, “I need a dog.” But the Superintendent shoots down his request: “All the dogs are 
out, Constable.” Bob grumbles, absent-mindedly looking at Poppy, and walks away.  
How best to evaluate the truth of what Sharon says, in this context? Plausibly, she has not said 
anything false, and Bob indeed took her at her word. One might suggest that Sharon spoke 
elliptically for “police dog”, and that Bob likewise understood this. Yet we are not compelled to 
read the scenario this way, for in this context, Bob needed a dog for a particular purpose: he needed 
a creature capable of performing certain tasks, for the likes of which poor Poppy has received no 
training. Poppy, so to speak, is not even in view for Bob or Sharon: what it is to be a dog in this 
circumstance is to be a creature of a particular constitution, ability, and certification. Perhaps here 
some will want to dig in their heels, and insist that Sharon’s usage is nonetheless elliptical; I rather 
suspect that such insistence will be motivated by a felt need to stay firm to a theoretical view about 
what word-meaning must be, and how it must contribute to the truth of sentences. What is notable 
here, however, is that Wilson clearly has no such commitment, and in fact has at his disposal a 
ready explanation for this scenario: the predicate “is a dog” has dragged itself from the property 
member of Canis familiaris, say, to (a more specified) creature of a particular constitution, ability, and 
certification. Accordingly, in Wilson’s terminology, the predicative use of “dog” is likely covered by 




My response to the first complaint helps provide an answer to the second: that norms are only 
involved in a rather limited way for those wandering concepts. Wilson articulates this complaint 
by taking the “ordinary language school” as his foil: 
We agree that a term like ‘‘hardness’’ is governed by a complex schedule of localized 
controls in a manner that allows [metallurgists] to advance apparently contradictory 
claims in a coherent and informative way. But the ordinary language school also 
presumes that such communicative capacities can only be acquired as ‘‘rules’’ imbibed 
in the course of becoming competent in English. I, on the other hand, view the facade 
of hardness as gradually framing itself as an initially unspecialized term adapts itself, in 
a fairly predictable manner, to the individualized aspects of the materials around 
us. (Wilson 2006, 343–44) 
One can see what Wilson is driving at here. From one patch of usage to another, metallurgists may 
make seemingly contradictory statements about the hardness values of a piece of metal—its 
hardness is given by Test A, but in the next moment, they say that Test B reveals its “true” 
hardness, and so on. Their ability to transition smoothly between such multi-valued judgements is 
ensured, Wilson thinks, by the control structures governing “hardness” they implicitly adopt in the 
course of investigation.148 That is, they learn that for some given metal needed for such-and-such 
a purpose, its hardness is best tested by scraping its surface; meanwhile, its hardness for some 
other purpose is better tested by compressing, and so forth. And such strategic operational skill, 
encapsulated in localised controls, is surely not “guided” by linguistic rules. Rather, Wilson 
concludes, such rules are “overcome by the impertinent particularities of metal, ceramic and 
plastic” (2006, 344). 
On the face of it, then, normativity takes second place in determining the conceptual content 
of “hardness”, for linguistic rules can prove inadequate when predicates wander into regions with 
more exacting and novel demands, as commonly found in materials science. However, to my ears, 
Wilson’s localised controls are normative through-and-through. True, one may not articulate the 
recommendations of hardness-testing so explicitly as rules, even in learning them through practice. 
But one will still be adapting usage to normative concerns—what counts as hardness in this context 
differs from that context—and one can articulate them as rules to guide others if need be. 
Moreover, it seems like the true locus of disagreement between Wilson and his (imagined) 
ordinary language critic concerns the driver of normative change, as it were. As we see in the next 
section, Wilson describes linguistic evolution in terms of an interfacial compromise between our 
                                                 





linguistic abilities or tools and the physical traits themselves (the particularities of metal, say). 
Wilson imagines the ordinary language proponent arguing that our ability to adapt seemingly 
contradictory usage to specific domains is down to the “ ‘rules’ imbibed in the course of becoming 
competent in English” (2006, 344). I am unsure who holds exactly that kind of view; as far as I am 
concerned, this is a simplistic and unhelpful picture of the normativity of language.  
Indeed, surely what needs emphasising here in addition to Wilson’s interfacial talk, as a prompt 
for normative change, are two more points. First, that the conceptual content of our classificatory 
terms is partly determined by purposes relative to conceptual context. For what purpose do we 
want a given piece of metal to be hard (as armour, penetration, load-bearing, and so on)? I contend 
that it is only with respect to those purposes that it makes sense to determine the content of “hard” 
in a given context. (This point will play out significantly in the next section, too.) The second point 
is that Wilson’s suggested localised control systems, the patchwork facades we operate with, 
constitute a form of practical know-how. If that is true, as I argue more plainly in §5, then in a 
sense one’s adaptation of “hard” to new investigative purpose, given the response of physical traits, 
is of course conceptual and normative. 
Finally, consider Sharon and Bob again. How are they able to apply and respond to “dog” in 
the manner described in my scenario? Imagine that after walking away from Sharon, Bob utters to 
a colleague, “I can’t stand Sharon’s dog—silly looking thing.” Bob can say this and yet still be 
committed to the claim earlier heard, that there are no dogs in the station. Prima facie it seems like 
he is again entertaining a contradiction, but this is an especially uncharitable view of Bob. Rather, 
it seems to me that he has picked up on the salient and implicit norms of the different scenarios: 
in the first, what counts as a dog is not what counts as a dog in the second, given different concerns 
and purposes.149 Wilson himself comes close to such an account when he explains how we can 
handle multi-valuedness in a patchwork structure; recall that for “weighs x pounds” there are so-
called prolongation rules which we follow when jumping from a patch covering a terrestrial 
domain to a space-shuttle domain, such that we are not genuinely contradicting ourselves when 
saying that Alfred weighs 0lbs and 160lbs. Accordingly, given his appeals to what seem to me 
clearly normative concerns, it is hard to see how Wilson’s attempt to demote the normative in his 
picture of conceptual content could succeed.  
Perhaps a large part of the problem here is that Wilson presumes any fairly robust appeal to 
normativity, in explaining the content of a concept, must be of a semantic finality stripe. That is, 
Wilson only seems to think one says “The proper use of concept ‘C’ is…” when one has in mind 
                                                 




a precisely delimited usage, such as a norm taught as part of learning the language. But Wilson’s 
own picture is much more forgiving, and it can be read in normative terms too. It may be that 
purposive empirical investigation into some subject prompts us to change course in how we apply 
a concept, yet still that change is expressible against a backdrop of prior normative employments, 
and itself has normative potential. Accordingly, there is no escaping the fact that conceptual 
content is normative. 
 
§5 The looming veil 
In the previous sections, we sought to reject some of Wilson’s offerings. We could not accept that 
Wilson’s pointing to interactions between control structures and physical traits fully gets a concern 
with “rules” out the picture. Nonetheless, there is still much to keep: a picture more detailed than 
any offered elsewhere of specifically empirical predicate usage; a more connected picture thus 
drawn of different usages, strung together as patches (and no longer so disparate, as were, 
seemingly, my “pockets” of Chapter 3). So much, it seems, we can retain while arguing substantive 
points against Wilson on the score of normativity. However, a new tension surfaces when taking 
into account an enduring strain of Wilson’s argument.  
Throughout Wandering Significance, Wilson recurrently recommends a diet low in certain Kantian 
(especially neo-Kantian) insight. He is keen to warn against a particular neo-Kantian thought 
concerning objectivity: 
In rough terms, the general claim [to be avoided] is that our naïve conception of 
‘‘objective’’ concepts as correspondent to real world attributes is incoherent; that every 
viable concept must inherently involve the constructive agencies of our own minds in 
some irrevocable way. (Wilson 2006, 77) 
On the face of it, this sounds like an accurate depiction of Kant’s view. Recall, in Chapter 1, our 
discussion of Kant’s thought that objects conform to reason. For Kant, our a priori intuitions of 
space and time, being the forms of perception, do not originate from perception itself but from 
us. Further, via the faculty of understanding, we employ a priori concepts (categories150) to 
synthesise what sensibility throws our way, a manifold of representations. Thus, by Kant’s 
reckoning, the subject plays an active role in organising what it is that she experiences. This is 
Kant’s so-called Copernican turn: to argue that the objects of knowledge and experience (setting 
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aside the supersensible) are not external to our understanding, but rather are “objects-for-us”. So 
if “real” in Wilson’s “real world attributes” is supposed to describe objects which have not 
conformed to reason—presumably, things-in-themselves—then, indeed, Wilson’s implicit 
correspondence claim would fall foul of Kant. The good Kantian line by contrast is that our 
concepts of objects are objectively valid151 (and, I imagine, “correspondent”) so long as we do not 
understand “the world” to comprise things-in-themselves, a region in principle alien to the faculty 
of understanding.  
Now, the reader may have noticed that throughout this thesis there is a strong Kantian bent; I 
am sympathetic to Kant’s attacks on traditional empiricism, which may well carry over to the 
contemporary naturalism of which Williamson is a fair representative.152 Moreover, Sellars’s fears 
of the Given, and McDowell’s attempted solution to the problem posed by it (both of which I 
endorse), are much less compelling if one does not take seriously the view of Kant just discussed. 
Thus, if Wilson is right to warn the reader away from this basic Kantian insight, it spells trouble. 
 
§5.1 Kantian tension 
Wilson’s resistance to neo-Kantian views finds its clearest expression in his warning not to 
succumb to the “veil of predication” (Wilson 2006, 390–401). The veil is described loosely by 
Wilson; indeed, it is hard to get a clear view in our sights of exactly the phenomenon he targets. 
Worse, he accuses wide-ranging philosophical positions and philosophers as having succumbed to 
it: Fregean views of sense, especially “mode of presentation” talk (2006, 303, 396); Russell’s claim 
that we know universals only through description (2006, 394); Quine and other pragmatists in 
certain of their holistic moods (2006, 261, 279), as well as Kuhn (2006, 82); of course, neo-Kantian 
work, Heideggerian views, communitarian readings of Wittgenstein, and Sellars too (2006, 83–84); 
finally, and most explicitly, Nelson Goodman (2006, 397–98).  
According to Wilson, just as traditional empiricists found the world behind their postulated 
sense-data essentially unreachable (behind a “veil of perception”), so too do those who fumble 
under the veil of predication (2006, 81), although this time the world is hidden behind concepts, 
not sense-data. The motivation for such a view, apparently, is an overzealous rejection of 
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by “object”. See Pereboom (2014, §1.2-1.3) 
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word/world (or “P”/) correlation, in which (as we have recently discussed) a worldly property, 
universal, or sense-datum is thought to underpin the conceptual content of a term, much as the 
property Canis familiaris supposedly supports “dog”. Those keen to avoid a simplistic correlation 
picture—whom Wilson dubs “anti-correlationists”—are inspired by Kant to maintain that “every 
viable concept must inherently involve the constructive agencies of our own minds in some 
irrevocable way” (2006, 77). The anti-correlationist thought, as I take it, is that any given 
conceptual content cannot entirely consist of that to which it refers; the predicates “is a dog” and 
“is round” do not latch onto real-world dogs or round things (or sets of round things) and thereby 
attain their content. Rather, human subjectivity plays some intervening role in forming these 
conceptions. There can be many glosses on such a view; many different rationales for the general 
claim. But among the worst, thinks Wilson, are those which postulate as equally available to us 
several incompatible theories describing the world, each of which on its own can be said to 
describe the world correctly (2006, 81). 
Indeed, Wilson’s greatest fear with respect to anti-correlationist talk is that it prevents us from 
appreciating the objectivity of our language—its “patterns of genuine correlation” (2006, 80), both 
simple word/world correlation and more complex patchwork types. The veil of predication, he 
claims, “bars us from ever determining whether the concepts we employ genuinely match the true 
traits of the world or not” (2006, 82). A more mature picture, by Wilson’s reckoning, acknowledges 
the human contribution to linguistic evolution, but not at the expense of objectivity: e.g., we learn 
to navigate patchwork facades with special techniques in order not to assert multi-valued claims, 
and in so doing we employ our idiosyncrasies while retaining objective information about the 
world (2006, 400). Accordingly, Wilson’s alternative picture stresses that “interfacial factors” shape 
our linguistic usage in unnoticed ways: our linguistic or “representational tools” adapt to “physical 
circumstance” (2006, 288). It is at this interface between our capacities and the world that 
patchwork facades form and allow classificatory conceptual content to correlate with physical 
traits. Wilson’s worry about the veil of predication, then, is that it seemingly forbids by fiat any 
kind of conceptual correlation with the world. Thus, 
philosophical sermons to the effect that it is inherently incoherent to segregate the 
subjectively based aspects of linguistic shaping from their more objective counterparts 
do not represent music to my ears. (Wilson 2006, 83) 
One such sermon to which Wilson takes exception is Goodman’s: 
If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell me how it is under one or more frames of 




say? We are confined to ways of describing whatever is described. Our universe, so to 
speak, consists of these ways rather than of a world or of worlds. (Goodman 1978, 2–
3) 
Wilson finds it problematic that Goodman thinks we cannot rightly point to one “world” or 
worldview as the correct one, and thus to ratify some set of objective facts. I do not wish to enter 
this specific debate—not least because the idea of a plurality of worlds is prima facie technical and 
confusing—but it strikes me that we ought to offer some “sermon” to the effect that the meaning 
of even our classificatory language is everywhere infused with our practical, normative, conceptual 
schemes. Indeed, I think that is the lesson to have extracted from the McDowell of Mind and World, 
who, strongly influenced as he is by (Strawson’s) Kant (McDowell 1994, viii), seemingly makes an 
apt target for Wilson.  
 
§5.2 The Given 
To remind, McDowell is struck by an epistemological problem which should give us pause: what 
provides our empirical beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the world) with rational support? Are they justified 
by “the world itself”, or maybe by some parts of that world? In the sense of “to justify” in which 
I say “Judge so-and-so’s decision is justified by Article x and cases y and z”,153 what justifies my 
belief that there is a tree in front of me, for example? There is an easy temptation to say here, 
simply, “the tree”—after all, were there no tree, my claim should not be true. But this is not the 
sense of justification to which we just appealed. When I say that there is a tree in front of me, I 
am using language to describe how things are. If I am asked “Why?” in response to my description, 
I am put in a position to offer a reason; I must show my specifically rational entitlement to the 
belief. For example, think of how the fact that a tree is before me itself provides reason to believe 
further claims, such as that I am not in a sealed basement, or that what lies before me is an 
organism. Accordingly, there are rational relationships between claims here, and I am required to 
traverse these pathways to offer a reason for my empirical claim. 
The problem with the answer “the tree” or “the tree itself” is that this part of the world as such 
offers nothing in the form of a reason itself. The tree is rationally mute, as it were. The presence 
of the tree is essential in this case for the accuracy of the belief, but the tree is not that to which 
the belief is answerable. In order for a listener to be satisfied that a speaker understands her words, 
she oftentimes will need the speaker to offer reasons for his claims; in this sense of “reason”, the 
                                                 





tree itself is not a reason. Not in the way that “because there is a tree right in front of me” is such 
a suitable reason; this latter response shows a rational entitlement. In short, anything which lacks 
this conceptual togetherness, as it were, is not the right category of thing to provide a reason for 
a belief. And anything which purports to provide such a reason for belief while being non-
conceptual is thus a form of the Given. 
One temptation in response to this failure of the Given is to forgo any attempt to make the 
world answerable to our beliefs. In the vein of McDowell’s Davidson, one might cite the world’s 
causal powers as providing at least some external constraint. Yet, as McDowell argues, this ignores 
a key insight: that we, in the world, are normally rationally entitled to our beliefs about how things 
are, and a cause is as rationally inert as the Given itself (or as the tree itself in my example). 
As we are by now familiar with, McDowell’s solution to the problem of how to undergird our 
beliefs is to show that our experience of the world is in a sense conceptual: it is imbued with 
conceptual capacities. One could not, for example, discern a tree as a tree without possessing a 
concept of a tree. And so, the world we experience is one which is already conceptually articulated; 
we are at any given moment able to perceive and describe it adequately only in virtue of our 
conceptual abilities. This means that even in our passive perception of the world, what we see is 
already conceptualised. In McDowell’s terminology, those conceptual capacities are always 
operative, even if not being exercised or actualised; accordingly, for McDowell, the content of 
perceptual experience itself is always in a sense conceptual. Further, if one is to classify, in one’s 
experience, an object as “red”, “large”, “bright”, and so on, one is bringing to bear conceptual 
capacities that one must be able to actualise outside this classificatory experience:  
Quite generally, the capacities that are drawn on in experience are recognizable as 
conceptual only against the background of the fact that someone who has them is 
responsive to rational relations, which link the contents of judgements of experience 
with other judgeable contents. (McDowell 1994, 11–12) 
Now, McDowell’s account of perceptual experience sounds to my ear prima facie similar to the 
views which bother Wilson. For Wilson thinks much of our language correlates with objective 
traits in the world, either in simple “P”/ fashion or via patchwork facades (or other, more 
complex structures), and yet McDowell’s solution to the problem of the Given is to say that our 
experience of the world is always in some sense mediated by concepts. Perhaps, however, 
“mediated” is tendentious, for the world’s “deliverances” are, in McDowell’s view, conceptually 
structured. Indeed, this last thought helps untangle the present knot. 
The relevant question to ask here is thus the following: does McDowell’s account of perceptual 




such an idealism that my own discussion of conceptual truth and normativity could find itself in 
significant tension with Wilson’s position.   
 
§5.3 Whose objectivity? 
For McDowell, the objective world is not irretrievably lost in its being conceptual. Yes, when I 
take my experience of a red ball at face value and report “the ball is red”, I am exercising the 
conceptual capacities already implicit in my experience of the ball as red. However, it is a fact of 
the world too, since that the ball is red is a perceptible fact. More generally, that things are thus and so 
is conceptual content but it “is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: it is 
how things are” (McDowell 1994, 26). Not only, indeed, is this a way to save objectivity; as far as 
McDowell is concerned, it is the only way. For the alternative, he argues, is either to postulate the 
Given, which is mythical, or to exculpate our judgements from answerability to the world (1994, 
26–27).  
How does this tally with Wilson’s conception of objectivity; is McDowell redeemed on that 
score? We can only tell that once we have Wilson’s conception of objectivity firmly in mind. For 
Wilson, objectivity is “concerned with the manner in which language finds correlated underpinnings 
within the world before us” (2006, 78–79). Thus, the ball really is red because it exhibits physical 
traits correlated with “red”—the attributes we “encode” in such judgements as “the ball is red”. 
Further, as Wilson shows, “red” is a classificatory predicate which we apply with great strategic 
ingenuity (unlike, as we have seen, he imagines for “dog”), of which we are mostly unaware. For 
example, we tacitly make vital discriminations of texture and incorporate aspects of the 
surrounding environment in even humble judgements of a given object’s colour.154 Having 
followed strategic perceptual procedures home to the patchwork structures of colour, surface, and 
texture predicates, we are well placed to judge that the ball is red. However, Wilson claims that 
this human contribution to the colour report does not hopelessly infuse it or its constituent 
concepts with subjectivity: 
In my story, humanly idiosyncratic factors can shape the personality of a predicate like 
‘‘red’’ greatly without compromising its capacities as a carrier of objective information. 
Quite commonly, the most important considerations behind the formation of complex 
facades have little to do with issues of subjectivity (in the sense of human psychology) 
                                                 





at all, but are determined by the measurement and inferential tools readily available at a 
macroscopic level. (Wilson 2006, 400) 
Wilson’s story here is that our usage of “red” is shaped by a compromise between our capacities 
to infer and measure, on the one hand, and the physical traits that we want to record, investigate, 
and discuss, on the other.  
I presume, in addition, there is a hidden pragmatist element at this interface (Wilson classifies 
himself as a kind of pragmatist, after all), because the practical purpose of using inferring and 
measuring “tools” is always lurking in the background. Indeed, it must be with respect to such 
purposes that “red” can be said to encode objective data; after all, different patches of usage—
different contextual employments—are partly demarcated by difference in point. For example, it 
matters for a different reason why the ball is “red” on a snowy football pitch to when the ball has 
rolled into a patch of tomatoes. Accordingly, here is another element of human idiosyncrasy in 
which our language is enmeshed, while it hardly seems to prevent us from accurately describing 
red items in the world. In fact, not only does purposiveness fail to hinder objective description, it 
is arguably an enabling condition—think back to the purposes I ascribed to the Martian 
astronomer in Chapter 3; without any purposes what significance has his enquiry and his use of 
“dry”?155 
Thus, Wilson rescues his own picture from untenable subjectivism by appealing to what seems 
to me a pragmatist criterion of objectivity. That is, worldly data is objective insofar as it is recorded 
in ways that allow us to infer, predict, explain, understand, investigate, and pursue our exploratory 
endeavours. That criterion is surely compatible with a Kantian conception of objects, according to 
which in order for any “physical traits” to be hypothesised or investigated, we must apply concepts 
to them. More significantly, this conciliatory harmony between the pragmatist and Kantian thought 
should carry over without problem to McDowell’s philosophy.  
Indeed, McDowell’s talk about the background conditions prerequisite for experience of 
colour are compatible with Wilson’s discussion of our strategic employment of colour predicates. 
(Moreover, it seems that McDowell understates how extensive those background conditions are, 
given Wilson’s survey.156) Importantly, McDowell regards these tacit abilities as conceptual; a 
colour-observer is “equipped with such things as the concept of visible surfaces of objects, and 
the concept of suitable conditions for telling what something’s colour is by looking at it” (1994, 
30). And clearly, the kind of concept-possession that McDowell has in mind is more a form of 
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know-how than a form of know-that: one might, upon reflection, be able to articulate guiding 
norms such as “Look at the ball in uncovered daylight to see its colour”, but one may just as easily 
never think such and yet still follow the norm by living in accordance with it, so to speak. Likewise, 
such a tacit, guiding norm is not essentially concept-forming; at least, we would not expect 
someone to articulate the norm as a way of demonstrating their grasp of the concept “red” (say). 
Nonetheless, the practical skill so employed on given occasions would manifest a kind of 
knowledge about colours, objects, surfaces, and so on. It is a small step from here to stating that 
“red’s” guiding directivities (to use Wilson’s terms) are in the same sense conceptual: we follow 
such procedures in order to ascertain, confirm, and pronounce the colours of objects (among other 
purposes). 
At this final juncture, it is possible, I think, to tie neatly together the different strains of thought 
here considered: Kant’s conception of objectivity, McDowell’s conceptual content of experience, 
and Wilson’s pragmatist gloss on objectivity (as I read it).  
Consider Pereboom’s reconstruction of Kant’s Transcendental B-Deduction, in which Kant 
hopes to show, inter alia, how Hume’s associationist psychological theory could not account for 
the representation of objects. Suppose one looks at a house from the front, and then the side, rear, 
and other side. Chronologically, one’s sense-impressions of the front, rear, and sides are sequential, 
yet one experiences these phenomenal parts of the house as simultaneous, not strung together 
from different temporal impressions. Compare that scenario with watching a boat sail down a 
river: one’s sequential sense-impressions convey in this case the boat’s co-ordinate changes as 
temporally successive. A psychological theory which admits of no other source of knowledge than 
sense-impressions struggles to tell these cases apart; Hume would need an experiential criterion of 
simultaneity which seems unavailable for him. In Kant’s case, however, he can appeal to the 
application of the categories Understanding and Necessity. Pereboom represents the import of those 
categories in the following principle: 
(U-N) Necessarily, if empirical conditions are normal, any human experience of the parts of the 
house is an experience of these parts as objectively simultaneous.157 
Presently, it is not important whether there are issues with this specific formulation (for example, 
what its logical and modal aspects amount to). Rather, just notice that (U-N) seems a realistic 
articulation of conceptual know-how; the principle expresses the kind of conceptual capacity 
which lay operative in our experience of the world. That is, (U-N) stands shoulder to shoulder 
both with an expression of the capacities Wilson attributes to employments of “hard” and “red”, 
                                                 




and such of McDowell’s capacities as might be expressed by “Look at the ball in uncovered 
daylight to see its colour”. I contend that all such know-how forms a large part of what one must 
learn in order to participate in normative, linguistic practices. 
Thus, this blend of ideas offers us a small glimpse of how diverse and subtle our conceptual 






This thesis addresses a question of contemporary philosophical relevance: How should we 
characterise the methodology of philosophy?  
A common response, exemplified at the beginning of this thesis by A. J. Ayer (1956), is to say 
that philosophy investigates the meaning of words, though not the words themselves. Ayer 
describes this process as one where we look at an application of words with which we are familiar 
and see how it fares in real or imaginary cases; subsequently, we then question “whether there is 
anything that we should be prepared to count as an exception to the suggested rule [in such cases]” 
(1956, 28). There is a clear sense, then, in which for Ayer philosophy is a conceptual discipline: we 
arrive at truths principally through reasoning with and investigating our concepts in a multitude of 
possible scenarios. That is more a claim about method than it is about subject-matter; for Ayer 
also claims that such enquiry issues ultimately in facts (1956, 29). 
Having worked through Williamson’s critique of what he calls “conceptual” or “linguistic” 
philosophy, we can, surprisingly, see a similarity with Ayer here. Although Williamson argues that 
“few philosophical questions are conceptual questions in any distinctive sense” (2007, 3), one 
reason he thinks this is because he regards any putative conceptual truths as being true in the same 
“sense” as empirical truths. That is, he thinks “Adults are grown-ups” is true in the same, factual 
sense of “true” as “Adults are disillusioned”—the latter, if true, is just less obvious. But, as I have 
shown, things cannot be so (and partly because the idea of conceptual truth is not the idea of a 
different sense of “true”). 
The most critical point of this thesis is that the kind of equivalence which both Ayer and 
Williamson (along with Boghossian) draw is fatally wrong: facts about what is the case and norms 
enjoining how to describe what is the case are logically independent. What now functions as a 
description may subsequently express a norm, but on one and the same occasion of its utterance, 
no sentence can express a rule and describe what is the case. Consequently, just as token uses of 
“Adults are grown-ups” are typically normative (i.e., they license transitions from, say, “Laura is 
an adult” to “Laura is a grown-up”), so are the truths over which philosophy puzzles: “Nothing is 
red and green all over”, “Red is a colour”, “Only I can feel my pain”, “Knowing entails believing”, 
“The mind is not a substance”, “Meaning is use”.  
And if one objects to characterising philosophical propositions as normative because one can 
conceive scenarios in which they are not true, then one has missed the point: what a sentence 
amounts to will be tied to its circumstances, within which, if anything is sayable at all, then there 




sometimes it is perfectly legitimate to say that one knows that p while not believing that p. For 
example, “I don’t believe it happened; I know it did”. The reason this is legitimate is because the 
uses of “believes that” and “knows that” subtly vary in significance, as circumstances and purposes 
change. For instance, sometimes, “A believes that…” expresses a lack of confidence, other times 
acceptance, or a qualified estimate;158 such uses are often incompatible in circumstances where a 
higher degree of assurance is sought. In each case, these uses are legitimated by norms, the kind 
of norms which philosophy expresses as analytic, conceptual truths. Far from undermining 
philosophy’s claim to conceptual investigation, then, such an objection reinforces it. 
At the outset of this thesis, I sought to engage with figures such as Boghossian and Williamson 
by agreeing to a central tenet of both their separate metaphilosophical views: that analytic truth 
and conceptual truth are the same thing. However, I qualified this agreement by insisting there is 
no one concept of analytic truth; instead, there are numerous conceptions. Chapter 1 was 
motivated to show how a criticism of one conception need not of itself present a danger to 
another. Another purpose was to demonstrate the considerable heritage that the analytic-synthetic 
distinction enjoys. To be sure, in light of that ancestry, there is reason to avoid describing what I 
call conceptual truth as analytic truth (Baker and Hacker 2009, 261–62; Hacker 2009, 343) or else 
to regard “analytic” as mostly though not entirely overlapping with “conceptual” (Schroeder 2009, 
102–8). For example, unlike, say, Frege, I am not associating a truth’s being analytic with its being 
arrived at by some process of analysis. Indeed, to my mind, it becomes inevitable that we segregate 
analysis (qua decompositional, transformational, or regressive) from analyticity as soon as we 
recognise the normative function of analytic truths in practice.  
Moreover, that same realisation encourages a way of rethinking, rather than discarding, 
analyticity: since analytic sentences are the ones that express norms, why not defend the analytic-
synthetic distinction afresh as one that distinguishes norms from descriptions? Such a defence, to 
my mind, is especially advantageous in a contemporary setting—analyticity has taken centre stage 
in metaphilosophical discussions, and yet disputants too regularly do not appreciate the role of 
normativity. Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis show just how this lack of appreciation leads to two 
unsettling philosophical outlooks, in the work of Boghossian and Williamson. 
Like myself, McDowell also hints, as we saw in Chapter 4, at the possibility of reworking 
analyticity to good effect. My attempt to do so in this thesis coheres with McDowell’s explanation 
of how we can use our experience of the world to justify what we say about it. In the slogan I 
eventually opt for, this means that analytic truth is a precondition of synthetic truth. We learn a 
                                                 




language by being embedded in normative practices, which we can articulate in the form of analytic 
truths. A handy way of putting the point is to say that our concepts are constituted by a network 
of normative, rational relations; to grasp a concept is then to know one’s way around relevant 
portions of that network.  
It is tempting, but unhelpful, to gloss this point as saying that conceptual content is exhausted 
by the inferential links of such a network. Tempting, because, as Brandom argues, anyone who 
understands a proposition must be able to specify what follows from it, or what entitles them to 
it—someone who asserts “The pitch is green” is committed to, say, “The pitch is coloured”. 
Further, according to Brandom, so long as a person can make these inferences, and so long as she 
can reliably respond to her environment with statements such as “That’s green”, she is to be 
counted as knowing that the pitch is green. McDowell shows us, however, that such a subject is 
fully justified in her claim that the pitch is green when she sees that the pitch is green. True, she needs 
to know which statements follow from which others in order to be credited with having the 
concepts involved in the judgement, but what provides her entitlement to the judgement is the 
conceptually mediated experience itself—not her ability to reel off a list of true inferences. 
Accordingly, having availed ourselves of the idea that analytic truth preconditions synthetic truth, 
modelling perceptual justification on reliable responses to the environment (as Brandom does) is 
an unnecessary and unhelpful step. For if we have had the relevant normative training, we 
encounter the pitch’s being green in experience. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, we consider prima facie objections to my approach posed by Wilson. 
Wilson thinks that as language-speakers we commonly have a poor grasp of our own concepts, 
and this is partly because the norms which govern their application are, he suggests, sometimes a 
step behind Nature itself. Focusing predominantly on concepts from applied physics and 
mathematics, Wilson charts the ways in which predicates “wander” from signifying one property 
in one circumstance to another across the border. This shifting significance is something Wilson 
alleges we frequently do not notice, and which our norms have not yet accounted for. But the 
problem for my thesis is largely illusory; Wilson proves more ally than foe. For what Wilson shows, 
in my view, is not that norms fail to determine conceptual content; to the contrary, he shows that 
in technical disciplines the new methods of description which participants take up are conditioned 
by norms which extend application, or which show how a new application is relatable to an old 
application. For instance, by looking at the metallurgists’ varying uses of “is hard”, Wilson shows 
that the concept of hardness does not—and could not—admit of a uniform “flattening out”, such 




What transpires in this final chapter, then, is that Wilson (somewhat like Williamson) turns 
away from talk of norms because he has in mind a rigid conception of them, where they fail to 
adapt to new circumstances. This view of normativity is representative more of a human slowness 
to articulate the norms they follow than anything like a slowness of norms in themselves. The way 
Wilson illuminates, effectively, a more fine-grained and interesting picture of normativity in 
practice is by use of so-called patchwork structures; these can be used to show how we cope, 
normatively, with shifts in domain and jumps between them. What is curious, however, is that 
Wilson is still wedded to a view on which plenty of predicates do not function in this way, but 
rather pick out properties across domains, in “P”/ fashion. Wilson’s paradigmatic example is 
“dog”, which he sees as tethered to a species property. But, as I show in Chapter 5, even this term 
is still subject to elasticities of significance—and not of a straightforward “pun”-style ambiguity—
according as contexts of employment vary. In each case, this semantic nuance is to be described 
as enabled by normativity, not as some flouting of it. That is, a seemingly errant claim such as 
“There are no dogs here”, when a poodle is plainly in view, can be perfectly true and yet betoken 
no misunderstanding so long as there is a norm which does not count such a creature as a dog in 
the circumstances. In sum, then, Chapter 5 presents us with an opportunity to show how pervasive 
normativity is; in the technical and in the everyday. 
Meanwhile, the overarching lesson of this thesis is that philosophy must take account of 
linguistic norms if it is to dissolve problems or to elucidate phenomena. Accordingly, we have to 
construe philosophy as a conceptual investigation, where this means that philosophy investigates, 
clarifies, untangles, and arranges the norms governing the concepts involved in characteristic 
statements of its problems. We can make this point by saying that philosophy is in the business of 
articulating conceptual truth. But too frequently that claim is assimilated to the thought that 
philosophy is about analytic truth, and analytic truth is disregarded. Let us go straight to the heart 
of the dispute, then, and speak in the terms of the disputants. The statements of philosophy are 
indeed analytic truths, because on closer inspection analytic truths are normative; this explains why 
they are not—for lack of a better phrase—“made true” by the world: they are not in the business 
of describing anything. A failure to recognise as much seriously undermines contemporary debates 
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